Election 2024: Final Preview

Congressional Elections -  Senate:  Those who foresee a difficult year for Democrats' chances to hold onto the majority in the Senate are correct. Not quite impossible but unlikely.  This is true in most Presidential political scenarios.   

As with the Presidential election, there are only a few states where the race should be close, and those are mostly Democratic-held.  West Virginia's seat was already lost before Joe Manchin decided not to run for re-election, and that brings the prospective count to 50-50, before considering the tough, but winnable re-election races.  The other shaky Democratic Senate vote, former Democrat Krysten Sinema's Arizona one, may end up being good news, as Sinema's running third in a three-way race, with Democratic Congressman Ruben Gallego now slightly favored to win it over Trumpist Kari Lake. .

Other holds may be more difficult.  Top of the list is Jon Tester in heavily Republican Montana, though he has successfully defended it in the past and will likely face an extremist. The same challenge, only in a larger, more expensive state, faces Sherrod Brown in Ohio, but he has the same strong record in statewide elections.  Tammy Baldwin has done well in the past in Wisconsin, but the state's electoral balance is narrow--she might be in danger if the Republicans nominate someone even a bit more moderate than their other senator, Ron Johnson.  Michigan's seat is now a toss-up since Debbie Stabenow decided not to run again, and it looks to be a battleground in the Presidential race, once again.  Jacky Rosen needs to defend her seat in Nevada, and that state's votes are always close. 

There are 10 or more seats on each side that seem very secure:  the likes of NY ,CA, WA, and the New England states for the Democrats; and several Midwest and South states for the Republicans.  There are several states in between--clear favorites but not slam-dunk landslides.  I'd include in that set PA, where Bob Casey should run well ahead of the Democratic Presidential nominee; a few Midwest states with strong Republican majorities but have challengers who could surprise (MO, NE, ND); Florida and Texas, which have controversial and unpopular Republican incumbents (Rick Scott and Ted Cruz) but definite Republican leans; and New Mexico and Maine, with reasonably strong Democratic tendencies and popular incumbents. 

I should mention New Jersey's Democratic Senator, Bob Menendez, who is facing a second criminal charge (along with his wife), one that looks devastatingly bad based on large chunks of presumed bribe money found in his house.  One more stress-inducer for Chris Van Hollen, the Democratic Senate campaign head.  He's certainly hoping Menendez will be successfully primaried, but it may not happen that way (dare I suggest Jersey folks have a high tolerance for corruption, especially for people of their party?), which would make the general election very risky.  If he's primaried out, it becomes a likely Democratic hold.

Incumbent Senators running for re-election do tend to win in most general elections, but Presidential landslides or very unpopular administrations can upset this.  We should not exclude that possibility, either that the Democrats hold on to their majority or even grow it if Trump fades, or that a big Republican night takes them to 53-55 seats from their current 49. 

Congressional Elections:  House - Despite the parties' efforts to make the House seats they hold as safe as possible, there are many unknowns about the House of Representatives and who may control it after 2024.   One manifestation of this is the great number of Representatives choosing not to run again, though that does not in itself indicate the winner, as they are numerous from both parties.  The majority of those seats thus opening up are deemed safe within party, but those are the type that could flip if the Presidential race tilts heavily to one side.

Meanwhile, there are a couple dozen that are held by Representatives from the party that was a minority in the last Presidential election (as projected with new Congressional boundaries).  This may prove to be an indicator of seats that will change hands; if so, this favors the Democrats to gain the (two? four? five?) seats they will need to gain on Election Day to gain control of the House. \

Redistricting--in this case, also known as gerrymandering--could play a role in how control of the House plays out, and at this point provides additional uncertainty.  The Supreme Court has given state legislatures somewhat of a free hand in rejiggering Congressional district boundaries for partisan advantage, and they are taking advantage of it, in North Carolina (to favor Republicans) and New York (to favor Democrats).  There are also a couple of states in the deep South where the courts have ruled that district boundaries must be changed to create one or two more majority-nonwhite districts.  The state legislatures are not aligned with that order, so far. As the deadlines approach, these issues will get resolved in the courts (basically, any change result will be challenged by the side perceiving disadvantage); some seats will change hands ultimately as a result, but again, that might net out to little to no advantage to either side vs. 2022. 

Congressional Control:   At this distance of 50,000 feet and 10+ months, the most likely outcome, barring the scenarios where Trump or Biden fades or drops out, is an unusual one, with control of both Houses changing, the Senate to Republicans and the House to Democrats.   

The former is a probability based on the numbers:  the Democrats have many seats at risk, and the Republicans few to none.  The Democrats will likely save many or most of them, but after losing Manchin's seat, they can afford no net loss.  

As for the House, I expect there will be strong turnout in 2024, which will tend to favor Democrats. I expect in particular a gain of five seats or so just from NY and CA.   That would be enough, but if the Democrats repeat the clear Presidential popular vote majority they had in 2020 (7 million votes), gerrymandering won't be enough to stop it, and the margin could be larger than the 222-213 result we saw in the last two Congressional elections.  

State Legislatures/Gubernatorial Races - I won't go too deep, but it's clear these electoral contests are only becoming more important in the general partisan context, particular as it relates to setting rules for Federal elections.  So more money than ever will be spent.  

A few general comments at this point:  Somewhat surprisingly, gubernatorial elections don't necessarily follow the pattern of Federal elections, especially not the Presidential outcomes.  There are plenty of blue state Republican governors, some red state Democratic ones, and swing state governors of both types.  And even independents can win statewide.  Gaps between contested governors' races vs. Presidential ones can be 10-15 percent. So those need to be viewed independently of the Presidential contest, the results of which are almost baked in for most states. 

There will be a serious effort by the Democratic party to try to take control of more state legislatures in 2024. The party's campaign committee created specifically to fund strategic races has low recognition and is chronically underfunded, but this year I think legislative races will get more assistance from above.  This will correct a glaring political strategic error the Democratic party has been committing since Obama's time. 

State races may produce an upstream effect on the Presidential race through special turnout efforts. Major voter registration efforts can make a difference.  Ballot measures are another difference-maker; Democrats will seek to have abortion and/or cannabis initiatives when possible, as those have tended to help them.  Mostly, though, these races turn on local issues like taxes, the local economic conditions and whether the government has been responsive to problems in that area, corruption and other scandals, health care and housing.

Updates/Corrections on the Previous Scenario-Based Posts - Three months have passed since the first one of those.  Apart from that, not so much changed, though I see a couple of things I must correct. 

Trump Collapse Scenario - Still looks quite possible to me.  The main thing we should look at is the "Standard Trump Trial Outcomes":  Trump's team has come up with a couple of delay tactics in the big trial, USA v. Dickhead (DC Court), and those ones may work, if the Supreme Court plays along.  The one about immunity is doomed to fail, while the 14th Amendment case occasioned by Colorado will also fail, but may take longer to decide, as the arguments are complex.  There is also a separate case being reviewed questioning whether the obstruction charge (used against very many Jan. 6 rioters) is valid to use in this case--seems also doubtful.  However, the March 4 trial date Jack Smith really wanted probably will end up back a month or two, but SCOTUS could potentially kill the whole deal. 

Also, I misread the 14th Amendment clause:  it doesn't say what is required to be applied to diqualify; the two-thirds Senate vote is actually what is required to remove the disqualification.  So what is required is very much under discussion, but I still see it only viable after conviction, though I would point out the language relates to serving in the office, not running for it!  So, it could be applied after the election, before the inauguration, if SCOTUS had the courage.  That would make Bush v. Gore a small-time decision.

Biden Weakened -  I would say the new charges against Hunter Biden hurt him but not his electoral chances.  The threat of impeachment doesn't do either; it does support the "do-nothing" argument against the House which Democrats will want to use, whether impeachment actually happens (still no effect; it would be laughed at in the Senate) or doesn't. 

The Crisis Scenario - In foreign affairs, a hell of a lot has happened in the last three months, between October 7 and Israel's response, trouble funding Ukraine's war with Russia, the border crisis driven by large crowds of migrants from all over, turmoil in control of the House and the new outrageous Christian nationalist Speaker holding the office second in succession, and so on.   I really don't see any of them having a significant effect on the Presidential or state races, except possibly some weakening for Democrats in Michigan.  In foreign policy, it would take an actual US war involvement, not a proxy one, and the Israel-Hamas War better be over well before November, or we won't be so friendly with Israel anymore.  Immigration will always be an issue, and it seems to work against Democrats at present, but claims our border has been massively overrun are made only by liars.

The real crisis is more likely to be internal.  It could still be stirred up in a serious way by extremists or foreign plants, too. One example: The 14th Amendment thing could cause major riots if Trump were successfully barred from the ballot in one or more states.

Trump Out - I foresaw the possibility of the Nikki Haley stock rising.  It looks likely to flower in New Hampshire, with a close outcome, but may wither in South Carolina and almost surely will do so on Super Tuesday.  So let's just hope for one of the other personal mishaps for him that I mentioned. 

Biden Out and Both Out (B&T) Out - Nothing has changed.  Biden made a comment which showed that the main reason he's in it is to stop Trump, so if for some reason Trump definitively leaves the race, Biden might do so, if it's feasible, and maybe if it's not.  

Status Quo Election--Part I, the Presidential Race - I don't see much of anything having changed, though that post is considerably more recent.  Polling continues to vibrate in a fairly narrow range nationwide, and there is little evidence either the public or the Biden campaign has engaged.  Subgroup tracking doesn't convince me of much of anything right now.  There is a lot of work to do, huge amounts of money will be spent to do it, and it will move few voters.  But maybe not so many need to be moved.  In this scenario Trump will provide rich and frequent evidence of his perfect lack of qualification, in a variety of venues, and most of it will not stick to him long.  

One correction:  New Hampshire does not have a Senate race in '24.  It will be close, regardless, but that might help the Republicans' chances to win that state slightly, as there will not be a Democratic Senator running for re-election down-ticket.   Again, though, that will only matter in an extremely close Electoral College outcome, essentially meaning a 50-50 split of the six larger swing states (PA, GA, AZ, NC, MI, and WI).

After the Bloodletting

I suspect Biden had a bold proposal to bring to the Middle East, but before he got there, the hospital explosion and the reaction to it  ruined all chances.  I can imagine what it was--something like a revitalized Palestine in the West Bank, with major humanitarian involvement on an international basis for Gaza.  As it was, he wasn't even able to meet with Palestine Authority head Mohammed Abbas.  It would have been great.  I'm sure that Israeli PM Netanyahu (I guess he still is--we'll see soon) made it clear to Biden that it's not time yet.   

It is not too soon, though, for a pause in the attacks for a release of hostages.   The airstrikes are for the targets they know about, and I imagine they will run out of those soon.  As for the ones they don't know about, they will need to occupy Gaza City and go house-to-house.   They will do so, even if the hostages are released.   I'd say a three-day pause would be enough. 

My thinking, when I heard of the hospital explosion and fire, was that, however the initial explosion came, there may have been something (weapons, explosives) underground that had triggered the huge fire that killed so many.   It would be just like Hamas to figure that under a hospital would be the very last place Israel would attack.  Maybe that's just rank speculation, and I don't encourage the thought, but I'm not convinced otherwise. 

Israel is right now not in a position to do anything more than apply its full effort to defeat of Hamas and release of hostages.  Netanyahu had a weak Cabinet before October 7, built around building more Israeli settlements in the West Bank and defeating the criminal case against Netanyahu.  That phase is over; the military technocrats who headed Israel's government before Netanyahu's latest capture of the Knesset have returned and are focused on that single priority.  Netanyahu very much deserves to lose his job, but he can stay for a long time unless his own party deserts him.  (Part of it has deserted in the past, but then Likud maintained its number of seats anyway.  Before October 7.)

We must prevent that the paranoid response takes over in the time after the Hamas War.  I think the security assistance Israel will need will be more of a direct defense and diplomatic support to Israel than through the nascent Israel-Saudi accord Biden was trying to facilitate. US support provides Israel the means to deal with Hamas, and with broken Gaza that they will be breaking once again. 

No doubt Israel knows what Gaza needs--pretty much everything, but with less crowding.  It would make sense to settle some peaceful Gazans in the West Bank alongside Palestinians living there already.  It is important not to create new refugee floods, as happened in Syria when we stayed out.  That's a point Egypt has been making quite clearly. 

Status Quo Ante '24: Part 1

Having reviewed in more depth all the alternative scenarios, we now come back to the one summarizing the current reality, the Null Scenario. Biden and Trump each running to the end of the line, gaining their nominations,  and on to the general election, with neither visibly yielding from roughly a half-share of the electorate in a primarily two-man race.  Trump goes through the brutal process described in the Standard Trump Trial Outcomes, but it's not enough to drive him from the race, or even noticeably change his support level.  So, there we are then--what happens? 

In this post we go over the BFD, the Presidential race; in a subsequent one, Congress and some state and local electoral battles. 

At the strategic level, a national election is about a single, dominant issue that drives the dialogue.  Normally, in a contest between an incumbent and a challenger, it's a barometer, a measure of the satisfaction level (or the pain level, if you prefer) with the performance of the incumbent's administration.  The Republicans would like it to be just that, and have confidence that the approval levels and "right track/wrong track" seen at present will continue to be unfavorable to Biden.  

There is one big difference, though--the challenger is a former President, with therefore a huge record of statements and actions that are not easily forgotten by the electorate. Biden's strategy is to make Trump that dominant issue, and he has the enthusiastic assist from the former President himself.  Repeatedly. 

To put his tone on an elevated level, at least here at the outset, Biden seeks to make the issue of the election the Defense of Democracy.  There are three reasons why that strategy will not take hold as much as it should: 

• One is that half of the people in the US don't even know or care what the nature of our (representative) democracy is; 
• The second is that, of those who do know, many recognize primarily a lack of democratic quality in many of  our processes to elect and govern; and
• The third is that many others of us who do know about our system are sworn opponents of Biden's continued administration (or, as they might put it, "Obama/Biden's continued administration"). 

 I think it's a worthwhile message for this early stage, but a bit confusing. 

I would think that ultimately, the Democratic theme will be something along the lines of  "Is That Really Who We Are?", referring to the man who would be the symbol of our nation to the world and of this era to history, if Donald Trump were, once again, re-elected President.  

As the fictional Cmdr. Scott said on Star Trek, "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." The modern-day admonition to Americans might read: "Fool us once, January 6; fool us twice, WW3". 

About Presidential Debates

I considered leaving this section blank, to indicate my expectation that there will be no general election debates between Biden and Trump, but I suppose I should explain why I think that will be the case. 

Neither Biden or Trump will want a debate before a live, impartial audience.  Trump generally does not like to perform before any audience that isn't stuffed with his fans; Biden might be willing to show, despite appearing so old and all, but not with Trump.  He has no respect for him, and might be concerned he wouldn't be able to keep his temper, or his heartrate, under control.*

There would be strong pressure, then, for some kind of meeting of the two, possibly in studio, or before a handpicked, limited audience.  Maybe better with two adjacent soundproof booths, and studio mikes and earpieces.  Zoom would not be a good idea, frankly, but could be a last resort, if there were a way to do it without granting any advantages.  That would be the sticking point of any kind of debate negotiations, which are likely to happen unless both dismiss the idea from the start.  I think they would both like to taunt the other about it, though. 

If there were just one debate, or two, it would be so superficial, with all the Trump diversions and interruptions that he could manage. There might be some interesting variances in the views of foreign affairs that are interesting but not important in many voters' choices.  And that, and a lot of Trump's whining, would be that. 

Tactics and Forecasting 

Money--First, there will be a lot of it. The spending of one side will drive the spending of the other, both in quantity and directionally.  So, keep that in mind as you contribute (see below).  

There is also a lot at stake, though, and pockets are going to have to be deep.  The electronic deluge of election requests are expanding in depth, frequency, and displacement, even at this early stage. I have a couple of consumer-friendly suggestions for those receiving election advertisements below. 

The so-called Popular Vote--That is what would decide our Presidential election, if we really wanted to have our collective preference decide both our head of state and executive head of government (probably not an altogether good idea).   It's not happening anytime soon--maybe if Texas or Florida flips. 

We tend to think of the Democrats having a built-in edge in the raw national vote total, relative to Electoral College outcomes, due to the "excess votes" in states like New York and California. This perception is what prevents popular vote deciding our election.  It's not really true; if Democrats were to abandon, for example, all serious efforts in Florida (something defensible given the failure to provide credible statewide candidates),for example,  that might throw a million or two  "excess votes" to the Republicans.  Something like that happens in those two large Democratic states, as Republicans run but are not expected to win, and have been outgunned since 2000.  Trump's fortunate 2016 found the cracks in the Democratic Electoral College wall. 

Other Issues for the Campaign: The fact of the Republican House's complete inability to legislate is one that works for partisan Democrats, but it doesn't bother Republican voters much if they are seeking less Federal government.  At this point, Independents don't seem inclined to penalize one party more than the other for this ineffectiveness.  Abortion politics were big in 2022 and largely favored Democrats, but I don't see it working at an overall level; the follow-up condition of  reproductive healthcare by state is all over the place--so its effect will be varied.  Taxes, the deficit and debt level, and defending government benefits, will come up, but they aren't going to be important in moving independents within the current static legislative environment.  The economy could be, if inflation ignites again, or a deep recession develops, but that would be more the Biden Weakened scenario than this one.  

The Big Chunks, and Getting "Granular" 

The starting point to identify the winner in a closely-contested election, Trump vs. Adversary (as in 2016, 2020) is:  Who wins Pennsylvania?  If the Democrats can hold Pennsylvania, they have a clear advantage in the drive to reach 270.   If they can't win, that means that Biden's margins in the cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, along with some edge in their suburbs, are not sufficient to overcome deficits in the rural and small towns in the rest of the state.  That would bode badly for the other swing states, each with its own mix of composite populations. 

Electorally, Pennsylvania is no picnic for the Democrats. It's very close, but more often the Democrats can win Pennsylvania in statewide elections, unlike, say neighboring Ohio, where the Republicans usually win, or New York, where the Democrats always do: Those states are also mixed, like PA, but not so balanced at that broad level.  Pennsylvania will have the re-election of popular Senator Bob Casey in 2024, the state government is headed by a popular governor, Josh Shapiro, and there will be other battles driving turnout there.  Biden has always claimed Pennsylvania roots, from one of those smaller cities (Scranton) that are themselves swing areas within the critical swing state. 

Pennsylvania is so important because it is the largest of the swing states, with 19 Electoral Votes.  Without it, Trump practically has to run the tossup states; with it, he only needs to split them with Biden to get into a photo-finish.  Current polling in PA (from Quinnipiac University's poll) confirms that, this far out, Biden and Trump are in a dead heat, well within the margin of error.  Self-declared independents prefer Trump by almost 10 points, and they are focused on the economy. 

The next most critical states are a threesome, all with long-term demographic trends favoring Democrats.  They are at different stages in their gradual shift over the fulcrum toward the left.  Arizona and Georgia have moved in parallel in Federal elections to elect Democratic Senators and narrowly vote Democratic in the Presidential as well (with contrary state government results), while North Carolina has remained just out of reach (except in 2008), though the state government elections show Democrats can win there. 

Democrats' Electoral College majorities before Arizona and Georgia became winnable depended on consistently winning the North Central states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, generally by very narrow, vulnerable margins.  Michigan and Wisconsin tipped over to the Republicans in 2016; they have tipped back since, margins in the urban and suburban areas overcoming furious right-wing resistance from the states' rural areas.  Michigan should lean Democratic if the economy holds, but Wisconsin's furious struggle for partisan dominance is continuing on a number of fronts, both legal and extralegal.  Minnesota was very close in 2016, but recent elections indicate it now has a decent-sized  Democratic lean. 

The other tossup entities are not decisive in themselves but could make a difference in an extremely close outcome.  Nevada (6 Electoral Votes) is always close but has broken to the Democrats in Presidential elections; it will be a focus also due to an expected close Senate race.  Of New Hampshire (4 EV) we can say the same.  Then there are the two individual EV in Maine and Nebraska that tend to go against the statewide result, and their states uniquely allow Congressional district-level votes.  (I wanted to get New Mexico some attention through legislation following this approach, though I'm not getting any traction.) 

Getting to 270

The 2024 election will be the first with revised Electoral College numbers after the 2020 Census, changing the calculations slightly in the Republicans' direction.  Biden wins if he can get 270 or more Electoral Votes; if not, he will lose--Trump wins in the House of Representatives if no one gets to 270.  That would presumably be  due to some third-party Electoral Votes, something that hasn't happened since 1968.  Democrats start with a good lead among states considered "Safe" due to predictably large margins in the large states of California, New York, and Illinois, while the Safe states for Republican are smaller ones; they do close the gap, though, when one adds to their number their "Likely" big states--Ohio, Florida, and Texas. 

In a closely-contested Biden vs. Trump contest, I would give a slight edge to the Democrats in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire.  This would give Democrats an edge of 259-218 (review that map here), with the following ones seemingly Toss-ups at this distance:  Georgia, Arizona, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Nevada, and the two single EV of Maine and Nebraska.  In that situation, any one of the first three states I named would get the Democrats over the line, while winning just Wisconsin of those would leave them one tantalizing vote short (holding the Maine seat, winning the Nebraska one, or Nevada would then be enough). 

To summarize, Democrats have a narrow advantage, even in a close race.  As long as they win Pennsylvania. 

Consumer-Friendly Advice on Political Contributions

The 2024 election is guaranteed to be the most expensive in history; billions of dollars will be expended to try to move small numbers of people to vote, and to vote in the direction sought by the spenders.  Engaged citizens would seek to add their monetary contributions to provide more leverage to outcomes than just voting locally, but we should recognize that ours will pale in comparison to the huge sums being laid down in unlimited Political Action Committees, unless our efforts are strategically or tactically accurate. Here are a few thoughts: 

• There are only a couple dozen House seats constructed to be competitive, out of 435; the other 400+ were constructed to be anti-competitive.  Give no more than a token contribution to your local Representative, or to its challenger, if you prefer, unless yours is one of that handful. 
• The same is true of the Senate races, except for a few--we will identify both groups in a susbsequent post. 
• When they say your contribution will be matched, triple-matched, or 9-to-1 matched (I saw that on a Trump email), it's tempting to think that its effect will be magnified.  It's the opposite:  the matching money is already pledged. 
• Late-campaign contributions will be burnt on TV ads.  In this early stage, one would hope that money will go toward building an effective campaign organization at the grassroots level. Watch out, though, for appeals from campaigns that face hopeless odds, or to defeat primary opponents. 
• Finally, every mid-month or end-month there will be the appeals to meet certain targets by the campaigns' deadlines, especially the official ones for reporting contributions.  Ignore all these; campaigns' bragging about the level of donations will only stimulate their opponents to do more.  If anything, the emails after the deadlines revealing the shortfalls (there's a lot of those, too) might be more appropriate targets for consideration.  

Both Out (B. & T.)

The American people have indicated clearly, albeit only through polling, that a majority would prefer to see the leading candidate of each major party out of the race. That would open up the 2024 contest to a new generation of leaders and possibly some new ways of thinking, which is admittedly quite attractive. The question is how that could ever come about. 

Almost certainly it would have to start with former President Trump leaving the race, though that could be for a variety of reasons.  In the other direction, I don't think President Biden dropping out would be any kind of impediment to Trump's running or a reason to quit--he has a desire to get even that won't be satisfied in any way other than using the Federal government to get his revenge, and the targets of his vengeance are so many that removing one from his hit list would not change that. 

The key thing would be to get Trump out of the way soon.  Then Biden would have some opportunity to reflect and think that signal idea of the moment, "Why not someone else?" Once he announced his withdrawal under those circumstances, events would take their own chaotic course. If things happen so quickly that Biden could withdraw before the primaries, or if he announced his intention to complete his term and then step aside, a nominee could be determined by the convention delegates chosen, even if after the primaries.   

Biden could cite health reasons, and no one would really argue the point.  He could say he needed to help his son Hunter with his escalating legal problems, though I don't think he would. He could say he's fed up with Washington, dealing with Republican dinosaurs, even trying to please an ungrateful public, and again all those are plausible, but not his style. His would be more to say that he is relieved and ready to retire. 

I do think he would want to get out if the menace of Trump's return is lifted from us, but it would have to be in a form that is definitive, with regard to the 2024 election.  As I said in a previous post, there are many ways that can be accomplished.  

How to get him out, though?  I do believe the compounding effect of all these indictments and trials (and, presumably, some eventual convictions) will make him next to unelectable in November, 2024. ("next to" being the key words, when the Electoral College is involved) The key to turning things around is for Republicans to see this, just in time.  Nikki Haley has a chance to brand him as a loser we don't want around anymore; if she fails to do this, she deserves the suffering we will all experience. 

Another possibility is that he fatally shows weakness. I'm thinking physical weakness, but it could also be brazen cowardice.  Macho men all across the nation of all ethnicities see him as a kindred spirit, fallible but "strong".  Something like the visual equivalent of "pudding fingers" for Ron DeSantis could reveal the insecure weakling he is inside for all to see. 

Or he could just die. As discussed, sooner better than later. 

A 2024 Presidential Election without the Two Headliners

It would certainly be interesting.  The 2020 election focused on the binary choice in a narrow Presidential race, and we will discuss that scenario repeating itself in our next posts.  Without those two running, I would expect both that turnout would decrease and that third- and fourth-party percentages would rise (thinking RFKJR as Libertarian and Cornel Wes for the rejuvenated Greens).  

The Republicans would have more of a crisis, I think: post-Trumpism could take various forms.  Besides Haley and Ron DeSantis, there might be significant new contenders entering the race late.  I'm thinking specifically of Virginia's Governor Glenn Youngkin, who will be termed out in 2025, but I wouldn't be surprised to see some reptiles from Congress (there are none in the race now!), such as Ted Cruz (to raise his profile before having to defend his Senate seat when he finds out how few Republicans like him) or Josh Hawley.  Depending on the state and the timing of Trump's descent (a hole in the floor taking the place of the escalator), such new entrants might be too late for some primaries, but in a dynamic environment such as would develop in '24 under these circumstances, a late move could be decisive--for example, if there are a lot of delegates committed to a no-longer-active Trump candidacy who would then be up for grabs.  

As for the Democrats, if Biden dropped out the party might move quickly behind Kamala Harris, particularly if time were short (or the convention already past).  If there were time to mobilize a candidacy, though, she would be challenged--probably from the moderate wing, and one would expect that Gavin Newsom's loyalty to the Biden-Harris ticket (very laudable!) would end abruptly.  I don't see Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries throwing his hat in, as he is looking forward to a likely Speakership in the next Congress, or the one after.  As I suggested before, it might be the time that Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez goes national for the first time, but only if she's confident that it would not be the last, regardless of outcome.   And why not, given the example of Joe Biden?  

The favorite in a general election under these circumstances would be the one whose nomination came about with the least internal damage to the party--the least chaotic, the least cantankerous.  There is big money waiting for the nominees, and they will fight hard to get at it.  The Democrats are historically more known for fighting with each other, but lately it has been quite different with the Republican party.  Once Trump is out of the way, though, you have to think they will come to a new, more authoritarian consensus (we don't call it "populist"), but one with some respect for laws now.  Maybe not recovering that famous certitude and consistency in talking points as quickly as November, 2024, though.  As for Congress, the starting point would still be the struggle to hold the Senate for the Democrats and the similar struggle of the Republicans to hold the House, dictated by the numbers.  This could change, however, if a landslide develops due to one party's mismanagement of this opportunity/crisis. 

I saw a panel discussing the Republican race yesterday:  the respected Republican pollster Kristen Soltis Anderson suggested the chances Trump could be defeated were 1 in 10.  I'd buy that estimate and add 5% that Trump involuntarily leaves.   Out of that 15%, I'd say at least half of the probability would then have Biden finding a reason to step aside.  

So this is a low-probability scenario, but undoubtedly the most fun.   Maybe the best, all-around for the US. 

Biden Out

 I will grant that President Biden does not seem to be running a strong re-election campaign at this "late" date a mere 13 1/2 months before the election.  There's plenty of time, really. 

There may be a question of whether Biden has plenty of time, though, if one is speaking of 5+ more years in the most difficult job in the world at age whatever.  It's a legitimate question, though the answer to that is clearly not to elect an unhealthy guy 3 years younger with illegitimate motives and behavior, so I don't see it resonating in the standard B v. T scenarios.  Biden has some difficulty with public speech, which I can confirm was present 50 years ago, but those who listen know that he can think and communicate clearly.  He walks like an 80-year-old in good health, nothing unusual these days.  

The noise from Democrats about his voluntarily withdrawing from the political battlefield, while Trump is still on it, is just that.  It's not their decision; someone would have to convince Biden that they would be better at defeating The Former Guy.  To put it on the other foot, like, if Nikki Haley showed Trump data that meant she would have a better chance than he to defeat Biden, then Trump would withdraw.  Right. /s

So, I'm really just talking about the various ways Biden would involuntarily leave the race.  

One that we cannot simply ignore is the possibility of a scandal affecting Joe Biden. Personally,  not his family members.  Biden is certainly a wealthy man, but he should be after 40-some years of public service at the highest levels and a restrained lifestyle.  (If you don't pay honest public servants adequately, you should expect corruption.)  There is the possibility of Biden choosing not to run for re-election and citing Hunter Biden's looming conviction(s) and possible jail time;  my response would be that there would have been some other reason even in that case.  I do not think it would be determinant of his decision, as he says it was with his other son Beau's cancer illness in relation to choosing not to run for President in 2016 as the sitting VP to Obama.*

So, we are really down to the sickness, death, and 25th Amendment part of the discussion. It's something real enough, but it is also a quantifiable, manageable risk.  It's really only a risk for the campaign and the election, as the Constitution is now very clear about succession.  But what happens, and when in the campaign it could happen, are critical to consider:  who here remembers Sen. Eagleton as VP candidate for George McGovern in 1972  until he dropped out, after the convention?  It was a political mess and hampered that quixotic campaign, but it is something that Biden can avoid. ++ 

Here is how I would approach it, if I were in the position that Joe Biden finds himself in:  He should make out a Political Will.  He should then give it privately to three largely disinterested senior officials--I would recommend Congressional Leaders Schumer and Jeffries, and former Speaker Nancy Pelosi.  In it, he should indicate what his preferred successor ticket would be should something happen to him.  It could be Kamala Harris and Pete Buttigieg, Kamala and throw it open for VP, just throw it open with some process indicated, whatever he wants.  Though it could be updated, the Will would remain secret, unless or until Biden was no longer able to serve.  Then it should become public.  In the meantime, those three would remain silent on the party leadership succession question but supporting Biden at all times, just as they do today. 

 Seems suspicious?  /s

The thing is, Biden is the elected representative of the people of the US until he's not.  Anyone who challenges that, under the circumstances, is basically an enabler of seditious conspiracy. So there's a pretty clear line.  Even most Republican office-holders will agree to that by now. 25th Amendment challenges to his authority are going to remain off-limits until there's extreme visible evidence. So, his point of view should matter; he's shown decent judgement, having been a better President than most (see below). 

If Biden were out, though, with Trump in the race, there would be madness without that Will. 

In the case after the nomination (assuming the Biden-Harris ticket is confirmed in the primary), Kamala would have to take the reins, though she would very likely be challenged.  In any case, she would have to announce, forthwith, her VP choice, and there would have to be some ratification process.  She would have no more than a matter of days.  Then, the campaign would have to advise each state how to modify the ticket on the ballot, if indeed they can change it.  Timing would be mission-critical, especially if the ensuing race is close. 

The case of his dropping out before the nomination is the one Democrats and Republican alike drool about, though I see the chances from now until then, considering all possibilities, to be less than 3%. Some kind of late train wreck, a 1968 scenario, as in RFK getting assassinated in California in June, just after the primary that was going to put him ahead.  Again:  The Will is the way to avoid that.  (Someone please tell them. :)

I saw a puff piece (no credits) with five pictures for that scenario:  Harris, CA Gov. Gavin Newsom, MI Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, Transportation Secretary Buttigieg, and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.  I think all those choices are accurate, even Ocasio-Cortez, who would have no chance to win, except in something like a five-sided race, but might well be the Bernie wing's choice.  But that's before the primaries, so even less likely.  It is however likely that the Democratic race could start shaping up that way, even soon after the 2024 election, as an initial framing of something that will go on for years.  Biden may leave the White House sooner, or later, but it's certain that, as a duck, he will be lame by late 2025.  Not the right kind of duck, for the world. 

Would Trump walk all over the replacement nominee, no matter whom?  I say no, not any of them.+++  These are smart people, capable, calm, rational, and they have plenty of warning, so they will be careful around him.  He's still not likely to win, though a third-party could easily come into play here and disrupt the scenario, especially if the Democratic replacement process is just a disaster. 

 The Will, again.  Maybe they have one--we wouldn't know, would we?

 

Biden as President, in 300 Words or Less

In his first 30 months as President, Biden has governed, or tried to govern, in line with his supporters in the 2020 election, a Democratic voting base that's somewhat left of center. Faced with the narrowest of Congressional margins, he accomplished legislation to move us in directions needed for our future (for infrastructure and renewable fuels).  As a longtime insider, he was able to get done more with such a fragmented legislature than Obama.  Still, he hasn't gotten either the current or previous Congress to move on immigration, or to do enough to secure Federal elections. 

In many public addresses and executive actions, Biden tried to protect us from the damage his opponents would cause us, often designed to handicap or cripple the capabilities of his administration.  (I'm thinking of the Supreme Court, Republican Congress, a former President.)

 He has performed well on foreign policy, a strong point, doing his best to re-establish ties with allies skeptical after Trump. The contrast in behavior with Trump is stark: Biden has acted with solemnity when he needed, silence when needed, and he stood up to Putin in a way that mattered. 

With regard to China, he has lowered the temperature despite many challenges; with Russia, he ended Trump’s appeasement when it became necessary with the Ukraine invasion; with India and some other Asian nations more than willing to let us stand with them, he has located and brought them in.

On the military side, he didn't get good execution when he decided to go forward with Trump's deal with the Taliban.**  After that, no major direct US military engagements.  We seem appropriately ready, involved, but at peace.  Even that is criticized. 

As for economics, while Presidents can’t do so much, Biden, like Obama, inherited a sick economy and got it back on its feet.

Yeah, gas prices suck--too bad. 

 (That last sentence not being part of the 300)

Footnotes

*Utah Senator Mitt Romney and Biden would have faced off in a better 2016 election, but Romney had expended his political capital fruitlessly challenging the incumbent President Obama, while Biden opted out, leaving the door open for Hillary Clinton.  Romney would have provided a much better opponent to Trump in the Republican primaries than John Kasich and Ted Cruz did.  Alas!

**If Trump were really such a good deal-maker, he would have traded better with the Talib:  Make Bagram Air Force Base US territory (like Guantanamo, really) and you get the rest of the country for your sick policies.  That would have provided a real deterrent and made for a better withdrawal. 

++  The reference I suggest is Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail, 1972, by Hunter S. Thompson.  If you haven't read it, it's a good ride. 

+++OK, maybe AOC, who would probably scream at him, he's so awful. That would hurt her, not him, as the standards are different for Democrats and their supporters.  As I see on comment threads, IOKIYAR.  (It's OK if You Are Republican.) 

Trump Out

 It is delicious to consider the ways Donald Trump might leave the 2024 race.  The idea I treasured was that the weight of multiple criminal trials, augmented by an endless stream of civil suits, would cause him to just pack it in.  The toll that breaks him could be psychological, physical, financial, economical, or just pure exhaustion from anger and anxiety.  While it does seem like this series of judicial setbacks and indictments is taking a toll on his psyche, it's not looking like that will drive him to quit. 

There is the possibility of severe illness, or death.  That would do the trick to get him out.  

There are other possibilities that could possibly deter him or even prevent him from completing his primary campaign and/or winning the nomination. He could be jailed, more likely for contempt of court or defying a gag order than for a sentence after conviction, as I don't think any case is likely to reach that stage, pre-November; however, he could even continue his campaign from behind bars--we should be certain he would make the most of it, performance-wise.  There is the thing about the 14th Amendment, which states people who participate in insurrection should be barred from Federal office.  OK, he did it, but who gets to decide that?  Without a conviction for sedition, I can't see the courts upholding it.  I don't think obstruction of a Federal proceeding will do it. 

He could be defeated in the Republican primaries.  It seems impossible now, but it's still early.  The most salient challenge to him yet within the party is the poll that shows that Nikki Haley does significantly better than he (or any other declared Republican candidate) against Biden.  It's not hard to understand:  she has a better chance of getting votes from some portion of those women who have had their rights reduced by Trumpist Supreme Court Justices.  But still, if it comes to a primary head-to-head against any of them, he will get the majority in most or all states.  As things stand. 

There could even be something he does that finally goes beyond what his supporters, generally, can tolerate.  Maybe trying to strangle Melania, or Tiffany?   It's hard to imagine his support falling so much that it would drive him to quit, unless it were through unlikely electoral defeat. 

I do feel the hammer blows of the trials will do damage, but they themselves are unlikely to drive him out.  If they do, or if by other means Trump is out, though, it could get very interesting. If something were to happen soon, say before Super Tuesday, there would be a scramble to get into the race from people like Chris Sununu of New Hampshire or Glenn Youngkin of Virginia, along with a ramping up of the funds raised by candidates like Haley or Tim Scott, who may suddenly have a chance.  Even Ron DeSantis, in this case!

I think it's far more likely, if we are presuming Trump out (and Biden remaining in) that this would be something happening much later, when Trump has a monster lead in delegates or has received the nomination. (I'm going by the deliberate pace of these trials, and that they may possibly wear on him physically as well.)   If that's the case, I can't see the Republican convention delegates, or the Republican National Committee members, who'd be called for a quick decision after the convention, doing any kind of an about-face with regard to the Trumpist populist nationalist theme.  So, that would point to a selection of the most Trumpy one around, Vivek Ramaswamy or Scott, or Kristi Noem (rumored to be Trump's favorite VP choice), maybe. 

This kind of sudden Trump departure may not derail the Republicans' chances, even if Trump's departure is egregious or shameful. There seem to be many who would have less qualms about voting against the Democrats if the Presidential candidate were someone they didn't have to feel guilty about supporting.  Similarly, if Trump bails early and the Republicans have time to consider their selection, that person may find their voice on issues like shrinking the Federal government and immigration in a way that will put the Biden campaign on the defensive. The successor is also likely to be considerably younger in that circumstance, which will also work against Biden's successful re-election. 

I think the same logic could apply to Congressional races--voters tend to despise Washington but like their Congressperson.  I don't think Trump's passing from the scene will hurt most Representatives from red districts, while the effect on swing districts would depend on the circumstances.  There could be sympathetic support for Trump's successor, and there could be a rally around that person stronger than the feigned love Republican office-holders offer for the Wherever Man. That would mean coattails.

I don't see a Trump departure giving any assist to third-party candidacies of the right.  Republicans would glom together very quickly.  The same may not be true of the left:  without Trump to unify Democrats, Biden's support may suffer and someone (RFKJR?)  could cleave off some support. 

So, this one's not all positive for Democratic chances by any means.  But I'll still take it, unlikely as it seems.

The Crisis Scenario

In the Null Scenario of political stasis under the closely-balanced partisan regime, we expect certain conditions to continue unchanged through the 2024 election.  One is the absence of any bipartisanship; I'm not even going to consider the possibility that changes next year.  The backdrop for the election cycle would change dramatically, though, if the relatively benign economy tanks, or if the war against Russian aggression is no longer so safely contained far from us. So far, Ukraine has held, and the cost to us of defending its sovereignty has only been material and financial, and there is no indication yet of imminent economic disaster. 

Those are two possible upsets against the status quo that are easily envisioned, though of course there are many others much harder to define specifically.  South Korea, China, the Middle East, North Africa--there's a long list of potential spots that could overheat. A recurrence of Covid in a more virulent form, or a new pandemic. Some kind of prolonged "natural" environmental disaster in the US worse than the ones we've experienced this year.

And then, there's the ones we might create for ourselves.  Think of Black Lives Matter, and how that clamor rose above the pandemic itself.  What about some sort of local resistance to governmental authority on a mass scale, and would it come from the right or the left?   Could the continuing Fed policy of tightening (even if not additional rate increases) produce the recession many still expect, and could an initially mild recession lead rapidly to further unraveling of our economic wealth, as the 2008 one threatened to do?

No one is expecting a deus ex machina, but a machine from outerspace?  One of our satellites crashing down, or one of theirs?  And who is "they", exactly?  We are once again hearing of the suppression of information about some now-named "Unexplained Aerial Phenomena". 

To consider the political import, in most of the crises I have suggested above, Americans' strong tendency would be to pull together and seek to preserve that which can be saved.  That's a conservative impulse, and, while the initial reaction to foreign dangers might be more in the direction of Trump's avoidance of entanglement, that doesn't tend to last forever.  So, timing could be important:  how the pandemic hurt Trump in the election was not his crazed initial behavior, or even the second, even more thickheaded phase he went through in the summer, but the fact he still hadn't gotten a coherent national response together by November.  

The principal thing to note about any of these crises is that they would change the terms of discussion.  We would not be so focused on the Trump Trials, or the legitimacy of the 2020 election, or even abortion rights.  The Constitution and its own critical issues would remain a topic, because it is always one, but the tragicomedy that is Trump's political career would become less central to most.  

I feel that in most of these cases the Biden administration would be able to rise to the occasion, which would be the key test:  advantage to the incumbent, if it is perceived as handling the crisis well.  Or, possibly even if not perceived well:  see the 2004 election!

I see crisis-driven disruptions to our politics in an election year as being less important than the long-term effects. The War of 1812 changed thinking about the need for a standing army; World War II gave impetus to the civil rights movement.  

There might well be a serious third-party arising from a crisis, which would signify that neither party's policy was addressing a significant popular sentiment about addressing it.  A Peace Party, or a Climate Party, or a Gun Party. (Don't laugh!) I feel this is less than likely in most of these potential crises, at least in the same year.  In an extreme case, turnout could drop sharply, adding more uncertainty to outcomes. 

Senate/House:  Incumbents would tend to do well in this scenario.  This might give the Democrats a better chance to defend difficult seats and hold control of the Senate (with Manchin).  It could help Republicans in close districts to survive, and thus keep their party's House control  as well.  The exception might be if there is a perception that Congress itself is at fault directly for the crisis.   I'm thinking here of economic paralysis arising out of  Congressional deadlock.  

Summary:  Though we would all wish to avoid the unexpected, its collateral effects on our politics may be less than catastrophic. 

Ed.  (10/12/23) - I promised to address the crisis of completely unfinished trial business in this scenario. If a trial of major direct significance to Trump, such as the DC Jack Smith case, has an uncertain outcome even by November, voters will truly be in a quandary.  That trial should be completed by then, even though Trump's strategy will be to delay, delay. A  more likely situation would be a conviction in that trial, waiting for appeal, and the Georgia trial hitting its climax in the fall election season.  Would the sentence be carried out?  Would Trump be in a position to pardon himself if he wins?  A conviction in Georgia would not be subject to his pardon, though the governor there could do it, if he wanted.  

It  suggests something like what has been happening in Israel, pre-war, with Netanyahu fighting criminal prosecution while campaigning, and then more recently, trying to change the law so he wouldn't be prosecuted.  It would bring great weakness in our global posture and likely would provoke one of our antagonists to start something. 

Electorally, I can't see Trump's whining  producing much sympathy from the general public, even though the indictments helped his polling numbers within the Republican base.  It is the independents, though, who will decide the election, and I suspect they would not appreciate the ambiguity.  

Biden Weakened

 It is painfully easy to imagine the situation in which President Biden cannot conduct a full-throated political campaign, though still able to function in his job.  It is one that is much more serious than the current state of Biden's compos mentis et corporalis, yet not death or even terminal illness or permanent incapacity.  It could even include his being an invalid for some period of time.  

It is not hard to see Biden adopting a nearly 100% digital, TV-based approach to the 2024 campaign under these circumstances, due to whatever health issues.  He almost did that in 2020, and it worked out okay. The circumstances will be different this time, and his minimal participation in public events, with no debates, will be noted by those whisperers who will not allow him to "do the FDR thing" (or maybe he would think of it as "doing the JFK thing").  He would be weakened, whenever it became general knowledge, anytime before the election. 

The critical question in assessing what could happen in such a circumstance is the timing. For this, it would be before the election. The 25th Amendment covers who acts as President, but not who would run for the office. No one's going to allow someone from the opposition to take the White House under those circumstances. So, the issue is what would be the effect on the election of a serious downturn in his health before the election? One where he doesn't step aside?

Whenever it becomes public, the stock market would surely take a tumble, a forerunner of a general near-panic. In this scenario, we assume Biden makes some sort of a "recovery" allowing him to soldier on. Which he would no doubt choose to do, other factors being equal.  

One other factor would be if some Democrats decide that this is too much, that their suspicion he can't complete the job has become a conviction, or even a certainty.  If Biden's obvious weakness shows before the nominating convention (Chicago, August; sound familiar?), a challenged President known to be unable to address the assembly could lead to disaster on the floor (see 1968).  Here, though, we're imagining Biden's survival in some form and going on to November.  Like Hubert Humphrey. 

As I recall, the Democrats' antics in '68 failed to convince "Democrat" George Wallace, who ran on a populist third-party and actually won 13% of the popular vote and several Southern states. Democratic splittism must wait for another time.  A third-party run by disaffected Democrats would be fatal. 

If Biden weakens very late in the general election campaign, the Democrats would have to cover themselves with agreement and public announcement on how electors pledged to Biden would vote on the equivalent of January 6, in 2025, if Joe were not going to be able to take the Oath of Office on January 20. Perhaps a President pro tempore of the Senate would be named, just in case, or perhaps Senate Democrats would block that in favor of Speaker Hakeem Jeffries taking the #2 spot in succession? 

That is all hypothetical, of course.  Some Biden weakness emerging very late in the campaign would be worst-case, as voters would be confused as to exactly whom they would be choosing to govern. A weakened Biden means a strengthened, enraged Donald Trump.  His bully nature would emerge, untrammeled. It has the potential to be the worst tragedy of all. 

Senate:  Without significant assistance from the President, several incumbent Senators would be in great danger.  Tester (MT) would have to run on his own, as would Sherrod Brown in Ohio; I feel Bob Casey (PA) would still be a winner.  But there could be trouble for Tammy Baldwin (WI) and Jacky Rosen (NV), while Manchin in WV then looks like a lost cause, and the party's push for Ruben Gallego in AZ to replace Sinema could fall victim to a weakened central party. 

We should expect the Republicans to regain control of the Senate in this scenario, Mitch or no Mitch. Something like  53-47 Republican looks like an average result given these conditions.  

House:  Though Democratic turnout might be reduced overall by such a demoralizing development, there might also be a countervailing strong push in heavily-Democratic districts to protect the nation from a complete Trumpist takeover. That might preserve the floor of the number of Democratic House districts.  Given the opportunities that exist to gain seats, there might even be a chance to get the majority back.  Unlike the Senate, where 60% of votes are needed for most purposes, in the House 50%+1 can get most things done.  (With a strong leader.)  

The Trump Collapse Scenario

This would seem the most logical outcome, yet it does not seem all that probable. The way this plays out is that Trump's support in the primaries carries him through to the nomination, but results along the line of the Standard Trump Trial Outcomes (see below) eventually cost him momentum, and his vote sinks relative to his fall opponent.  (Here we presume that opponent remains Biden, though it could be against an emergency Democratic replacement, if it is a consensus choice not creating scandal.)

Based on review of Presidential contests from the last few decades, it appears there is a tipping point between the close ones, where a few medium-sized, winner-take-all results decide the Electoral College contest, and ones where the margin in the EC blows up disproportionately to the popular vote margin.  The key ones to note in this regard are 1988 (Bush Sr. v. Dukakis) and 2008 (Obama v. McCain).  Each was a 7-point popular vote win; Obama got 336 Electoral Votes and Bush 426.  If you go much beyond that, it becomes an Electoral College rout (1980, 1964). 

Biden won by 4.4% in 2020's popular vote. If he can gain just 2-3% against that result in 2024, the chances for Trump deteriorate rapidly.  The three most-critical swing states from 2020 (AZ, GA, PA) are no longer so close, while NC comes into range.  Trump's imminent loss also would be likely to encourage votes for any sour-grapes third parties on the ballot (Libertarian, No Labels, "Constitutional"), votes the Republicans might otherwise count upon. 

In terms of the Trump Trials in this scenario, there will be a mixed bag by the time of the convention.  Certainly not just a litany of guilty verdicts; there will be some trials in process, some not even commenced, probably a dismissal on some charges, maybe a mistrial.  I'm thinking one or two convictions, no sentencing decisions to speak of.  The Republican Convention attendees will be as worried as can be, but most will try to put a brave face upon it somehow.  Some will not attend; there may be even a futile floor motion contrary to the professed unanimity. Some splinter group will put on a third-party opposition effort--a kind of Evan McMullin, maybe even him.  A bad show.  

From that point, the numbers trend down.  Trump's future Oscar-winning performance in his defense at the GA trial* provides mixed-to-negative results in the polls.  The one state poll that can be trusted--in Iowa--shows a dead heat.  Florida too close to call. 

The floor in terms of popular vote is clear:  37% (1984, 1964). This is true for either party, even when there is a third-party of significance.  So, Trump scores in the 38-42 range and loses by 7-15 percent, the Electoral College result being a margin of 100-300 points. 

A defeat so comprehensive that few Trump supporters remain afterwards to plead his cause. 

As collateral outcomes, Trumpism is defeated, the Republicans have to regroup, the Democrats will be able to govern. The world will not fall apart. For two years, anyway.    

Senate:  This is the one scenario when the Democrats actually have a chance to increase their margin in the Senate. In particular, I would think this is the case when Manchin perceives the chance to keep his seat, stays put, and wins as a Democrat. The key swing state Senate contests (NV, MT, PA, WI) all hold, which makes the long-shot opportunities to pick up a GOP seat more interesting. 

It will still be close, with Sen. McConnell in uncertain condition for the remaining two years in his term making for a scramble among the ambitious would-be party leadership to regroup in the post-Trump era.  

House:  We can talk about a Blue Wave again--we would hear about it, as the Presidential horserace becomes a runaway--but the Republicans have a pretty durable floor, somewhere in the range of 195 seats.  Even more, if they can successfully fight off the courts' decisions that they must re-gerrymander in a way that allows more minority seats in the South. 

There would be a variety of fallback positions Republican candidates will take under this scenario, but most could be described as "making local constituents' interests foremost".  Hiding under the rock from which they came. 

Democrats will pick up 10-15 seats easily, ensuring control.  The next 10-15 are possible but not certain.  That puts the tally in the range of 228 to 233, a workable majority for most purposes. 

Local/State Elections:  There may be a somewhat valid talking point for the mainstream media in the weeks following the wipeout about the relatively strong performance in red states for state and local elections.  

Standard Trump Trial Outcomes

These are what I expect, in general, for all the Scenarios, except where noted. 

1) NY Trial(s):  It's best not to expect too much from the criminal trial finally filed in New York.  When it comes, it will be Michael Cohen's comeuppance in court against Trump--Cohen's already been jailed for his role in this malfeasance.  Trump's fraud in this case is somewhat minor league, by his standards.  

It goes all the way back to 2016's hush-money payments to Stormy Daniels and false reporting of it.  It wouldn't be so much except that it was the first-ever criminal indictment of him.  In political terms, it's old business, certainly discounted in the 2020 re-election run, though that was a chaotic campaign season for the ages. Still, it could be the first criminal case to go to jury, and thus could result in the first conviction, if the timing works.  It is secondary, at best, in terms of scheduling. 

There's another NY trial, a civil case against the Trump Organization for similar offenses on a grander and more prolonged scale.  Trump's accountant has already gone to jail on this, but he is so far going stiff upper lip.  This one is the domestic equivalent of sanctions; that particular entity will be prohibited from a lot of legal and typical borderline activities they would normally engage upon under that name.  It may end up being Trump's record-breaking sixth (?) business bankruptcy.  It won't stop him and his criminal syndication activity, though; he'd just move it to DeSantis' Florida. 

2) Mar-a-Lago documents case:  This one is expected to be in Florida.  I'm expecting this to be the last, or one of the last, to go to trial, probably after the 2024 election.  The Florida judge seems very willing to do whatever she can, within and at the edge of normal ethical standards, to help Trump.  In this regard, I think this case--a sure conviction, under any reasonable objective view--to be the least likely to have a negative effect on Trump's re-election. 

Jack Smith cleverly positioned it to be a clearly winning case.  It does not relate to whether Trump legally ever had possession of the documents, post-January 20.  It relates to his stupid efforts to hide and prevent the government's recovering the documents, so his culpability is almost beyond doubt.  I think his thinking is that it is a fallback case so Trump will not get off completely scot-free, but if it goes beyond January, 2025, there's the risk re-elected President Trump could make it all moot. 

3) DC Case of January 6:  I see this as the biggie:  it is unmistakably the US v. Trump, and it is about whether his actions leading up to the riot constituted crimes against the US and the Constitution.  Even if it's just called "Obstruction of a Federal Proceeding" (the most likely charge for conviction, as I see it), that proceeding was one with serious Constitutional import, so it puts him as opposed to our self-governing republic operating as such.  It is clearly a violation of his oath of office.  He did it, so if they execute the trial properly, it will lead to conviction, even upon appeal, whenever that comes up. 

I don't see its leading to his disqualification under the 14th Amendment, though.  That would probably require a two-thirds act of the Senate, which is not likely to be forthcoming. 

As for timing, Jack Smith's prioritizing this one over the other, the Mar-a-Lago case.  It appears the other DA's in other jurisdictions are also likely to do the same.  This could make it the one that has a conviction prior to the Republican party nominating convention in July.  Right now, it's scheduled for March, but some movement in that date (always backward) seems likely.  Considering any phase of the campaign after April, it could be a factor, or still not sinking in. 

Electoral impact:  Yes, that is the question. Both the question of guilty or not guilty, but also what will happen  after.  Either way, really.  That is, if the verdict comes before November. If it is still pending then, it becomes a whole different story, see Scenario 3.  

4) GA RICO: This is the one that will affect popular media the most, so most likely to affect voter behavior, one way or the other.  Unlike the others, it looks as though it will be televised!

RICO is a fair stretch, so appropriate in general, so questionable in this particular case.  I think most will get off on some form of "it was too disorganized".  The real organiztional activity occurred through untraceable phones and Telegram. 

That is a nice package, but the real crimes are much more tangible and threatening, for the likes of Giuliani and Meadows.  The likelihood of a conviction of Trump himself is too hard for me to say--it will probably need some form of smoking gun, beyond the incriminating phone call.  Like in The Caine Mutiny, though, it doesn't matter the verdict--Trump will have great difficulty with any competent cross-examination, in which he will be exposed as the con man and habitual liar that he is. 

*We should all expect Donald F. Trump to appear in person as defendant, to be precise in the defense case for the GA trial, contrary to the advice of every well-wishing legal partisan.  Too risky!  

He will be making his plea to be freed from all charges in this case.  He will immortalize the obvious line, "I never even went to Georgia!" (I'm sure that will be proven false, in cross-exam.)  His performance (before cross-exam, anyway) will be rehearsed, confident, if possible a little less whiny, sir?  It will be the Exhibit A for future movie versions of the The Obstruction which will win someone an Oscar, not Trump.  Whatever medium it is that they will be using in, say, 2053. 

Initial 2024 Election Post

 

I guess I have to admit the 2024 electoral campaign has started.  If candidates have already entered and failed, then something must be happening.  Indeed, something similar seems to have happened to the campaign of the Marquis (de Sadeness); Governor Ron DeSantis' campaign has already peaked and is imploding. 

Another indicator:  PredictIt has posted its first market on the popular vote margin (Dem%-Rep%).  As far as PI is concerned, this clarifies the limitations they have agreed to with regard to new markets, after a hiatus for over a year.  They still focused the brackets on the null scenario of an Electoral College nailbiter, in the interests of generating revenue (and academic research, too!) To note the initial market take for the record, Dem winning % (tie being the exception) is about 60-40, taking into account the bid/ask. 

I don't count that initial debate as part of the campaign, as such; more like spring training in baseball. I can't resist a couple of comments, anyway. Smarmy Vivek has postulated himself as the most Trumpy of all, and it will be hard to top him for smarminess. Ah, DeSadness!  I think it was a little too evident Ron saw that gig as nowhere.  He was back in his element at home with hurricane warnings and gratuitous insult to Biden. 

I will proceed with a scenario-based analysis, considering the effects upon the massively-important House and Senate races for each.  The 2022-23 status of Congress is anomalous, with the House improbably with a Republican majority, considering the Senate has a narrow Democratic majority.  Most likely outcomes are reversal of both, but the Presidential race should be so consequential that it will carry more coattails than many recent partisan re-alignments in Congress. 

 I will also need to consider possible effects of significant third-party candidacies in each scenario, something that has not happened since Ross Perot in '92 and '96 (the marginal effects of Nader/Stein-type results, as we can expect for Cornel West's candidacy, for example, not changing the scenario, though they could be tiebreakers). 

The planned sequence of posts by scenario is as follows, starting, arbitrarily, by my choice of the most desirable one: 

1 - Trump Collapse.  The weight of his criminal trials cripples him--it only takes a few percent of his following turning against him, but he won't quit. 

2- Biden Weakened - Either economic weakness or undeniable physical/mental weakness makes him less-than-viable for all but his committed supporters. 

3 - War/Chaos - A crisis of massive proportion.  Think Pearl Harbor/9-11/COVID/UFO's, or widespread insurrection.

4 - Trump Out - He does quit, or die, or he is barred from campaign as a result of any of his convictions or court rulings. 

5 - Biden Out - He becomes deathly ill and must be replaced.  Or won't leave and is the victim of a successful party revolt. 

6 - Both Out - The most likely way is Trump gives in or is out for whatever reason, and Biden then finds a reason he doesn't need to run.

7 Stasis - the Null Scenario.  Biden and Trump run until the bitter end.  Debates will be few, and Trump's plea in the Georgia case proves the climax, one way or the other.

I don't want to get too precise about the likelihood of the scenarios, but I would say 1 and 2 are about equally likely at 10% or so, Scenario 6 is probably more likely than either 4 or 5, and all three add up to 20-30%, and Scenario 3 we can pull a number out of the air and say is no more than 5%.  Those events have happened several times in the past century, but have not often come in election years, as it turns out (2020 the exception!)   

That leaves no more than 40-50% likelihood for the Null Scenario that everyone focuses on.  It is, though, the one with the highest likelihood, so I will go into it with the most depth. 

I do not want at all to trivialize or counter the argument that this election is extremely important, on the order of ones like 1860, 1932, or 1968.  In most of these scenarios I describe briefly above, the key question underlying the competition is whether our Constitution can hold up under the threat of Executive malfeasance and manipulation.  It managed to hold up during Watergate, but this combines that with elements of classic American rebellious behavior threatening our way of governing ourselves. 

 

  

News of the World

Yes, Virginia, There is Climate Change - It''s hard to imagine how anyone could doubt it after this summer.  July was the hottest month in recorded history, but there is more than just the "global warming", which itself is real enough.  

I had always thought the global recognition of a changed climate would come through high winds, experienced globally, something like the Jet Stream coming down from the higher atmosphere into our level.  Like the rising temperature, the high winds are a natural expression of increased energy released into our closed ecosystem from carbon sequestered from the remains of living things hundreds of million years ago.  We see that uncontrollable wildfires are occurring in many parts of the world, the combination of weather conditions and troubled natural vegetation.  These should be expected to continue, releasing even more carbon into the atmosphere.  

From Baseball - TV broadcasters have an annoying habit of referring to players/teams as being the best (or worst) "in baseball", when they mean in our Major Leagues.  As if there were no other games being played worthy of the name "baseball".  Anyway: 

Big Reds - There is a revival of fortunes this year for my team, the Cincinnati Reds.  They are currently slumping due to a severely-weakened starting rotation, so not quite as hot as a few weeks ago, when they battled for the Division lead.  It is time to be realistic:  they passed on trading any of their rising infield prospects and arriving stars for more pitching, and we are seeing the result.  They have time to rectify their rotation for 2024 and make a real run for it.  In the meantime, my prediction was for third place, and I'm OK with that this year.  If they do make the playoffs, probably as a Wild Card, I don't expect much at all. 

Still Astros-Braves:  They are the best teams in their leagues.  Of course, anything can happen in short baseball series.  The dangerous Dodgers are getting their star pitchers back, and the Padres, Brewers, and the AL's Angels all have enough to make surprise runs. The Cubs have caught the Reds and have similar prospects, short and long. There should be some AL East team opposing the Astros in the ALCS, though Texas, who has given Houston a run for it, could make things interesting in the AL semis (for the Orioles--the team I always fail to consider--or Rays, Blue Jays, Red Sox, etc.)  As always, I warn to watch out for the team that gets in as the final (third) Wild Card--it will have just survived a tense competition and will be in peak form. Meanwhile, the top two teams in each league will face the challenge of using a week off to prepare rather than lose their edge.  Those are pretty much set with the Braves, Dodgers, Orioles, and either Texas or Houston. 

Meanwhile, we must all pause and consider the greatness of Shohei "Unicorn" Ohtani and his 2023 season.  The question arises if there has ever been any season that rises to his performance, as there is no doubt there has never been one like his, for its combination of hitting and pitching. 

Bottom line on the rules changes:  the game absorbed them fairly well.  The near-shift replaced the shift, and the game moves faster, with more baserunning and fielding involved.  The lure of hitting to the opposite field remains. 

Hero Departures

Sinead O'Connor - (July 26) Check out her voice on The Edge's recording of "Heroine" (correct spelling) for the soundtrack of "Captive" (some creepy movie that seems was never released). She could wail with the best of them.  And she had things to wail aboot. 

Lowell Weicker - (June 28) If I'm not mistaken, he was the last person running as Republican that I voted for, in 1976 (a blowout win for him).  Who needs to be reminded of his heroic performance demanding the truth from Nixon's henchmen in the Ervin Senate Committee? His career as a Republican Senator and an Independent governor of Connecticut is a great example of how a true nonpartisan should behave, but where did he come from? The answer is, he was a classic rich Republican, an heir to a fortune like Jay Rockefeller (who was a Democratic Senator from West Virginia, repeatedly re-elected.  Imagine that.)

Robbie Robertson (August 9) -- The lead guitarist and songwriter for The Band, which was Bob Dylan's group for a critical period in the late '60's and early '70's.  He went on to a successful solo career and did soundtracks for Scorsese movies.  His is an interesting heritage story involving native Americans and Jews and Canadians.  But he practically invented Americana!  A good lesson that America is more than just the US. 

Paul Reubens (July 30) - Hard to say what I feel about Pee-Wee.  Personally, I couldn't stand watching his show, though it was very popular in certain circles for being campy. He seemed to be very aware, very sensitive, even kind, but he had to do time for sex crimes.  

John "Bud" Wilson (April 9) - I didn't know him, but he was famous, beloved.  He had a spectacular career as a physician and surgeon, and then afterwards built a legacy from his land conservation efforts in the Lama area (north of Taos, in the mountains).  

Milan Kundera (July 11) - I hadn't heard much from him for decades, but The Unbearable Lightness of Being  remains a touchstone novel for latter-day existentialist thought.  Written when his Czechoslovakia was behind the Iron Curtain, it helped us on this side of the Wall to understand how life was, and was not, different over there then. 

Tony Bennett (July 20) - Like Reubens, I wouldn't say he was a hero of mine, but he was one for many.  His jazzy versions of easy listening classics were one thing, but his public behavior and steadfast stance for justice, equality, and chill made him easily enviable.  

Cormac McCarthy (June 13) - He had an uncompromising vision of doom and gloom in the post-modern West.  I would say he had a good understanding of how the land could be "No Country for Old Men", but he rubbed our face in it, over and over.  I loved "All the Pretty Horses", before his method began to wear on me.  Still, deserves maximum respect for his honesty.   

The War - Unlike all the phony crises in this tweener kind of year, Russian premier Putin has decided that we must continue to have a real one, spreading death and destruction widely.  All efforts to contain it are subject to be overcome by both sides' desire to strike in new ways at their enemy, creating escalation without direction.  Efforts to bring the butchery to an end are suspended until Ukraine can make enough progress to regain its sovereign territory, which has so far in this counteroffensive been slow or non-existent. 

Today we receive word that Valery Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, who has both served and irritated Putin, was believed to be on a plane that crashed in Russia.  How and why it crashed is something we are not likely to know, but that his days were numbered was an easy prediction.  Which I made not long ago--his departure seems to have been accomplished sooner than I expected. 

The 2024 Election-- I have enjoyed some respite from the continuous political wars--ignoring the dozens of emails daily requesting money for next year's battles.  Alas, it seems we can avoid the looming struggle no more.  I will be blogging on politics tonight as the GOP debate kicks off the unavoidable. 

    

Showdowns

 We'll start light but add weight below. 

Reds v. Braves - The collision of two hot teams Friday night--the Reds on an 11-game win streak and the Braves on a 7-game one of their own--produced what must surely be one of the great regular-season games of this increasingly vital season.  In the first of a three-game series, the Reds spotted Atlanta a 5-0 lead in the first inning, but had made it up by the third and took the lead.  Joey Votto's triumphant return featured here with two clutch homers, but it was newly-minted superstar Elly De La Cruz who hit for the cycle (homer, double, single, and a thrilling triple) who stole the show.  The Braves came up with back-to-back-to-back homers in the 8th, but Cincinnati held on for a 11-10 win. 

The second game was reversed, as the Reds' ninth-inning rally fell a run short, ending their best streak since the 19th century.  De La Cruz' cycle recalled the Reds' legendary great Eric Davis and that team filled with young stars that came from nowhere to win the 1990 World Series.  This team does have that capability to hit anyone, and their relief pitching is rising toward the quality level of those Nasty Boys of '90--they will need that, as despite some young talent, their starting pitching will never be enough in that ballpark.  I suspect Atlanta may make this rivalry look a bit more one-sided when the Reds visit Atlanta.

Alcaraz v. Djokovic - This is the indicated tennis final for the upcoming Wimbledon men's singles championship.  They are the clear #1 and #2; it's not easy to envision either losing prior to this showdown.  If the envisaged final happens, it will be decisive in establishing King of the Hill for the year.  Djokovic is trying to run victory laps in his Grand Slam competition with Federer and Nadal, and Carlos is ready to try to dislodge him, which a Wimbledon win should do. 

They are both all-around talents with all the shots, excellent tactical ability, and extraordinary court coverage (legs).  Initially, it seemed that Carlitos was just following in Rafael Nadal's Spanish steps, but I now see more similarity with Djokovic and his approach.  We may see in Wimbledon whether he can match his mental discipline. 

Prigozhin v. Gerasimov - The Russian head of the infamous Wagner mercenary force brought his feud with the incompetent, corrupt Russian Defense establishment out into the open, so much so that even brainwashed Russian citizens would notice it. Though dramatic, I would minimize it as having singular importance, being another example of the chaotic Russian war effort.  While Prigozhin's force moved through the interior of Russia in a way that was shocking, he shied away from confronting Putin himself.  And Putin, for his part, was willing to grant Prigozhin the favored exile status he has given other oligarchs in the past,  ones who do not challenge Vladimir's reign. 

But, in fact Prigozhin violated that trust, the understanding between superior and subordinate, and Putin, while sympathetic to his complaint, will not forgive. I would bet on the parlay that neither Prigozhin, nor the general in charge of the Ukraine campaign (Gerasimov)will survive beyond spring of 2024 in a form we would recognize as living.  

I would have to say that this moment--when Wagner is standing down and the Chechen forces were pulled back to counter the Wagner threat--must be the time for Ukraine to push forward with whatever offensive they can muster, against the weak spots that they identified or that suddenly emerge.  There is still the possibility of a rout, such as occurred on the other side of the Dneiper and in the Kharkiv area earlier on.  Barring that, I look for an armistice (not a peace deal) before winter. 

Trump v. DeSantis - Many of these matchups are in the genre I call "Alien vs. Predator", after the sequel movie pitting monsters.  One roots only for all involved to fall.  In this case, the Crueler than Thou policy competition favors "Marquis" DeSadeness over whiny, vengeful D'Head*  due to DeSantis' more targeted attack (vague though it is). This Republican campaign is beyond that, though-- Alien v. Predator v. King Kong v. Mothra v. Godzilla.  Shells flying in all directions. 

My betting on RNom on PredictIt, one of the few, but very salient, markets still traded there, is No on both headliners, looking for the combined second shoe from Jack Smith and Georgia's indictments to take the wind from Trump's back near year's end.  The opening will be too late for DeSantis, though; I see a path for a third person to snatch it, whoever that might be could hardly be worse than the winner of the current featured bout. 

Roe v. Wade - (Just to remind, "Roe" was the complainant seeking legal access to abortion; Wade represented those who would limit it) -  Wade picked up a significant win with the Dobbs decision; Roe countered with the '22 midterms.  Like Ali v. Frazier, the third showdown will have some finality, as the Democrats seemed determined to make it front-and-center, while the Republicans are playing up their pro-life credentials during this pre-primary season in a way that will make it hard for them to hide next November.  If the Democrats win in '24, Roe will gain some legislative backing, whereas if the GOP wins, the question will be simply whether there will be Federal prohibitions (the 15-week standard seems to be a consensus position for Republicans) or will a chaotic state-by-state mess remain. 

In the meantime, the numbers are starting to roll in for the first year of Wade's revival:  How many abortions averted, how many diverted, and how many lives ruined.   I would say it is more the awareness of the fragility of our personal rights that is the issue than those numbers, while on the right the danger of overreach is everpresent. 

Humans v. Gaia - This is one of those battles in which, the more you win, the more you lose.  We are definitely winning the climate change this season (as opposed to the embattled less-climate change faction).  Excessive rain, excessive temperature, and aggravated cyclonic storms are the themes for the "temperate" and "subtropical" zones (not sure about the arctic ones yet).  El Nino will ensure record global mean temperatures this year.  

Politically, the "we still have lots of fossil fuels, what's the hurry?" faction is ascendant. (Also here, right, Gov. Lujan Grisham?) The problems with relying too much on electricity to replace fossil fuels are many (batteries, grid leakage, the fossil fuel sourcing for much electricity).  Nuclear is raising its head in various forms to fill the gaps in timing from renewables, which will be a mixed response at best. 

I am encouraged by the recognition in some of the areas impacted by the current heat wave (in Arizona, Texas, and much of the Deep South) that these are problems that will recur.  One part of the answer is the establishment of public "cooling centers".  If we must air condition the masses, this is the efficient way to do it. 

I am not one who believes Gaia will aim for total annihilation of humanity in order to cleanse itself--She is wise enough to know that we will do it for ourselves, sooner or later.  We will survive our climate snafu, but the issue is, as always, quality of life.  In this our track record is poor and our current level (better than ever, but) vulnerable. 

* I have decided to cease referring to the Criminal Traitor Former President as "Dickhead", as the reference shows insufficient respect for the male organ. 

2023: The Year of Phony Crisis

We've had some real critical moments in the past couple of years:  the COVID pandemic, the 2020 Presidential election and the January 6 aftermath of it, and the definitive break with the "postwar" and "post-Cold War" peaceful international status in the West caused by Putin's invasion of Ukraine. 

What's going on now with our 24/7 news cycle is a batch of invented crisis-mongering, whipping ourselves into unwarranted frenzies about lesser issues, or news stories that aren't even issues.  Our electoral parties are similarly making somewhat hysterical appeals--for fundraising purposes, of course--in a year where there are really no domestic elections of national significance.  On that subject, let's just keep our political contribution powder dry this year, as we will be called upon for 2024, which is certain to be an epic battle with massive potential consequences.

Looking at some of the specific so-called crises: 

The Border - The expiration of the Title 42 mandate requiring US border authorities to turn away virtually all migrant asylum-seekers is the opposite of a crisis.  It instead marks the official end of pandemic crisis-related policy with regard to immigration.  The policy was likely a violation of international law, but we have often seen that concern fall by the wayside when it runs up against national security interest.  Personally, I doubt that Title 42 really had all that much to do with protecting public health--the virus never observed border niceties--but was instead a convenient method for our Dickhead 45 to fulfill his populist promise to close down opportunities for immigration.

Now, the promised tidal wave of uncontrolled border crossing has not materialized.  If we are looking forward for initiatives to manage likely future surges of unsponsored people seeking to immigrate, I can propose one (see * below), but for the time being our careful preparations are providing for orderly handling of asylum applications.   This clear failure of one of the Republicans' pet political rabble-rousing notions is an outcome worthy of public promotion. 

"Balloongate" - The publicly-revealed identification of a Chinese spy balloon over us was accidental.  (see The Sheep Look Up, an underrated near-future sci-fi novel from a couple decades ago by the hugely underrated, largely-forgotten John Brunner).   The balloon's incursion was no big deal, it turns out; they'd sent them over us before, and our intelligence agencies knew it.  It was kind of fun to shoot it down, though I thought it would be more spectacular to figure out how to capture it whole.  The problem is that it poisoned further our messy relationship with China, which is one of utmost importance.  Overreaction should be carefully avoided, on both sides. 

The Debt Limit -- Our Federal government's brinkmanship in authorizing this routine measure is totally unnecessary.  Congress approved the spending, and the revenue measures which only partially fund them, and thus the debt.  The Treasury does not need to have approval to execute the laws that relate to these--that's in the Constitution.  They must issue the debt instruments, just as they must seek to collect revenues.  If the subject is, instead, reducing that gap between revenue and spending, fine.  A different question.  President Biden will find a way to have two linked bills, as a concession to the Republican House majority, but the one relating to the debt limit needs to have some measure preventing future inanity of the sort going on now. 

Banking Deposits - One unintended consequence of the official interest rate rises the Federal Reserve has used, in its efforts to combat the higher inflation seen since the pandemic receded, has been some banks' competition to attract or retain deposits by raising the rates they offer.  Banks naturally want to grow profits, and in order to make more loans they need to have funding to correspond, but there is great danger in getting too far ahead of the pack.  The money thus attracted is unstable, ready to pull out when a new, even higher rate is offered by others, or simply because the depositors' timeframe is short-term.

From the accounts I've read, the failed Silicon Valley Bank had this problem.  Their management seemed to think they had a nearly-unlimited profit-generating machine, taking in large demand deposits (getting those depositors to promise exclusivity, a different bad practice) and laying off the money in long-term bonds, getting fat spreads between rates offered and loans (bonds are a form of loan).  This creates what's called "duration risk"; it is mitigated if a bank has, behind that speculative funding, some more stable core deposits or sufficient capital.  Without that, when these well-heeled tech firms found other needs for their deposits and pulled them out, a liquidity crisis occurred at SVB--they didn't have the money to pay back the depositors--and the bank became insolvent and was taken over by regulators.  This was a huge error by the bank's asset-liability management function, which is expected to contain such a risk. 

Treasury regulators moved to assure that all deposits would be protected and available, even those way in excess of the FDIC's insurance limits.  The move was a regrettable precedent, one necessitated by their belated recognition that this medium-large bank's failure presented a risk to the whole banking system. Yet the contagion they spotted has spread to other banks, ones not necessarily afflicted with the same problem:  any bank is vulnerable to depositors' panicky flight if enough of them act simultaneously (as in Jimmy Stewart's bank in the movie It's a Wonderful Life).  Banking institutions are now obliged to take some unpleasant measures, reducing their spreads and reducing their lending to make sure they protect their liquidity. A broader crisis should thus be averted, and banks will subsequently look for opportunities to start taking deposit rates back down to restore profitability as soon as they feel they can. 

This one is more like the "opportunity event" that is supposedly the Chinese term for "crisis". The lesson going forward is that it is not just the identified "too big to fail" extra-large institutions that need close supervision on the management of assets, liabilities, and capital, and that smaller institutions' contributions to the FDIC (an agency which is normally self-funded by the banks that are themselves regulated by it) need to have, in their calculations, the risk of deposit outflow taken more into account. 

The real crises for the US, apart from that looming 2024 electoral battle royal, are festering policy problems that are not being addressed, storms that are gathering force.  I would list among those our electoral system (voting rights, anti-democratic measures, threats to electoral officials), our decaying education system (especially the lack of grounding in civics, history, and critical analysis in it, along with inadequate funding and inadequate compensation for teachers), lack of commitment to measures to combat or mitigate climate change, our diplomatic impasse with China (subject of more posts here in the near future), lack of a meaningful immigration policy (actually, a global problem), and, of course, guns. 

* My long-term proposal would be to work with Mexico (imagine that!) to create a large, well-funded expanded consulate somewhere a decent distance away from our border (Matamoros, or Monterrey, maybe) as a center for handling asylum applications for those coming from beyond Mexico.  Additional staffing to handle them, and housing for 30 days for those would-be migrants, along with enhanced security provided both by Mexico and the US, working together.  It's not the comprehensive reform of immigration policy we need, but just a sufficiently aggressive provision to cool the issue until such time as we can look at it rationally (post-Trump).