The Crisis Scenario

In the Null Scenario of political stasis under the closely-balanced partisan regime, we expect certain conditions to continue unchanged through the 2024 election.  One is the absence of any bipartisanship; I'm not even going to consider the possibility that changes next year.  The backdrop for the election cycle would change dramatically, though, if the relatively benign economy tanks, or if the war against Russian aggression is no longer so safely contained far from us. So far, Ukraine has held, and the cost to us of defending its sovereignty has only been material and financial, and there is no indication yet of imminent economic disaster. 

Those are two possible upsets against the status quo that are easily envisioned, though of course there are many others much harder to define specifically.  South Korea, China, the Middle East, North Africa--there's a long list of potential spots that could overheat. A recurrence of Covid in a more virulent form, or a new pandemic. Some kind of prolonged "natural" environmental disaster in the US worse than the ones we've experienced this year.

And then, there's the ones we might create for ourselves.  Think of Black Lives Matter, and how that clamor rose above the pandemic itself.  What about some sort of local resistance to governmental authority on a mass scale, and would it come from the right or the left?   Could the continuing Fed policy of tightening (even if not additional rate increases) produce the recession many still expect, and could an initially mild recession lead rapidly to further unraveling of our economic wealth, as the 2008 one threatened to do?

No one is expecting a deus ex machina, but a machine from outerspace?  One of our satellites crashing down, or one of theirs?  And who is "they", exactly?  We are once again hearing of the suppression of information about some now-named "Unexplained Aerial Phenomena". 

To consider the political import, in most of the crises I have suggested above, Americans' strong tendency would be to pull together and seek to preserve that which can be saved.  That's a conservative impulse, and, while the initial reaction to foreign dangers might be more in the direction of Trump's avoidance of entanglement, that doesn't tend to last forever.  So, timing could be important:  how the pandemic hurt Trump in the election was not his crazed initial behavior, or even the second, even more thickheaded phase he went through in the summer, but the fact he still hadn't gotten a coherent national response together by November.  

The principal thing to note about any of these crises is that they would change the terms of discussion.  We would not be so focused on the Trump Trials, or the legitimacy of the 2020 election, or even abortion rights.  The Constitution and its own critical issues would remain a topic, because it is always one, but the tragicomedy that is Trump's political career would become less central to most.  

I feel that in most of these cases the Biden administration would be able to rise to the occasion, which would be the key test:  advantage to the incumbent, if it is perceived as handling the crisis well.  Or, possibly even if not perceived well:  see the 2004 election!

I see crisis-driven disruptions to our politics in an election year as being less important than the long-term effects. The War of 1812 changed thinking about the need for a standing army; World War II gave impetus to the civil rights movement.  

There might well be a serious third-party arising from a crisis, which would signify that neither party's policy was addressing a significant popular sentiment about addressing it.  A Peace Party, or a Climate Party, or a Gun Party. (Don't laugh!) I feel this is less than likely in most of these potential crises, at least in the same year.  In an extreme case, turnout could drop sharply, adding more uncertainty to outcomes. 

Senate/House:  Incumbents would tend to do well in this scenario.  This might give the Democrats a better chance to defend difficult seats and hold control of the Senate (with Manchin).  It could help Republicans in close districts to survive, and thus keep their party's House control  as well.  The exception might be if there is a perception that Congress itself is at fault directly for the crisis.   I'm thinking here of economic paralysis arising out of  Congressional deadlock.  

Summary:  Though we would all wish to avoid the unexpected, its collateral effects on our politics may be less than catastrophic. 

Ed.  (10/12/23) - I promised to address the crisis of completely unfinished trial business in this scenario. If a trial of major direct significance to Trump, such as the DC Jack Smith case, has an uncertain outcome even by November, voters will truly be in a quandary.  That trial should be completed by then, even though Trump's strategy will be to delay, delay. A  more likely situation would be a conviction in that trial, waiting for appeal, and the Georgia trial hitting its climax in the fall election season.  Would the sentence be carried out?  Would Trump be in a position to pardon himself if he wins?  A conviction in Georgia would not be subject to his pardon, though the governor there could do it, if he wanted.  

It  suggests something like what has been happening in Israel, pre-war, with Netanyahu fighting criminal prosecution while campaigning, and then more recently, trying to change the law so he wouldn't be prosecuted.  It would bring great weakness in our global posture and likely would provoke one of our antagonists to start something. 

Electorally, I can't see Trump's whining  producing much sympathy from the general public, even though the indictments helped his polling numbers within the Republican base.  It is the independents, though, who will decide the election, and I suspect they would not appreciate the ambiguity.