Translate

Monday, July 25, 2016

The 2016 Election: It's PFONI!

I don't mean to suggest at all that this is a "phony" election, with its outcome rigged, or with no difference resulting from the outcome.  There are real differences between the national candidates and the national party platforms (immigration, tax policy, climate change), and even larger differences in the governing and leadership style.  If that doesn't convince, there is the Supreme Court, experiencing a 4-4 stalemate on most issues since Scalia's death, and the prospect of a couple of other Supreme Court nominations coming in just the next four years  (Thomas, Ginsburg).

"PFONI" is a mnemonic acronym, a shorthand term I've coined to summarize the focus of this year's election.  Both the Presidential election and control of the US Senate will be decided in a handful of states, and my new word is composed of their first letters, and in order of priority (specifically for the Presidential election).  Technically, it should be PFO3NI, as there are three "N" states that make the cut.  It is partially a coincidence that the key Senate races are in these states; a coincidence that they all have Senate races (2/3 have a contest in a Presidential election year), but of course not coincidental that close Senate races tend to be in states that are close for the Presidential contest.  And yes, there are some other consequential Senate races outside the seven key states (I'll come back to that later), but these seven have most of those that look to be close at the finish.

The background story is President Obama's 332-206 Electoral College margin vs. Mitt Romney in 2012.  To win the election, Trump must net a gain of at least 63 Electoral votes; the states below gave 83 to Obama and 15 to Romney. Let's go through them one at a time:

Pennsylvania  (20 Electoral Votes)- This is the single state that I believe will be most determinant of the outcome:  if Clinton wins it, it is very unlikely she will lose; if not, she is in trouble. Fivethirtyeight.com (will be abbreviated as "538", but don't use that to check the website) has it at 60% probability for Clinton (their "polls-plus" forecast, which takes all into account and estimates election day likelihood), the same as the election in general.  Predictit.org has it at 66% probability for Clinton, the same as her price on winning the election.
If one looks at the demographjcs of the election and of the state, PA will depend on Clinton's ability to draw the votes of the college-educated in suburban Philadelphia and the margins she can draw (turnout) among African-Americans.  As in the election in general, it is all there to be won by her campaign. In this regard, the choice of Philly for the site of the Democrats' convention looks smart, as long as it comes off well.

The Senate race promises to be close.  Pat Toomey is a Republican that is too conservative for the state; he won in a poor Democratic year (2010) against Joe Sestak (perceived to be a weak candidate by the party elders).  Sestak lost the primary to Katie McGinty, who is running neck-and-neck with Toomey in the polling.

Florida (29 EV) -  A must-win state for Trump;  it is nearly impossible for Trump to win without FL (ignoring the nonsense Trump campaign people offer about totally blue states like NY, CA, CT, IL). Tthe only alternative would be to overturn and sweep states like MN, WI, MI, all of which have been consistent--close, but Democratic--in every recent Presidential election.  FL's basic demographics will match large margins for blacks and Latinos for Clinton against those among white non-college voters for Trump; the deciding factor might be the large elderly population, so Trump's positions on Social Security and Medicare (which I haven't clearly heard yet) could be make-or-break--expect him to try to out-pander the Democrats in this area.  It's very much 50-50 right now, though I think the longer-term dynamics will favor Clinton.

The Senate race  will be one of the highest-profile ones, and the outcome is far from certain.  Marco Rubio's late entry, a complete reversal from what he had always said (but still not too surprising), turns it from an uphill struggle to hold his seat to something somewhat likely.  Rubio is not particularly popular in his state these days, as evidenced by the trouncing he took from Trump, but the Democrats are not ready to take him on:  a fierce primary battle between two Congressmen, one a Blue Dog (Patrick Murphy) and the other a raving, ethically-compromised radical (Alan Grayson).  Grayson wins my award for the most consistently amusing emails, but I share the party's doubt that he may be the strongest potential opponent.

Ohio (18 EV) - As always, a key state for the Republicans' hopes, and what should be fertile ground for Trump's appeal to embittered, working-class whites.  He would be favored if not for his failure--so far--to make peace with his defeated rival, Gov. John Kasich.  Without Kasich's support, or if it comes too late, Trump has to be considered the underdog. (538 has it about 50-50, Predictit 60-40 Clinton).

The Senate race has a lower profile than Florida's, but it is also very close, with each party nominating strong, somewhat bland candidates who are proven winners in statewide elections, Rob Portfman for the Republicans and Ted Strickland for the Democrats.  It will likely be a tossup all the way to Election Day.

Next come three "N" states, I'll start with the one with the most Electoral votes:
North Carolina (15 EV) - This is the only one of the seven which went Republican in 2012 (after going very narrowly for Obama in 2008); we are told the demographics are gradually shifting more toward the Democrats in the state, but this year's vote may show a  reversal of the trend.  It polls very close right now, but I tend more to the 538 view (60-40 Republican) than Predictit's 50-50.

The Senate race has an incumbent, Richard Burr, against a promising woman contender, Elizabeth Ross.  Burr is what passes for a moderate Republican outside New England, and Ross is a moderate Democrat.  The state's politics have been roiled by the passage of the infamous legislation requiring transgender persons to use the public bathroom of their "birth gender", which is causing great embarrassment to the Republican-dominated state government.  Predictit gives the Democrats a 40% chance to pick up this seat.

Nevada (6 EV) - This state has moved from reliable Republican to narrowly favoring the Democrats in national elections; the question is whether the impending retirement of the state's political kingpin, Senator Harry Reid, will change the balance of power. It is polling even, but I would favor the Democrats.

The race for Reid's Senate seat is perhaps the most critical of all; the Democrats need to gain four seats (and keep control of the White House, or five without it) to regain control of the Senate.  All of the other seats mentioned are Republican-held and many represent good or great chances for Democratic gains, but losing this one would make the Democrats' task doubly hard.  Of course, a smaller state's Senator gets the same vote as the Senators from New York or California. The Democrats' candidate, Catherine Cortez Musto, was previously the state Attorney General; the Republicans', Joe Heck, is a Congressman and party regular. It will be a hugely expensive race and is a true tossup;  Cortez Musto will have plenty of support from national organizations.

New Hampshire (4 EV) - The Granite State provides surprises, but usually just in the primaries:  it gave Bernie Sanders a large margin, and Donald Trump in the same day.  In its polling, third-party candidates are unusually strong.  Really alone among the states of the Northeast, there is doubt about the likely outcome, but it is also unlikely NH will make the difference in the Electoral College.

The Senate race is a high-profile battle between two strong candidates, Gov. Maggie Hassan and the Republican incumbent, Kelly Ayotte.  Ayotte has tried to maintain some distance from Trump and has avoided being tarred with the brush of the darkest Republican slurs. Hassan is at least at parity in the contest.

Iowa (6 EV) - IA was a great state for President Obama (two general election wins, and a crucial win in their 2008 caucuses) but has been less-than-great for Hillary Clinton.  This year she eked out a narrow win over Sanders which would have been disastrous if she had lost.  This is not a state where the Democrats' huge advantage with minorities will help her; she will have to win this on her appeal to college-educated whites.  In this regard, it is typical of the fulcrum of the which will decide the national race.  (See below for the demographics discussion on a national level)

The Democrats are pressing to make the Senate contest here a close one but the odds are somewhat against them.  The longtime incumbent Chuck Grassley, is a little vulnerable because, as head of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he is single-handedly preventing Obama's nominee for the Supreme Court, Merrick Garland, from getting a hearing (though everyone knows he is fully qualified and actually quite moderate).  Unfortunately for Democratic nominee Patty Judge, the issue has not ripened much anger, and it would not convince many Republican-leaning independents to turn against Grassley, who has always won easily in the past.

I must mention three Senate seats for which the Democrats are currently favored to pick up seats, in order of likelihood:  Wisconsin, where Russ Feingold seems headed toward gaining revenge for his surprise loss to conservative Ron Johnson in 2010; Indiana, which has suddenly become a great pickup target for the Democrats to gain the seat being vacated by Republican Dan Coats, with the late entry of former Democratic Senator Evan Bayh (this deserves a column in itself); and Illinois, where the expected large Democratic turnout makes Rep. Tammy Duckworth the favorite to defeat the slippery incumbent, Mark Kirk, in a battle of candidates with physical handicaps (Duckworth a veteran amputee, Kirk a wheelchair-bound survivor of a serious stroke).  Kirk emails me regularly with his progressive positions on the environment and social issues, is a leader in attacking the Iran deal, and dodges Trump at every opportunity, but I don't think it will save him.   These three make the Democrats' task of gaining the Senate very achievable.

There are some other races beside all these where the Democrats have some chance:
Missouri, where they have a strong candidate in Jason Kander, but he will have an uphill battle because of the state's Republican lean in the Presidential race; Arizona, where John McCain is facing his toughest challenge yet and is at odds with the Trump campaign; and Georgia, which is a longshot possibility for the Democrats also in the Presidential race.   The shortest route for the Democrats to gain control is winning WI, IL, IN; one of OH, PA, or FL; and holding onto NV.

Demographic Shifts & Final Notes
538 has an interactive tool which I love for this Presidential contest (originally they called it the "swing-o-matic", now it is the more dignified question, "what would it take to turn the Blue states Red?"). It allows the reader to try out shifts in the turnout and party percentage, on a national basis, for five demographic groups (college-educated whites, non-college educated whites, blacks, Hispanic/Latinos, and Asian/Other) from their starting point, which is the 2012 data, updated for demographic changes.  Those shifts you choose are then applied on a state level and you can see if they cause a change on the state-level voting outcomes.  This was done several months ago and the basis of the projection is static--it's not updated for recent polling, and it doesn't take into account third-party voting.  (To adjust for that factor, I would suggest to keep the party vote percentages the same, so as to maintain their relative shares, but reduce turnout--more on the white groups, less on the minorities.)

My own starting scenario for the general election (two-party version) makes the following shifts, which I think are all arguable:

  • College-Educated Whites go from 56% Republican with 77% turnout to 51%/71%;
  • Non College Educated Whites go from 62% Republican with 57% turnout to 67%/65%;
  • Blacks go from 93% Democratic with 66% turnout to 90%/59%; 
  • Hispanics go from 71% Democratic with 48% turnout to 83%/55%; and 
  • Asian/Other (includes Native Americans) goes from 67% with 49% to 75%/56%. 
Guess what?  Those changes offset such that the result in the Electoral College is the same, 332-206. Shifting the turnout down, as I proposed, only shifts NC into the Democratic column.  If, from the changes I suggest above, I revert College-Educated Whites to the edge Mitt Romney gained, IA and OH flip, but the Democrats retain a 330-208 margin.   After that, then, the swing comes from the margin (much more than the turnout) for the Hispanics: At the 2012 level of 71% Democratic, the Republicans get 295 EV, picking up WI, VA, NH, PA, and FL.  The tipping point on Hispanic support, with that unfavorable scenario (bad news on whites, lower turnout for blacks) turns out to be 80% Democratic, when it flips suddenly to a 295-243 margin for the Democrats.

So, my feeling is that Tim Kaine is a good pick for Hillary, apart from the fact that she likes him, and that she feels he could do the job:  he should help with blacks, Latinos, and college-educated whites.

A different scenario results from leaving all the breaks the same as 2012 but shifting just the non-college educated to the high-turnout, high-Republican level above.  That shifts FL,OH, IA,NH, and crucially, CO (by 0.1%) to the Republicans and gives Trump a 272-266 margin.

As for the polls, my suggestion is to ignore them until August 15:  once the impact of the conventions has settled, we will see if Hillary has a real lead or not.  We should certainly expect that the percentage choosing neither will drop from 20% to about 10%, but it will make all the difference if it looks more like 47-43 Hillary or 45-45.

Wednesday, July 20, 2016

Well, They Went and Did It


I wake up in the morning, and I wonder
Why everything's the same as it was
And I can't understand
No, I can't understand
Why life goes on the way it does

Why do the birds go on singing? 
Why do the stars shine above? 
Don't they know it's the end of the world? 
--Herman's Hermits (1964)

OK, it's not that bad--not yet. Nothing really bad has happened yet to the country simply because the Republicans have nominated as their Presidential candidate a poorly-informed, bigoted bully who seems to be running because it feeds his ego. 

I remember feeling this way, though, in early 2001 once we had gotten past the disaster of the 2000 election and its aftermath:  Bush hadn't done anything stupid yet.  And we know how that one came out. 

We have already covered the question of whether Trump is the "least-appealing" candidate of the postwar era (or is it now the prewar era? History will tell) Due to his uncertain ideology and his relatively weak ability to lead an effective national campaign, I rated him only the third most-dangerous candidate of the last 60 years, behind Reagan and Dubya.  But that would change if the American electorate does the unthinkable and actually elects him. 

His views are perhaps unprecedented in modern times among Presidential candidates for their virulence (though Nixon may have been as bad, he was less open about it).  In terms of riding an unexpected popular movement, taking a politically inexperienced businessman candidate to of uncertain party loyalty to a Republican nomination, though, I can think of a precedent.  Wendell Willkie, a former Democrat, appeared practically from nowhere to take the 1940 Republican nomination; he ran a spirited campaign but lost the Electoral vote, 449-82.  Willkie's political career after the defeat infuriated his party; in those days, after World War II had started but before Pearl Harbor, he stood out as one of the strongest backers of greater involvement.  Unlike Trump, he had very progressive, internationalist views.  Though we remember Franklin D. Roosevelt's death shortly after being re-elected one more time, in 1944, Willkie actually died before he did 

So, that is encouraging, but of course Hillary is no FDR.  At least, I don't think so. 

Status Report:  Ship Still Sinking
Personally, I think Donald should use the word "titanic"--it would be a good addition to his vocabulary, fits well with the other adjuectives he typically uses, and it would be a delicious reference to his chosen party and its state.  The Republicans have hit the iceberg, and it has a name: Drumpf. 

George Will does a good impersonation of a rat, and so it is appropriate that he has already bailed on the party.  I have to respect those, like John Kasich and Mitt Romney, who have taken a firm stance on principle against their party's nominee, though rowing in the opposite direction of the tack the wind is pushing the boat does not work very well.  Most of the more respectable members of the party resemble those who are reaching in desperation for anything still floating after the vessel sinks under the waves. Finally, there is Ted Cruz, who has commandeered a life raft and is heading further out to sea.  I have sensed (not watching, saying "la-la-la" so as not to hear) that Cruz has released his supporters from any obligation to vote for his nemesis; he is positioning himself well for a 2020 bid to run as the True Conservative, At Last.  I like it. 

Monday, July 18, 2016

Conventional Thinking

Donald Trump looks at the national party convention as a big TV show--and he's not wrong about that.  He will judge his TV production's success by the TV ratings his "showbiz" package produces, as compared to the one the Democrats will put on the following week.  Therefore, the least I can do as a public citizen is to vote with my remote:  the Republican convention's live broadcasts on the various networks will not receive one minute of my television monitors' time.  There may be some drama, very likely a metaphorical train wreck of some kind or other (either inside or outside the convention hall), but I can catch up with them through alternate sources (Stephen Colbert with Jon Stewart, Bill Maher's coverage, Rachel Maddow's....)

From the Democratic convention I expect little drama, but the roster of speakers will be far more impressive:  both Michelle and Barack Obama, both Hillary and Bill Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden.  I am flying out for vacation on Wednesday of that week (and we don't have home TV service where I'm going), but I'll do my best--maybe head to a local watering-hole Wednesday night for the President and Thursday night for the President-to-be.

My Problems with Hillary Clinton
I have been remiss in clearly proclaiming my endorsement of the presumptive Democratic nominee for the Presidency, though I believe any reader of my past posts would see that I always believed she both should and would win this election. Now that even Bernie Sanders has provided his endorsement, I certainly have no reason to hold back:  I promise my full support for her campaign. 

Still, I have some reasons for concerns, which I now intend to list, explain, and also point out some concerns others have that I do not share.  I hope this does not qualify me for the social media epithet, "concern troll", the meaning of which I confess I do not understand.

Concern 1:  Too Much Continuity - This is a concern more about electability than substance.  I am not looking for major changes from the policy directions President Obama has been pursuing; the lack of efficacy in the federal government (or in most state governments) is a function of Republican obstruction.  The question is whether the country needs a change, and, if so, can Hillary Clinton be expected to deliver it.  I was more concerned about this when it appeared the race might be Clinton-Bush II (the first was 1992!) , and now that it's Donald Trump that will be her opponent, it seems the question will be about change for change's sake rather than status quo vs. a plausible alternative.

The return to the White House of the Clintons after 16 years does seem a bit reactionary, as though we could wish away the last decade and a half  (or, at least, it seems nostalgic).  My desire is that Hillary win as big as possible, carry the Senate and bring the House closer to an even split, do her best to hit the ground running in 2017, have a good two years, campaign hard for the party in 2018, and then decide:  does she really want or need four more years of this?  Unless I am mistaken and she falls in love with the power (which would be a big problem), I think she can pass the torch to her designated successor--which is exactly why her choice of VP is so important--and leave office in January, 2021 with her place in history secure.

Concern 2:  Too Cozy with the Moneyed Elite - I don't think it's entirely fair to criticize her for the positions she took in favor of Wall Street when she was their Senator, nor do I think that her performance as Secretary of State gave unusual preference to American business (the fact is, it's just business as usual for State to seek to promote American business interests abroad).  What she has done since then as a private citizen doesn't concern me, either:  she and Bill have been reaping big bucks, for themselves and for their very worthwhile Clinton Foundation, and that's fine with me.

The concern I had is about the big money contributions she has been happy to receive, for her campaign and for the PAC's that support her.  I recognize that President Obama did the same as she has been doing, with the valid justification that unilateral monetary disarmament is a fool's strategy; however, she seems a bit too comfortable with it.  I will say in her defense that a lot of the big money she has raised has been passed on to other Democratic candidates, and that she has come out clearly for a Constitutional Amendment to reverse Citizens United (something that will seemingly never pass) and, more importantly, for making it a litmus test for Supreme Court justices she will nominate. Again, though, I wish she would walk the walk a little (more in the mode Bernie Sanders did):  it means little unless she is willing to sacrifice her self-interest, at least a little, for the cause.

Concern 3:  The War Hawk Thing - Let's just say that it would be good if Hillary has an opportunity to say "no, thanks" to some proposed military incursion between now and November.  She has more than established her strong support for a robust American military posture.  A little more than required, even.  At least she has the good sense to regret that her 2002 vote to give Dubya authorization for military action in Iraq turned out the way that it did, something Mike Pence does not have.

That's it.  Now for a couple of concerns I've heard expressed that I don't share.

She Didn't Accommodate Bernie Sanders Supporters Enough -  Hillary does not have to make the concession of choosing a Sanders follower, or Sanders himself, for her Vice Presidential nominee, and she won't.  In some sense, Sanders might have made sense as the nominee once it became clear Trump would end up being the Republicans' nominee; get the cat to catch the rat, as they say.  It was never going to happen, however.  From the point of view of giving the Democratic primary campaign and the platform for the general election some real substance, I am glad Sanders ran, and also glad that his efforts were so successful. It's now part of the party's DNA, and that will pay great dividends in the future.  When it comes to the VP pick, though, Hillary should pick the best person to get white, college-educated voters to support her, someone intelligent who could carry on as President if needed.

I don't blame Bernie for the delay in his endorsement, either.  For one thing, he didn't need to give up his shot until the off chance that Hillary might be indicted had passed (was that months ago, though?) He owed his passionate supporters a good battle over the platform, which was duly battled, and seems to have emerged as a reasonable center-left amalgam. In particular, it calls out the issues of climate change, income inequality, and campaign reform more than it would have without his influence.

The Damned Emails:  Here is what Hillary, and her subordinates, were guilty of:  a conspiracy to deny the American public the access to her private communication which the Freedom of Information Act allows.  Is that a crime?  I'm no lawyer, I don't know, but apparently it wasn't enough to indict a ham sandwich, let alone a major party Presidential nominee.  I am sympathetic to her desire, though I recognize that any hope of privacy is pretty much a lost cause.

As a conspiracy, it was evidently a total failure.  We now know a lot more about all her emails than we ever would have known, or care to have known, if she had used the government server.  Even if some misguided do-gooder had hacked and released them all, something not improbable in this day. They don't amount to much in their substance, and it is generally not understood that she used secure lines of communication, available to the State Department in every nation, for the really important stuff.

I have been arguing in Facebook and the like that nobody cares--outside the chattering classes of the Beltway, or the professional information security professionals who get so worked up about the rules There is another group, those who are unalterably opposed to her anyway and see it as a great opportunity to make political hay.  I'm not in any of those groups.

TP: T'Pence for His Thoughts
Mike Pence is the perfect "Veep", as in the brilliant TV satire with Julia Louis-Dreyfuss  in the title role.  There is absolutely no reason to think he will serve any purpose other than to reassure right-wingers that Trump's on their side.  In that regard, though, he was a solid choice, much better than the other two finalists, Newt Gingrich and Chris Christie, would have been.  Gingrich would have threatened to one-up his craziness at times, and Christie, by now, is so thoroughly humiliated that even Trump could not stand to have him around.

The gossip is that Pence was having trouble with his re-election bid for Indiana governor and this provided him a relatively safe harbor.   From Hillary's point of view, Pence is no threat and she can name any intelligent moderate or liberal, confident that person will show up Pence as the raving loony with a reassuringly normal look that his record shows that he is.


Saturday, July 16, 2016

Turkey coup: (At least) Four Theories

In the interest of providing better information to you, my readers, I sometimes take on the task of reading posts from commentators whose views are antithetical to mine, so that I can monitor their thinking and communications strategy.  There are also those, like Chris Cilizza of the Washington Post, who are useful to read because they so consistently get things wrong:  they overthink questions, or force stuff out due to their job-related necessity of producing against publishing deadlines, and embrace wrongheaded ideas.  The logic, of course, is that if Cilizza says A, then not-A is more likely to be true.

Then there are a couple for which both of those are true:  distasteful views, offensively expressed, but also consistently wrong predictively.  Bill Kristol is one; and Dick Morris another.  So, when I read Dick Morris' assessment of the motivation for the plotters of the attempted coup in Turkey, I got a major clue for a theory to discard.  I have an intense interest in Turkey and its role in geopolitics--for me, Turkey's right at the heart of every issue in the Middle East and it can be a determining factor in many of the possible outcomes, whether positive or negative. In the aftermath of the coup yesterday, facts are few and speculation is rampant as to what they were trying to accomplish, and I will be joining in on that.

Morris, who made his name advising the Clintons for their Democratic-lite, centrist "Third Way" triangulation in the '90's, but has since shown himself to be no friend of the Democrats and an extremely unreliable source of political advice, advanced the theory that the coup plotters were trying to save secular Turkey from the Islamist tendencies of President Erdogan. His theory is not ridiculous; the Turkish military views itself as the protector of the secular state formed by Ataturk after WWI and has staged several successful coups against the civilian government in the past when the military leaders saw the government as straying too far from Ataturk's design.   ,

The problem with the theory is that Erdogan's Islamism is very mild.  While it is true that his party has broken substantial new ground in terms of accommodating religious followers of Islam into the Turkish political system, he has not governed as an Islamist, has not attempted to introduce Sharia law, has not taken action against non-believers.  He has governed as a nationalist who represents the aspirations of the Sunni Moslem majority.  Turkey is overwhelmingly Sunni Moslem, over 95%, but the degree to which Turks actively practice varies widely, and there are many diverse strains of Turkish Islam within that broad classification.

So, in fact, my first speculation on the motivation for the coup attempt is the opposite:  it is a bit of a longshot, but it's possible that there could have been a more radically Islamist faction in the military that wanted to overthrow Turkey's government to try to end its efforts in support of the anti-ISIS coalition.  As I have discussed previously,  policies with regard to the Syrian civil war are very complex:  they are first, ardently anti-Assad; second, anti-Kurdish nationalist; and only third, anti-ISIS.  Still, they have done quite a bit:  they allow the US air forces to attack ISIS positions from its Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey, they have done more to seal their borders with Syria to prevent infiltration of radicals in both directions.  There is plenty of evidence that ISIS has targeted Turkey to punish it for what it has done--suicide bombers in Ankara and, repeatedly, in Istanbul, topped off by the recent attack (apparently by Chechen supporters of ISIS) on the airport there.  I say it's a longshot, because it may have been unlikely ever to have succeeded, but a successful coup by forces friendly to ISIS would have been a catastrophe for the rest of the world.

For the next theory I would advance I have no evidence whatsoever, but it seems logical to me.  It requires some background.  The sporadic civil war in the southeast against Kurdish nationalism which simmered for decades seemed possibly to have ended just a few years ago.  The head of the movement, Abdullah Ocalan, had been captured by the Turkish authorities; in prison he had urged his followers to lay down their arms, and he seemed likely to make a peace agreement.  Recently, though, it fell apart;  ceased, there were some terroristic attacks blamed on the Kurds, and the violent struggle resumed, at a  much higher level of lethality than before:  Turkish armored forces surround the center of several Kurdish towns, where rebels have barricaded themselves and plan to fight to the death, feeling in fact that they have no choice, as surrender would lead to their movement's liquidation and their own lives' as well.

Erdogan seems much at fault to me, and his motives questionable.  It is arguable that the resumption of war was a tactic in his ongoing self-aggrandizement campaign, an effort to modify the constitution to give himself even more power.  One key for him is to drive the legal Kurdish parliamentary party below the 10% threshold required for representation in the national Parliament.  Hostilities started shortly before a snap election Erdogan called to try to boost his numbers in Parliament--he did gain, but not enough, and the party (called the HDP) remained just above the threshold.

So, the theory is that some elements of the Turkish military are highly dissatisfied with how they are being employed, killing their fellow citizens, and blaming Erdogan.  The one thing I heard from the coup side during the brief period they controlled the public media was that they were doing it to save the country from Erdogan, who "had lost all claim to legitimacy".  Less-specific versions of this military resentment theory  is that they rose up in response to his autocratic tendencies--which are clear, and frequently denounced in the West--and his suppression of civil liberties, especialy freedom of dissent and of the press.

If the intention was to provoke a popular uprising against Erdogan's authoritarianism, it failed spectacularly.  The popular uprising was among Erdogan's supporters--he deftly called his people to the streets by social media, then upon returning to Istanbul's airport from his vacation, and they answered his call.  Even the opposition parties, including even the HDP, spoke out in favor of the constitutional government and against the coup, regardless of what they deemed the motives of the plotters to be.  At the end of the day, it looks as though Erdogan's hand will be strengthened again in the reaction to the coup, with the defense of constitutional democracy ironically ending up in its reduction.

The final theory is a subtle one, but supported by some of the few facts known. Even during the height of the confusion and uncertainty, persons speaking on behalf of the government were already blaming it on followers of a Muslim cleric, Fetullah Gulen.  Gulen has been blamed before by Erdogan, for an abortive coup attempt some years ago, which gave the President the reason--whether invented or not--to purge a number of military officers and prosecute some alleged traitors.

Gulen is a moderate Islamic cleric who was once an ally of Erdogan and has many followers in the country; Erdogan may see him as his greatest rival.  After the falling out, though, Gulen flew the coop and is now actually living in Pennsylvania.  It is hard to imagine that Gulen would think he could direct a successful coup against a powerful government from such a distance, and he has denied any connection with the coup's plotters.  It is just barely possible, though, that Turkey's extensive secret police force caught wind of discontent among the military, whether related to Gulen or not, and that the government provided some secret encouragement to those forces, confident they could suppress the rebellion in the end--as they have done.

Erdogan has moved to accuse Gulen of treason and to demand he be extradited by the US to Turkey to stand trial. The Turkish government, in the aftermath of its success, has also closed Incirlik to military operations, with the argument that rebel air force elements (most of the worst damage and loss of life during the coup resulted from attacks by rogue helicopters and attack planes; generally speaking, the Army elements involved proved unwilling to take on the citizenry) are still afoot.  We shall see how long that condition lasts, but extradition is generally a long, uncertain process and Gulen might plausibly request political asylum.

Of course, more than one of these theories could be true.  The only combination logically impossible is the combination of  Morris' defense-against- Islamism one (which I discount) and my radical-Islamist one.  In particular, the combination of #3 and #4--government provocation of dissatisfied elements--seems possible to me.  We are likely to ever have any definitive proof, barring a statement in public trial from leaders of the plot, which I would not expect will be permitted.

Turkey's messy politics seem likely to involve the US ever more, but for us it is the cost of the assistance from a very significant ally (beyond Incirlik, NATO's Eastern Mediterranean fleet is based in Izmmir, on the Aegean coast).   I will be interested to see how the US Presidential candidates will respond to these challenges:  Hillary Clinton, I am certain, will be well-informed and sensible, while Trump, I expect, will demonstrate a lack of understanding of any of the subtleties, and may have trouble identifying it on a map if asked.

Monday, July 04, 2016

Thoughts on Independence Day

Well, they went and did it.  The voters of England (except London) and Wales rejected common sense, the leaders of their political parties (except the once-shunned UK Independence Party), all the "so-called experts", and their own conationals from Scotland and Norther Ireland in the surprising referendum vote against remaining in the European Union.

I believe in the maxim that the markets overreact to every new piece of news, and in fact the downturns experienced all over the world, but particularly in the British markets and in the value of the British currency,  have already largely reversed, but I think they actually may have gotten it right the first time.  I have no doubt that Britain will move rapidly into a well-deserved recession, as trade will fall, with trading partners deterred by increased uncertainty. I don't feel that this--alone--will lead to a global recession, but, despite the denials by most of the Leave advocates, this result will contribute to a trend already underway, reciprocal raising of barriers to trade, which may do so. 

I still have some notion that the result of the referendum is not definitive and irreversible; the constitution of the European Union requires legislation by Great Britain (an act of Parliament) in order to invoke Article 50, which would commence the process of separation.  The Conservative party alone has a majority of seats in Commons, so they could do it without any support from the other parties, and I would hope none of the members of other parties (with the exception of the single UKIP member, and the possible exception of the Wales nationalist party, but I doubt that as well) are foolhardy enough to support this act.  So, the party would need to hold firmly together to this policy that many, but not all, of its members wanted despite the opposing position of its leadership.  This seems to include the probable new leader, Theresa May, who supported Remain but looks likely to inherit the party's burden due to the spectacular failure of the party's Leave advocates to have a plan to move ahead after it won the vote.  

A strong British Labour party leader--and one doubts that the current leader is such--could make the Brexit gamble so politically risky that some Tories might desert, or, more likely, when things go bad, could win a major electoral victory in 2020 and reverse the disastrous decision.  It might not be too late by then, particularly if the contrast emerges soon enough, to salvage the integrity of the nation and delineate some reasonable terms for re-entry. 

If not, then we are looking at a probable decision by Scotland's voters to separate itself from Britain, renewed trouble between Northern Ireland's Protestant majority and Catholic minority, and, regardless, continued centrifugal forces within the EU:  in the words of the Irish poet Yeats, "the center cannot hold".   

Britain's loss--of prestige, of business, of the strength of its currency and its debts--may translate into some gains for the US, but we should not cheer the English show of its independence.  In the long run, its weakness, and that of the EU, will do us no good.  I would hope that the EU will respond to this challenge by strengthening its legitimacy and capability to act in a unified way.   I would also urge all to show patience and avoid further hasty action:  I remind all that the US needed some 13 years to go from its own Declaration of Independence to the establishment of its Constitution, with the failed attempt of governing through the Articles of Confederation in the intervening years.

For a clear, simple, humorous, but factual review prepared especially for Americans to understand the current status of Brexit, I recommend the post at this link.