Both Out (B. & T.)

The American people have indicated clearly, albeit only through polling, that a majority would prefer to see the leading candidate of each major party out of the race. That would open up the 2024 contest to a new generation of leaders and possibly some new ways of thinking, which is admittedly quite attractive. The question is how that could ever come about. 

Almost certainly it would have to start with former President Trump leaving the race, though that could be for a variety of reasons.  In the other direction, I don't think President Biden dropping out would be any kind of impediment to Trump's running or a reason to quit--he has a desire to get even that won't be satisfied in any way other than using the Federal government to get his revenge, and the targets of his vengeance are so many that removing one from his hit list would not change that. 

The key thing would be to get Trump out of the way soon.  Then Biden would have some opportunity to reflect and think that signal idea of the moment, "Why not someone else?" Once he announced his withdrawal under those circumstances, events would take their own chaotic course. If things happen so quickly that Biden could withdraw before the primaries, or if he announced his intention to complete his term and then step aside, a nominee could be determined by the convention delegates chosen, even if after the primaries.   

Biden could cite health reasons, and no one would really argue the point.  He could say he needed to help his son Hunter with his escalating legal problems, though I don't think he would. He could say he's fed up with Washington, dealing with Republican dinosaurs, even trying to please an ungrateful public, and again all those are plausible, but not his style. His would be more to say that he is relieved and ready to retire. 

I do think he would want to get out if the menace of Trump's return is lifted from us, but it would have to be in a form that is definitive, with regard to the 2024 election.  As I said in a previous post, there are many ways that can be accomplished.  

How to get him out, though?  I do believe the compounding effect of all these indictments and trials (and, presumably, some eventual convictions) will make him next to unelectable in November, 2024. ("next to" being the key words, when the Electoral College is involved) The key to turning things around is for Republicans to see this, just in time.  Nikki Haley has a chance to brand him as a loser we don't want around anymore; if she fails to do this, she deserves the suffering we will all experience. 

Another possibility is that he fatally shows weakness. I'm thinking physical weakness, but it could also be brazen cowardice.  Macho men all across the nation of all ethnicities see him as a kindred spirit, fallible but "strong".  Something like the visual equivalent of "pudding fingers" for Ron DeSantis could reveal the insecure weakling he is inside for all to see. 

Or he could just die. As discussed, sooner better than later. 

A 2024 Presidential Election without the Two Headliners

It would certainly be interesting.  The 2020 election focused on the binary choice in a narrow Presidential race, and we will discuss that scenario repeating itself in our next posts.  Without those two running, I would expect both that turnout would decrease and that third- and fourth-party percentages would rise (thinking RFKJR as Libertarian and Cornel Wes for the rejuvenated Greens).  

The Republicans would have more of a crisis, I think: post-Trumpism could take various forms.  Besides Haley and Ron DeSantis, there might be significant new contenders entering the race late.  I'm thinking specifically of Virginia's Governor Glenn Youngkin, who will be termed out in 2025, but I wouldn't be surprised to see some reptiles from Congress (there are none in the race now!), such as Ted Cruz (to raise his profile before having to defend his Senate seat when he finds out how few Republicans like him) or Josh Hawley.  Depending on the state and the timing of Trump's descent (a hole in the floor taking the place of the escalator), such new entrants might be too late for some primaries, but in a dynamic environment such as would develop in '24 under these circumstances, a late move could be decisive--for example, if there are a lot of delegates committed to a no-longer-active Trump candidacy who would then be up for grabs.  

As for the Democrats, if Biden dropped out the party might move quickly behind Kamala Harris, particularly if time were short (or the convention already past).  If there were time to mobilize a candidacy, though, she would be challenged--probably from the moderate wing, and one would expect that Gavin Newsom's loyalty to the Biden-Harris ticket (very laudable!) would end abruptly.  I don't see Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries throwing his hat in, as he is looking forward to a likely Speakership in the next Congress, or the one after.  As I suggested before, it might be the time that Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez goes national for the first time, but only if she's confident that it would not be the last, regardless of outcome.   And why not, given the example of Joe Biden?  

The favorite in a general election under these circumstances would be the one whose nomination came about with the least internal damage to the party--the least chaotic, the least cantankerous.  There is big money waiting for the nominees, and they will fight hard to get at it.  The Democrats are historically more known for fighting with each other, but lately it has been quite different with the Republican party.  Once Trump is out of the way, though, you have to think they will come to a new, more authoritarian consensus (we don't call it "populist"), but one with some respect for laws now.  Maybe not recovering that famous certitude and consistency in talking points as quickly as November, 2024, though.  As for Congress, the starting point would still be the struggle to hold the Senate for the Democrats and the similar struggle of the Republicans to hold the House, dictated by the numbers.  This could change, however, if a landslide develops due to one party's mismanagement of this opportunity/crisis. 

I saw a panel discussing the Republican race yesterday:  the respected Republican pollster Kristen Soltis Anderson suggested the chances Trump could be defeated were 1 in 10.  I'd buy that estimate and add 5% that Trump involuntarily leaves.   Out of that 15%, I'd say at least half of the probability would then have Biden finding a reason to step aside.  

So this is a low-probability scenario, but undoubtedly the most fun.   Maybe the best, all-around for the US. 

Biden Out

 I will grant that President Biden does not seem to be running a strong re-election campaign at this "late" date a mere 13 1/2 months before the election.  There's plenty of time, really. 

There may be a question of whether Biden has plenty of time, though, if one is speaking of 5+ more years in the most difficult job in the world at age whatever.  It's a legitimate question, though the answer to that is clearly not to elect an unhealthy guy 3 years younger with illegitimate motives and behavior, so I don't see it resonating in the standard B v. T scenarios.  Biden has some difficulty with public speech, which I can confirm was present 50 years ago, but those who listen know that he can think and communicate clearly.  He walks like an 80-year-old in good health, nothing unusual these days.  

The noise from Democrats about his voluntarily withdrawing from the political battlefield, while Trump is still on it, is just that.  It's not their decision; someone would have to convince Biden that they would be better at defeating The Former Guy.  To put it on the other foot, like, if Nikki Haley showed Trump data that meant she would have a better chance than he to defeat Biden, then Trump would withdraw.  Right. /s

So, I'm really just talking about the various ways Biden would involuntarily leave the race.  

One that we cannot simply ignore is the possibility of a scandal affecting Joe Biden. Personally,  not his family members.  Biden is certainly a wealthy man, but he should be after 40-some years of public service at the highest levels and a restrained lifestyle.  (If you don't pay honest public servants adequately, you should expect corruption.)  There is the possibility of Biden choosing not to run for re-election and citing Hunter Biden's looming conviction(s) and possible jail time;  my response would be that there would have been some other reason even in that case.  I do not think it would be determinant of his decision, as he says it was with his other son Beau's cancer illness in relation to choosing not to run for President in 2016 as the sitting VP to Obama.*

So, we are really down to the sickness, death, and 25th Amendment part of the discussion. It's something real enough, but it is also a quantifiable, manageable risk.  It's really only a risk for the campaign and the election, as the Constitution is now very clear about succession.  But what happens, and when in the campaign it could happen, are critical to consider:  who here remembers Sen. Eagleton as VP candidate for George McGovern in 1972  until he dropped out, after the convention?  It was a political mess and hampered that quixotic campaign, but it is something that Biden can avoid. ++ 

Here is how I would approach it, if I were in the position that Joe Biden finds himself in:  He should make out a Political Will.  He should then give it privately to three largely disinterested senior officials--I would recommend Congressional Leaders Schumer and Jeffries, and former Speaker Nancy Pelosi.  In it, he should indicate what his preferred successor ticket would be should something happen to him.  It could be Kamala Harris and Pete Buttigieg, Kamala and throw it open for VP, just throw it open with some process indicated, whatever he wants.  Though it could be updated, the Will would remain secret, unless or until Biden was no longer able to serve.  Then it should become public.  In the meantime, those three would remain silent on the party leadership succession question but supporting Biden at all times, just as they do today. 

 Seems suspicious?  /s

The thing is, Biden is the elected representative of the people of the US until he's not.  Anyone who challenges that, under the circumstances, is basically an enabler of seditious conspiracy. So there's a pretty clear line.  Even most Republican office-holders will agree to that by now. 25th Amendment challenges to his authority are going to remain off-limits until there's extreme visible evidence. So, his point of view should matter; he's shown decent judgement, having been a better President than most (see below). 

If Biden were out, though, with Trump in the race, there would be madness without that Will. 

In the case after the nomination (assuming the Biden-Harris ticket is confirmed in the primary), Kamala would have to take the reins, though she would very likely be challenged.  In any case, she would have to announce, forthwith, her VP choice, and there would have to be some ratification process.  She would have no more than a matter of days.  Then, the campaign would have to advise each state how to modify the ticket on the ballot, if indeed they can change it.  Timing would be mission-critical, especially if the ensuing race is close. 

The case of his dropping out before the nomination is the one Democrats and Republican alike drool about, though I see the chances from now until then, considering all possibilities, to be less than 3%. Some kind of late train wreck, a 1968 scenario, as in RFK getting assassinated in California in June, just after the primary that was going to put him ahead.  Again:  The Will is the way to avoid that.  (Someone please tell them. :)

I saw a puff piece (no credits) with five pictures for that scenario:  Harris, CA Gov. Gavin Newsom, MI Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, Transportation Secretary Buttigieg, and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.  I think all those choices are accurate, even Ocasio-Cortez, who would have no chance to win, except in something like a five-sided race, but might well be the Bernie wing's choice.  But that's before the primaries, so even less likely.  It is however likely that the Democratic race could start shaping up that way, even soon after the 2024 election, as an initial framing of something that will go on for years.  Biden may leave the White House sooner, or later, but it's certain that, as a duck, he will be lame by late 2025.  Not the right kind of duck, for the world. 

Would Trump walk all over the replacement nominee, no matter whom?  I say no, not any of them.+++  These are smart people, capable, calm, rational, and they have plenty of warning, so they will be careful around him.  He's still not likely to win, though a third-party could easily come into play here and disrupt the scenario, especially if the Democratic replacement process is just a disaster. 

 The Will, again.  Maybe they have one--we wouldn't know, would we?

 

Biden as President, in 300 Words or Less

In his first 30 months as President, Biden has governed, or tried to govern, in line with his supporters in the 2020 election, a Democratic voting base that's somewhat left of center. Faced with the narrowest of Congressional margins, he accomplished legislation to move us in directions needed for our future (for infrastructure and renewable fuels).  As a longtime insider, he was able to get done more with such a fragmented legislature than Obama.  Still, he hasn't gotten either the current or previous Congress to move on immigration, or to do enough to secure Federal elections. 

In many public addresses and executive actions, Biden tried to protect us from the damage his opponents would cause us, often designed to handicap or cripple the capabilities of his administration.  (I'm thinking of the Supreme Court, Republican Congress, a former President.)

 He has performed well on foreign policy, a strong point, doing his best to re-establish ties with allies skeptical after Trump. The contrast in behavior with Trump is stark: Biden has acted with solemnity when he needed, silence when needed, and he stood up to Putin in a way that mattered. 

With regard to China, he has lowered the temperature despite many challenges; with Russia, he ended Trump’s appeasement when it became necessary with the Ukraine invasion; with India and some other Asian nations more than willing to let us stand with them, he has located and brought them in.

On the military side, he didn't get good execution when he decided to go forward with Trump's deal with the Taliban.**  After that, no major direct US military engagements.  We seem appropriately ready, involved, but at peace.  Even that is criticized. 

As for economics, while Presidents can’t do so much, Biden, like Obama, inherited a sick economy and got it back on its feet.

Yeah, gas prices suck--too bad. 

 (That last sentence not being part of the 300)

Footnotes

*Utah Senator Mitt Romney and Biden would have faced off in a better 2016 election, but Romney had expended his political capital fruitlessly challenging the incumbent President Obama, while Biden opted out, leaving the door open for Hillary Clinton.  Romney would have provided a much better opponent to Trump in the Republican primaries than John Kasich and Ted Cruz did.  Alas!

**If Trump were really such a good deal-maker, he would have traded better with the Talib:  Make Bagram Air Force Base US territory (like Guantanamo, really) and you get the rest of the country for your sick policies.  That would have provided a real deterrent and made for a better withdrawal. 

++  The reference I suggest is Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail, 1972, by Hunter S. Thompson.  If you haven't read it, it's a good ride. 

+++OK, maybe AOC, who would probably scream at him, he's so awful. That would hurt her, not him, as the standards are different for Democrats and their supporters.  As I see on comment threads, IOKIYAR.  (It's OK if You Are Republican.) 

Trump Out

 It is delicious to consider the ways Donald Trump might leave the 2024 race.  The idea I treasured was that the weight of multiple criminal trials, augmented by an endless stream of civil suits, would cause him to just pack it in.  The toll that breaks him could be psychological, physical, financial, economical, or just pure exhaustion from anger and anxiety.  While it does seem like this series of judicial setbacks and indictments is taking a toll on his psyche, it's not looking like that will drive him to quit. 

There is the possibility of severe illness, or death.  That would do the trick to get him out.  

There are other possibilities that could possibly deter him or even prevent him from completing his primary campaign and/or winning the nomination. He could be jailed, more likely for contempt of court or defying a gag order than for a sentence after conviction, as I don't think any case is likely to reach that stage, pre-November; however, he could even continue his campaign from behind bars--we should be certain he would make the most of it, performance-wise.  There is the thing about the 14th Amendment, which states people who participate in insurrection should be barred from Federal office.  OK, he did it, but who gets to decide that?  Without a conviction for sedition, I can't see the courts upholding it.  I don't think obstruction of a Federal proceeding will do it. 

He could be defeated in the Republican primaries.  It seems impossible now, but it's still early.  The most salient challenge to him yet within the party is the poll that shows that Nikki Haley does significantly better than he (or any other declared Republican candidate) against Biden.  It's not hard to understand:  she has a better chance of getting votes from some portion of those women who have had their rights reduced by Trumpist Supreme Court Justices.  But still, if it comes to a primary head-to-head against any of them, he will get the majority in most or all states.  As things stand. 

There could even be something he does that finally goes beyond what his supporters, generally, can tolerate.  Maybe trying to strangle Melania, or Tiffany?   It's hard to imagine his support falling so much that it would drive him to quit, unless it were through unlikely electoral defeat. 

I do feel the hammer blows of the trials will do damage, but they themselves are unlikely to drive him out.  If they do, or if by other means Trump is out, though, it could get very interesting. If something were to happen soon, say before Super Tuesday, there would be a scramble to get into the race from people like Chris Sununu of New Hampshire or Glenn Youngkin of Virginia, along with a ramping up of the funds raised by candidates like Haley or Tim Scott, who may suddenly have a chance.  Even Ron DeSantis, in this case!

I think it's far more likely, if we are presuming Trump out (and Biden remaining in) that this would be something happening much later, when Trump has a monster lead in delegates or has received the nomination. (I'm going by the deliberate pace of these trials, and that they may possibly wear on him physically as well.)   If that's the case, I can't see the Republican convention delegates, or the Republican National Committee members, who'd be called for a quick decision after the convention, doing any kind of an about-face with regard to the Trumpist populist nationalist theme.  So, that would point to a selection of the most Trumpy one around, Vivek Ramaswamy or Scott, or Kristi Noem (rumored to be Trump's favorite VP choice), maybe. 

This kind of sudden Trump departure may not derail the Republicans' chances, even if Trump's departure is egregious or shameful. There seem to be many who would have less qualms about voting against the Democrats if the Presidential candidate were someone they didn't have to feel guilty about supporting.  Similarly, if Trump bails early and the Republicans have time to consider their selection, that person may find their voice on issues like shrinking the Federal government and immigration in a way that will put the Biden campaign on the defensive. The successor is also likely to be considerably younger in that circumstance, which will also work against Biden's successful re-election. 

I think the same logic could apply to Congressional races--voters tend to despise Washington but like their Congressperson.  I don't think Trump's passing from the scene will hurt most Representatives from red districts, while the effect on swing districts would depend on the circumstances.  There could be sympathetic support for Trump's successor, and there could be a rally around that person stronger than the feigned love Republican office-holders offer for the Wherever Man. That would mean coattails.

I don't see a Trump departure giving any assist to third-party candidacies of the right.  Republicans would glom together very quickly.  The same may not be true of the left:  without Trump to unify Democrats, Biden's support may suffer and someone (RFKJR?)  could cleave off some support. 

So, this one's not all positive for Democratic chances by any means.  But I'll still take it, unlikely as it seems.

The Crisis Scenario

In the Null Scenario of political stasis under the closely-balanced partisan regime, we expect certain conditions to continue unchanged through the 2024 election.  One is the absence of any bipartisanship; I'm not even going to consider the possibility that changes next year.  The backdrop for the election cycle would change dramatically, though, if the relatively benign economy tanks, or if the war against Russian aggression is no longer so safely contained far from us. So far, Ukraine has held, and the cost to us of defending its sovereignty has only been material and financial, and there is no indication yet of imminent economic disaster. 

Those are two possible upsets against the status quo that are easily envisioned, though of course there are many others much harder to define specifically.  South Korea, China, the Middle East, North Africa--there's a long list of potential spots that could overheat. A recurrence of Covid in a more virulent form, or a new pandemic. Some kind of prolonged "natural" environmental disaster in the US worse than the ones we've experienced this year.

And then, there's the ones we might create for ourselves.  Think of Black Lives Matter, and how that clamor rose above the pandemic itself.  What about some sort of local resistance to governmental authority on a mass scale, and would it come from the right or the left?   Could the continuing Fed policy of tightening (even if not additional rate increases) produce the recession many still expect, and could an initially mild recession lead rapidly to further unraveling of our economic wealth, as the 2008 one threatened to do?

No one is expecting a deus ex machina, but a machine from outerspace?  One of our satellites crashing down, or one of theirs?  And who is "they", exactly?  We are once again hearing of the suppression of information about some now-named "Unexplained Aerial Phenomena". 

To consider the political import, in most of the crises I have suggested above, Americans' strong tendency would be to pull together and seek to preserve that which can be saved.  That's a conservative impulse, and, while the initial reaction to foreign dangers might be more in the direction of Trump's avoidance of entanglement, that doesn't tend to last forever.  So, timing could be important:  how the pandemic hurt Trump in the election was not his crazed initial behavior, or even the second, even more thickheaded phase he went through in the summer, but the fact he still hadn't gotten a coherent national response together by November.  

The principal thing to note about any of these crises is that they would change the terms of discussion.  We would not be so focused on the Trump Trials, or the legitimacy of the 2020 election, or even abortion rights.  The Constitution and its own critical issues would remain a topic, because it is always one, but the tragicomedy that is Trump's political career would become less central to most.  

I feel that in most of these cases the Biden administration would be able to rise to the occasion, which would be the key test:  advantage to the incumbent, if it is perceived as handling the crisis well.  Or, possibly even if not perceived well:  see the 2004 election!

I see crisis-driven disruptions to our politics in an election year as being less important than the long-term effects. The War of 1812 changed thinking about the need for a standing army; World War II gave impetus to the civil rights movement.  

There might well be a serious third-party arising from a crisis, which would signify that neither party's policy was addressing a significant popular sentiment about addressing it.  A Peace Party, or a Climate Party, or a Gun Party. (Don't laugh!) I feel this is less than likely in most of these potential crises, at least in the same year.  In an extreme case, turnout could drop sharply, adding more uncertainty to outcomes. 

Senate/House:  Incumbents would tend to do well in this scenario.  This might give the Democrats a better chance to defend difficult seats and hold control of the Senate (with Manchin).  It could help Republicans in close districts to survive, and thus keep their party's House control  as well.  The exception might be if there is a perception that Congress itself is at fault directly for the crisis.   I'm thinking here of economic paralysis arising out of  Congressional deadlock.  

Summary:  Though we would all wish to avoid the unexpected, its collateral effects on our politics may be less than catastrophic. 

Ed.  (10/12/23) - I promised to address the crisis of completely unfinished trial business in this scenario. If a trial of major direct significance to Trump, such as the DC Jack Smith case, has an uncertain outcome even by November, voters will truly be in a quandary.  That trial should be completed by then, even though Trump's strategy will be to delay, delay. A  more likely situation would be a conviction in that trial, waiting for appeal, and the Georgia trial hitting its climax in the fall election season.  Would the sentence be carried out?  Would Trump be in a position to pardon himself if he wins?  A conviction in Georgia would not be subject to his pardon, though the governor there could do it, if he wanted.  

It  suggests something like what has been happening in Israel, pre-war, with Netanyahu fighting criminal prosecution while campaigning, and then more recently, trying to change the law so he wouldn't be prosecuted.  It would bring great weakness in our global posture and likely would provoke one of our antagonists to start something. 

Electorally, I can't see Trump's whining  producing much sympathy from the general public, even though the indictments helped his polling numbers within the Republican base.  It is the independents, though, who will decide the election, and I suspect they would not appreciate the ambiguity.  

Biden Weakened

 It is painfully easy to imagine the situation in which President Biden cannot conduct a full-throated political campaign, though still able to function in his job.  It is one that is much more serious than the current state of Biden's compos mentis et corporalis, yet not death or even terminal illness or permanent incapacity.  It could even include his being an invalid for some period of time.  

It is not hard to see Biden adopting a nearly 100% digital, TV-based approach to the 2024 campaign under these circumstances, due to whatever health issues.  He almost did that in 2020, and it worked out okay. The circumstances will be different this time, and his minimal participation in public events, with no debates, will be noted by those whisperers who will not allow him to "do the FDR thing" (or maybe he would think of it as "doing the JFK thing").  He would be weakened, whenever it became general knowledge, anytime before the election. 

The critical question in assessing what could happen in such a circumstance is the timing. For this, it would be before the election. The 25th Amendment covers who acts as President, but not who would run for the office. No one's going to allow someone from the opposition to take the White House under those circumstances. So, the issue is what would be the effect on the election of a serious downturn in his health before the election? One where he doesn't step aside?

Whenever it becomes public, the stock market would surely take a tumble, a forerunner of a general near-panic. In this scenario, we assume Biden makes some sort of a "recovery" allowing him to soldier on. Which he would no doubt choose to do, other factors being equal.  

One other factor would be if some Democrats decide that this is too much, that their suspicion he can't complete the job has become a conviction, or even a certainty.  If Biden's obvious weakness shows before the nominating convention (Chicago, August; sound familiar?), a challenged President known to be unable to address the assembly could lead to disaster on the floor (see 1968).  Here, though, we're imagining Biden's survival in some form and going on to November.  Like Hubert Humphrey. 

As I recall, the Democrats' antics in '68 failed to convince "Democrat" George Wallace, who ran on a populist third-party and actually won 13% of the popular vote and several Southern states. Democratic splittism must wait for another time.  A third-party run by disaffected Democrats would be fatal. 

If Biden weakens very late in the general election campaign, the Democrats would have to cover themselves with agreement and public announcement on how electors pledged to Biden would vote on the equivalent of January 6, in 2025, if Joe were not going to be able to take the Oath of Office on January 20. Perhaps a President pro tempore of the Senate would be named, just in case, or perhaps Senate Democrats would block that in favor of Speaker Hakeem Jeffries taking the #2 spot in succession? 

That is all hypothetical, of course.  Some Biden weakness emerging very late in the campaign would be worst-case, as voters would be confused as to exactly whom they would be choosing to govern. A weakened Biden means a strengthened, enraged Donald Trump.  His bully nature would emerge, untrammeled. It has the potential to be the worst tragedy of all. 

Senate:  Without significant assistance from the President, several incumbent Senators would be in great danger.  Tester (MT) would have to run on his own, as would Sherrod Brown in Ohio; I feel Bob Casey (PA) would still be a winner.  But there could be trouble for Tammy Baldwin (WI) and Jacky Rosen (NV), while Manchin in WV then looks like a lost cause, and the party's push for Ruben Gallego in AZ to replace Sinema could fall victim to a weakened central party. 

We should expect the Republicans to regain control of the Senate in this scenario, Mitch or no Mitch. Something like  53-47 Republican looks like an average result given these conditions.  

House:  Though Democratic turnout might be reduced overall by such a demoralizing development, there might also be a countervailing strong push in heavily-Democratic districts to protect the nation from a complete Trumpist takeover. That might preserve the floor of the number of Democratic House districts.  Given the opportunities that exist to gain seats, there might even be a chance to get the majority back.  Unlike the Senate, where 60% of votes are needed for most purposes, in the House 50%+1 can get most things done.  (With a strong leader.)  

The Trump Collapse Scenario

This would seem the most logical outcome, yet it does not seem all that probable. The way this plays out is that Trump's support in the primaries carries him through to the nomination, but results along the line of the Standard Trump Trial Outcomes (see below) eventually cost him momentum, and his vote sinks relative to his fall opponent.  (Here we presume that opponent remains Biden, though it could be against an emergency Democratic replacement, if it is a consensus choice not creating scandal.)

Based on review of Presidential contests from the last few decades, it appears there is a tipping point between the close ones, where a few medium-sized, winner-take-all results decide the Electoral College contest, and ones where the margin in the EC blows up disproportionately to the popular vote margin.  The key ones to note in this regard are 1988 (Bush Sr. v. Dukakis) and 2008 (Obama v. McCain).  Each was a 7-point popular vote win; Obama got 336 Electoral Votes and Bush 426.  If you go much beyond that, it becomes an Electoral College rout (1980, 1964). 

Biden won by 4.4% in 2020's popular vote. If he can gain just 2-3% against that result in 2024, the chances for Trump deteriorate rapidly.  The three most-critical swing states from 2020 (AZ, GA, PA) are no longer so close, while NC comes into range.  Trump's imminent loss also would be likely to encourage votes for any sour-grapes third parties on the ballot (Libertarian, No Labels, "Constitutional"), votes the Republicans might otherwise count upon. 

In terms of the Trump Trials in this scenario, there will be a mixed bag by the time of the convention.  Certainly not just a litany of guilty verdicts; there will be some trials in process, some not even commenced, probably a dismissal on some charges, maybe a mistrial.  I'm thinking one or two convictions, no sentencing decisions to speak of.  The Republican Convention attendees will be as worried as can be, but most will try to put a brave face upon it somehow.  Some will not attend; there may be even a futile floor motion contrary to the professed unanimity. Some splinter group will put on a third-party opposition effort--a kind of Evan McMullin, maybe even him.  A bad show.  

From that point, the numbers trend down.  Trump's future Oscar-winning performance in his defense at the GA trial* provides mixed-to-negative results in the polls.  The one state poll that can be trusted--in Iowa--shows a dead heat.  Florida too close to call. 

The floor in terms of popular vote is clear:  37% (1984, 1964). This is true for either party, even when there is a third-party of significance.  So, Trump scores in the 38-42 range and loses by 7-15 percent, the Electoral College result being a margin of 100-300 points. 

A defeat so comprehensive that few Trump supporters remain afterwards to plead his cause. 

As collateral outcomes, Trumpism is defeated, the Republicans have to regroup, the Democrats will be able to govern. The world will not fall apart. For two years, anyway.    

Senate:  This is the one scenario when the Democrats actually have a chance to increase their margin in the Senate. In particular, I would think this is the case when Manchin perceives the chance to keep his seat, stays put, and wins as a Democrat. The key swing state Senate contests (NV, MT, PA, WI) all hold, which makes the long-shot opportunities to pick up a GOP seat more interesting. 

It will still be close, with Sen. McConnell in uncertain condition for the remaining two years in his term making for a scramble among the ambitious would-be party leadership to regroup in the post-Trump era.  

House:  We can talk about a Blue Wave again--we would hear about it, as the Presidential horserace becomes a runaway--but the Republicans have a pretty durable floor, somewhere in the range of 195 seats.  Even more, if they can successfully fight off the courts' decisions that they must re-gerrymander in a way that allows more minority seats in the South. 

There would be a variety of fallback positions Republican candidates will take under this scenario, but most could be described as "making local constituents' interests foremost".  Hiding under the rock from which they came. 

Democrats will pick up 10-15 seats easily, ensuring control.  The next 10-15 are possible but not certain.  That puts the tally in the range of 228 to 233, a workable majority for most purposes. 

Local/State Elections:  There may be a somewhat valid talking point for the mainstream media in the weeks following the wipeout about the relatively strong performance in red states for state and local elections.  

Standard Trump Trial Outcomes

These are what I expect, in general, for all the Scenarios, except where noted. 

1) NY Trial(s):  It's best not to expect too much from the criminal trial finally filed in New York.  When it comes, it will be Michael Cohen's comeuppance in court against Trump--Cohen's already been jailed for his role in this malfeasance.  Trump's fraud in this case is somewhat minor league, by his standards.  

It goes all the way back to 2016's hush-money payments to Stormy Daniels and false reporting of it.  It wouldn't be so much except that it was the first-ever criminal indictment of him.  In political terms, it's old business, certainly discounted in the 2020 re-election run, though that was a chaotic campaign season for the ages. Still, it could be the first criminal case to go to jury, and thus could result in the first conviction, if the timing works.  It is secondary, at best, in terms of scheduling. 

There's another NY trial, a civil case against the Trump Organization for similar offenses on a grander and more prolonged scale.  Trump's accountant has already gone to jail on this, but he is so far going stiff upper lip.  This one is the domestic equivalent of sanctions; that particular entity will be prohibited from a lot of legal and typical borderline activities they would normally engage upon under that name.  It may end up being Trump's record-breaking sixth (?) business bankruptcy.  It won't stop him and his criminal syndication activity, though; he'd just move it to DeSantis' Florida. 

2) Mar-a-Lago documents case:  This one is expected to be in Florida.  I'm expecting this to be the last, or one of the last, to go to trial, probably after the 2024 election.  The Florida judge seems very willing to do whatever she can, within and at the edge of normal ethical standards, to help Trump.  In this regard, I think this case--a sure conviction, under any reasonable objective view--to be the least likely to have a negative effect on Trump's re-election. 

Jack Smith cleverly positioned it to be a clearly winning case.  It does not relate to whether Trump legally ever had possession of the documents, post-January 20.  It relates to his stupid efforts to hide and prevent the government's recovering the documents, so his culpability is almost beyond doubt.  I think his thinking is that it is a fallback case so Trump will not get off completely scot-free, but if it goes beyond January, 2025, there's the risk re-elected President Trump could make it all moot. 

3) DC Case of January 6:  I see this as the biggie:  it is unmistakably the US v. Trump, and it is about whether his actions leading up to the riot constituted crimes against the US and the Constitution.  Even if it's just called "Obstruction of a Federal Proceeding" (the most likely charge for conviction, as I see it), that proceeding was one with serious Constitutional import, so it puts him as opposed to our self-governing republic operating as such.  It is clearly a violation of his oath of office.  He did it, so if they execute the trial properly, it will lead to conviction, even upon appeal, whenever that comes up. 

I don't see its leading to his disqualification under the 14th Amendment, though.  That would probably require a two-thirds act of the Senate, which is not likely to be forthcoming. 

As for timing, Jack Smith's prioritizing this one over the other, the Mar-a-Lago case.  It appears the other DA's in other jurisdictions are also likely to do the same.  This could make it the one that has a conviction prior to the Republican party nominating convention in July.  Right now, it's scheduled for March, but some movement in that date (always backward) seems likely.  Considering any phase of the campaign after April, it could be a factor, or still not sinking in. 

Electoral impact:  Yes, that is the question. Both the question of guilty or not guilty, but also what will happen  after.  Either way, really.  That is, if the verdict comes before November. If it is still pending then, it becomes a whole different story, see Scenario 3.  

4) GA RICO: This is the one that will affect popular media the most, so most likely to affect voter behavior, one way or the other.  Unlike the others, it looks as though it will be televised!

RICO is a fair stretch, so appropriate in general, so questionable in this particular case.  I think most will get off on some form of "it was too disorganized".  The real organiztional activity occurred through untraceable phones and Telegram. 

That is a nice package, but the real crimes are much more tangible and threatening, for the likes of Giuliani and Meadows.  The likelihood of a conviction of Trump himself is too hard for me to say--it will probably need some form of smoking gun, beyond the incriminating phone call.  Like in The Caine Mutiny, though, it doesn't matter the verdict--Trump will have great difficulty with any competent cross-examination, in which he will be exposed as the con man and habitual liar that he is. 

*We should all expect Donald F. Trump to appear in person as defendant, to be precise in the defense case for the GA trial, contrary to the advice of every well-wishing legal partisan.  Too risky!  

He will be making his plea to be freed from all charges in this case.  He will immortalize the obvious line, "I never even went to Georgia!" (I'm sure that will be proven false, in cross-exam.)  His performance (before cross-exam, anyway) will be rehearsed, confident, if possible a little less whiny, sir?  It will be the Exhibit A for future movie versions of the The Obstruction which will win someone an Oscar, not Trump.  Whatever medium it is that they will be using in, say, 2053. 

Initial 2024 Election Post

 

I guess I have to admit the 2024 electoral campaign has started.  If candidates have already entered and failed, then something must be happening.  Indeed, something similar seems to have happened to the campaign of the Marquis (de Sadeness); Governor Ron DeSantis' campaign has already peaked and is imploding. 

Another indicator:  PredictIt has posted its first market on the popular vote margin (Dem%-Rep%).  As far as PI is concerned, this clarifies the limitations they have agreed to with regard to new markets, after a hiatus for over a year.  They still focused the brackets on the null scenario of an Electoral College nailbiter, in the interests of generating revenue (and academic research, too!) To note the initial market take for the record, Dem winning % (tie being the exception) is about 60-40, taking into account the bid/ask. 

I don't count that initial debate as part of the campaign, as such; more like spring training in baseball. I can't resist a couple of comments, anyway. Smarmy Vivek has postulated himself as the most Trumpy of all, and it will be hard to top him for smarminess. Ah, DeSadness!  I think it was a little too evident Ron saw that gig as nowhere.  He was back in his element at home with hurricane warnings and gratuitous insult to Biden. 

I will proceed with a scenario-based analysis, considering the effects upon the massively-important House and Senate races for each.  The 2022-23 status of Congress is anomalous, with the House improbably with a Republican majority, considering the Senate has a narrow Democratic majority.  Most likely outcomes are reversal of both, but the Presidential race should be so consequential that it will carry more coattails than many recent partisan re-alignments in Congress. 

 I will also need to consider possible effects of significant third-party candidacies in each scenario, something that has not happened since Ross Perot in '92 and '96 (the marginal effects of Nader/Stein-type results, as we can expect for Cornel West's candidacy, for example, not changing the scenario, though they could be tiebreakers). 

The planned sequence of posts by scenario is as follows, starting, arbitrarily, by my choice of the most desirable one: 

1 - Trump Collapse.  The weight of his criminal trials cripples him--it only takes a few percent of his following turning against him, but he won't quit. 

2- Biden Weakened - Either economic weakness or undeniable physical/mental weakness makes him less-than-viable for all but his committed supporters. 

3 - War/Chaos - A crisis of massive proportion.  Think Pearl Harbor/9-11/COVID/UFO's, or widespread insurrection.

4 - Trump Out - He does quit, or die, or he is barred from campaign as a result of any of his convictions or court rulings. 

5 - Biden Out - He becomes deathly ill and must be replaced.  Or won't leave and is the victim of a successful party revolt. 

6 - Both Out - The most likely way is Trump gives in or is out for whatever reason, and Biden then finds a reason he doesn't need to run.

7 Stasis - the Null Scenario.  Biden and Trump run until the bitter end.  Debates will be few, and Trump's plea in the Georgia case proves the climax, one way or the other.

I don't want to get too precise about the likelihood of the scenarios, but I would say 1 and 2 are about equally likely at 10% or so, Scenario 6 is probably more likely than either 4 or 5, and all three add up to 20-30%, and Scenario 3 we can pull a number out of the air and say is no more than 5%.  Those events have happened several times in the past century, but have not often come in election years, as it turns out (2020 the exception!)   

That leaves no more than 40-50% likelihood for the Null Scenario that everyone focuses on.  It is, though, the one with the highest likelihood, so I will go into it with the most depth. 

I do not want at all to trivialize or counter the argument that this election is extremely important, on the order of ones like 1860, 1932, or 1968.  In most of these scenarios I describe briefly above, the key question underlying the competition is whether our Constitution can hold up under the threat of Executive malfeasance and manipulation.  It managed to hold up during Watergate, but this combines that with elements of classic American rebellious behavior threatening our way of governing ourselves.