Midterm Election Preview

As I write, 14 Tuesdays before Election Day 2026, the polls are about to close in Michigan for that important Democratic Senate primary.  Recent polls still are showing Abdul El-Sayed with a lead of at least 10 points.  One would think that with a leadlike that, the election will be called for him almost immediately, but I don't think that's true.  For one thing, Haley Stevens may have the momentum at the close, and the vote for the black community in Detroit may be determinative, and its nature is unknown.  

I have a rule not to take sides in Democratic primary elections not in my state, so I just want to say this:  whoever wins the primary, better win.  This seat is not one the anti-Trump movement can afford to lose. Allowing Republican Mike Rogers to win in the general election, a real possibility whichever of the two Democrats wins the nomination, would likely end any chance for a change of control through the election. It is very hard for the Democrats to get to 51 seats without Michigan's. It's the responsibility of the candidate who loses today to give full support to the winner; I've heard they are willing.  

The Background

There is a lack of consistency between the popular electoral sentiment and the estimates of the resulting elections from the political think-tanks.* Their policy is to be very cautious on rating as probable losses by incumbents, a policy well-rewarded more often than not, and now with unlimited money? 

This is not a normal year, though, with the support for the administration and its Republican Congress abysmally low, and the prospects, 14 weeks out, that things will not materially improve.  The most that seems to be likely is an ongoing question whether the Fed will  raise interest rates, the opposite of what Trump and his new Fed Chair Warsh were supposed to do.  Regardless of whether he does or does not raise, or even if he lowers rates as Trump would like, this is a distraction with regard to the election, as is the likely positive but not convincing stock market situation. We can expect gas prices to ease downward but inflation to remain stickily high, in part because of the downstream effect of higher oil prices during the acute moments of the Iran war.   

The Senate

If we look at the question from the Republican side, their strategy resembles what is called the "Prevent Defense" in American football, ahead but vulnerable.  Looking to run out the clock and not give up the lead, which is three seats.  If they lose four or more, it will be lethal for Trump 2.0, as we should assume that kind of successful Democratic Senate gain correlates with the House results, and a hostile Congress will shut down a lot of the madness and mark the end of the Drumpfenreich.  

The Republicans will have few chances to go on offense to try to take one from the Democratic side:  Michigan, and to a lesser extent New Hampshire and Wisconsin. Then there's Georgia, but the Republicans are on the defensive under the onslaught of Jon Ossoff, who's executing an excellent re-election campaign.  For the GOP, it's all about defending this Trumpist regime. That is not easy to do, and Trump is not doing things that will help them to do that.  You could say that the Republicans are fortunate in that many of the challenged Senate seats are not being defended by their  incumbent, but that is no accident. 

In the search for those four seats to flip, we start with North Carolina, where Roy Cooper is not running against Senator Thom Tillis, who chose not to run. Cooper's opposition is not in good shape and Cooper is very good at winning elections in North Carolina.  It still a state that tends slightly red, though, so his win is likely, but possibly close. 

In Ohio, there is technically an incumbent, but the Republican in that seat was appointed to it, not elected.  So, a weak opposition and a very good Democratic challenger, Sherrod Brown.  I'd say slightly better than 50-50 that Brown wins. 

Maine and Alaska are the two close races where the Republican candidate is seeking re-election. Both states in the two northern corners of the nation look to be toss-ups, but the circumstances are very different.  Maine Democrats successfully shed Graham Platner when he became untenable, and in Troy Jackson they have come up with a viable challenger who combines much of Platner's political policy with a more congenial local persona.  Alaska has the best candidate the Democrats could find, Mary Peltola, who has proven able to win statewide, but she has an uphill battle in term of party support in what appears to be mostly a head-to-head matchup where the effect of Alaska's ranked-choice-voting is not so important.   I would rate each slightly less that 50-50, but not necessarily correlated for those differing characteristics. 

Flipping those four, and holding Michigan, etc. is the shortest route to success for Democrats, but there are many other possibilities, forcing the Republicans to play defense in many states.  They have plenty of money, though.  Leading the list of those opportunities described as "not-probable, but possible" is Texas.  James Talarico's argument to the inevitable "Why this year, after so many disappointments there before?" question is referring to the previous high-water mark in recent times, Beto O'Rourke's 48% vs. Ted Cruz in 2018, and then adding that sentiment is worse for the Republicans, their candidate is somehow even worse, and the unspoken third point is that Talarico is a better candidate.  No disrespect to Beto, but Talarico is a special rhetorical talent with a very interesting political platform that he can defend, and proven ability to raise large amounts of campaign funds.  Against that is a powerful system that seeks to stack the results for Republicans.

There are several additional states, very red in Presidential contests, where the unpopularity of the government is leaving an opening for challenge, though not necessarily a Democratic challenger, and usually not an incumbent Republican.  Iowa is the best shot for Democrats of these--a strong candidate (Josh Turek) against a Trumpist. Florida has an appointed Senator and is challenged by Alex Vindman, the original whistleblower in the case of the first Trump impeachment.  Nebraska, Montana, and South Dakota feature independents making the challenge in place of a committed Democratic opponent.    

Winning one out of all those (TX, IA, FL, NE, MT, SD) would be a bonus, helping to cover for the risk in Michigan and for John Fetterman, the PA Senator who's gone rogue and could be liable to go with the Republicans at any time.  Given Fetterman, Democrats actually need to aim for 52 to have a majority that is truly functional.  

The House of Representatives 

Winning control of the House is the minimum requirement for Democrats in this election--falling short of that is not acceptable.  Still, the Republicans have mined the field with their redistricting gambit, and, while Trump's policies are disastrous for Republican candidates, he will do his best to create chaos during the election and while votes are being counted.  

It should not make a difference, if the public sentiment holds.  Based on analysis of the "generic House vote" polls and its close relationship with the Presidential approval level (or disapproval, in this case), we could project a national lead of 6-8%, which would translate to a gain of 20-30 seats, taking into account the reduced number of seats designed to be competitive.  Very much a maximal gain, under the circumstances.  

But the real starting point for the Republicans is 227 seats, given the net of +5 that they managed with the gerrymandering battles.   The resulting number is Republicans getting a number in the low 200's, while they would need 218 to keep control.  It will take some time for Democrats to pass 218, probably a week, during which the Trump-driven rants will peak. 

The prediction markets are giving Democrats about 80% chance of winning the House.+  In my view, that's a bit too high--I'd say more like 70-30.  

Statehouses  .   

Although the Congressional contest is so enormously important, that does not mean we should ignore the significance of the contests in all the 50 states, among which there are 36 governor contests. Those gubernatorial elections are important in themselves, but they also have a huge effect on state legislatures, which will have to be the firewalls for additional gerrymandering attempts in the next two years. Successful governor candidates have a strong positive effect on candidates all the way down the ticket, and on the Federal contests, too.  In particular, competitive races in Florida, Ohio, and Iowa could help the Democratic senatorial candidates' chances as underdogs.  A strong Democratic candidate for governor in Michigan, Jocelyn Benson, might help the eventual Senate candidate get over the top, while a somewhat radical Democratic governor nominee in Wisconsin (Francesca Hong) might make Tammy Baldwin's re-election as Senator more difficult.   Arizona does not have a Senate contest this year, but the political battle between Democratic incumbent Governor Hobbs and her team against a slate of extreme Trumpists will be a critical contest that may also affect a couple of the truly competitive House contests, of which there are so few nationally.  

The Prediction  Democrats will gain two governorships, three state legislatures, net gain of 12 House seats (225-210) and four Senate Seats (51-49),  the Senate seats gained being NC, OH, ME, and TX.  The Michigan Senate race will be the last to be called.  Trump will be furious!

* Think Cook Political Report, Larry Sabato's shop at U of Va., Adam Silver's group or Real Clear Politics.

+ And about 40% chance for Democrats to win the Senate, a number that has come up 10% or more since the beginning of the year.      

The Most Critical '26 Electoral Contest

 In the desperately important election this year, every closely contested race is a battle worth fighting.  There are a few state governor contests of that ilk, something like 10 different Senate races this year that could be considered competitive*, but not too many more House races than that, post-gerrymandering war, and probably a few hundred seats in state legislatures across the country.  There is the overall contest for control of the House of Representatives and for the Senate, and those two outcomes are massively important , but each is the result of a number of different elections, so one can hardly focus on those, in themselves--it is necessary to go into the next level down and look at what will drive those victories, or defeats. 

The race that I think is most critical, though, is the Senate contest in Texas, between Democrat James Talarico and Republican Ken Paxton.  The latter candidate was just nominated by his party's voters in a run-off election that ran off 24-year incumbent John Cornyn (who will remain as a dangerous zombie Senator whose emotional status is uncertain, like Bill Cassidy in Louisiana, similarly jettisoned from the Titanic Trumpist Tragedy. (ETTTTTS)).  Paxton is the most Trumpist viable candidate ever, rating super highly on both the loyalty and corruption scales. Texas is only rated as something like a 35-40% chance for Democrats to win in the prediction markets. 

It's only one Senate seat, and so the chances that it will be decisive are maybe one in 10 (but a little higher since the Platner controversy has made gaining the Maine seat more uncertain), but the implications are much greater.  Talarico is not just an unusual talent, squeaky-clean, and uniquely suited to be the Democratic candidate in Texas, due to his convincing Christian-but-not-Christian-nationalist vibe, but a potential national leader--in a Democratic administration, like Buttigieg is, even if he isn't able to get elected this year. 

Beyond that, though, the Texas race has possibly decisive and enduring effect on the big picture:  control of the Federal government at the top. The thing is, we are used to looking at a certain set of midsize "swing states" as a fixed, or slowly changing, decisive group for purposes of Presidential elections.  States like New Hampshire, say, or Iowa, may be somewhat susceptible to flipping from one election to another, but they are too small in Electoral College votes to be at all likely to changing the outcome.+   We know the suspects; it starts with Pennsylvania, then it goes to Michigan, Wisconsin, and more recently Georgia and Arizona (the last two replacing Ohio, which went red, and Minnesota, now seemingly safely blue). 

There has not been a really big state that has looked even possibly marginal in its outcome since California and New York fell off the cliff for Republicans in statewide elections.  The only other states in that category are Florida, which seemingly remains inexplicably beyond redemption, and Texas.  If Texas were to become a "purple" state where the outcome of a Presidential election there is not certain, it would have a huge effect on the numbers--of Electoral College votes, and of spending on the contest, too. 

I'm way ahead of myself, but a Mark Kelly-James Talarico ticket, Kelly promising to serve one term, could carry the swing states and Texas and lead to the kind of 350+ EV rout that is needed (in 2028, or 2032 if we must defer our dreams) in order to put the GOP in its place, which is as a regional party no longer a threat to destroy our Federal government and our Constitution.  That would make reforms of the kind needed possible. 

* In order of likelihood of Democrats winning the contested seats (+4 net result needed):  New Hampshire (to retain vacating Democratic seat),  North Carolina (flip, Republican vacating), Michigan (again, to retain vacating Democratic seat), Alaska (flip, strong Democratic candidate), Iowa (Republican vacating), Ohio (flip of appointed Republican Senator), Maine (flip, with Platner being only moderately damaged in Maine voters' eyes), Texas (flip, vacating Republican due to the primary result), then ones like Florida (weak appointed Senator), South Carolina (good candidate flipping on flippant Lindsay Graham), and finally longshots in South Dakota and Louisiana.  Ranking above Florida are Nebraska and Montana, where the strong candidate who might flip the seat is running as an Independent..   I'm assuming Georgia is safe for Jon Ossoff against a disorganized Republican opposition.  He's also a Talarico-type rising star. 

 From this list, you could see that I rate Texas as the sixth-most-likely to flip, and thus not absolutely necessary, if Democrats hold their seats and come through in Maine, Iowa, and Ohio.  I'm counting on North Carolina and Alaska to get things started.  

+ Unless there is no majority in the Electoral College and it goes to the House, where the Constitution gives each state's delegation one vote.  That remains very improbable as long as there are only two major party candidates winning all the states (last time that didn't happen was 1968).  

My Nation, Alas!

The very worst thing about this, Americans of all kinds, we let Trump win! I hate when we can't stop assholes from profiting by their bad behavior. 

 The Betrayal of Hope -   This was supposed to be the Beginning of the End of Trumpism.  It still is, in a way, but the end is not as I visualized, the public's awakening to the corruption at the heart of it and their rejection of him.  I would say this is the end of the Obama-Biden-Harris Era, which overlaps with the newly-recognized Era of Dickhead.  Republican obstructionism throughout limited the gains a true Democratic majority coalition could get for the American people and for the future of humanity.  That coalition is breaking down now.

The next couple of years will see how much of those limited improvements will be wiped out by the return of the monstrous extremists to full Federal power. Then, after that, the inevitable Republican-driven economic collapse (I see it as renewed inflation combined with job scarcity driven by export dropoffs). The nation will then (2026?  more likely 2028) be ripe for the Great Restoration, and Trump's own rapid fade from center-stage as among the lamest of ducks. 

My speculative theory was that Putin and Trump, in their numerous private, unrecorded calls, made a high-stakes wager:  the proposition was that Trump could basically campaign with nothing but tariffs, xenophobia, and invective, and win the election.  If he wins, the two of them split up the resulting future grift in some specified way (Putin gets X% of the future Trump Moscow?); if he'd lost Putin gives him a safe exile spot (Baku).  Putin wins, either way, as confidence in American democratic elections will be undermined.  So, congratulations to them on their winning bet.

Justice Unserved - To put it in baseball terms, our systems for Presidential accountability batted one-for-six, .167, against Trump. 

 The first impeachment was, in effect, a "waste pitch", it never had a chance, Democrats were just showing they were willing to impeach.  (We have since seen that the House can, in effect, impeach a ham sandwich, as the Republican House just did with HHS Secretary Mayorkas.) . The second impeachment, though, was the real chance to kill off the threat of Trump, and most Republican Senators failed to show, many of them with miserable excuses.  Foul ball. Any claims of acquittal on that one ring hollow, though technically correct. McConnell said it should be left to the prosecutors.  So they did.  (The part about Trump's being out of office for the Senate trial portion was completely bogus, and recognized as such.)

We got a second strike with the NY state trial and conviction, though it did not produce an out.  Two good things about that one:  1) As it is in NY state, which is unlikely to have a Republican governor willing to eliminate the conviction anytime soon, history will record the felony (sentenced to probation, never completed).  Historians do notice things like that.  2)  It will record his legal indiscretion as tax fraud. It is entirely appropriate that he, personally, be convicted of fraud (not just his charities, or his organization, or his luckless subservient victims).  It is certainly one prominent aspect of his criminal persona, fraud. 

The big one, though, was his contempt for the constitution and for the rule of law overriding his power. The overt evidence of it was the indictment for the same incitement to insurrection (Jan. 6) that the second impeachment's Senate punted (to mix sports metaphors), though there was a lot of evidence of covert acts for the same purpose uncovered through investigations.  Not all of it could be used, ruled the Trumpist Supreme Court, in effect, but some of it could be.  There was a real chance for a conviction, if it were to happen. 

Now, it won't.  I'd still like to see Jack Smith, who has a very smart legal mind, come up with a way that his case be frozen in ice for four years, to be defrosted later.  To put it somewhere Trump can't have it dismissed without recourse, and without the statute of limitations expiring.  If that were so, and Trump alive, he'd still be guilty, the public would undoubtedly hate him and all his former allies would already have deserted him.  The record should show, regardless of whether he serves a day in prison, that he did indeed conspire to obstruct a Federal proceeding and defraud the American public. 

As for the other two cases, they won't come to trial, either, now, if they ever would have without the election result.  Trump will get a very stern letter about his abuse of documents, and the Georgia case against him will go into a file cabinet while the rest of the case may eventually go on without him.

We Become the World's Untreated Sewer Hole - I put my thoughts about the pollution the US will be spewing upon the rest of the world above the domestic effects of this electoral result. Culturally, there will be the usual dreck we export, though some of it has lost its bite.  Technology-wise, we will see whether there will seen to be risk trusting American devices.  Trash-wise, we will go from being the "world's garbage dump" to a serious brain-drain, and I doubt anyone will take our barges of unrecycled recyclables. 

In the midst of reduced exports (and a stubbornly resistant negative trade balance, which will irk Trump incessantly), our tariffs will give Trump a chance to play wheeler-dealer with other countries, and you know what kind of edge he will seek.  One he can capitalize upon. 

This will apply in particular to his management of oil exports and the associated grift.  We will do our best in the next four years to contribute to climate warming, while sponsoring nothing new domestically to reduce our footprint upon the air, the land, and the waters. 

We Need Resistance at the State Level - By which, I mean also at the local level.  We can expect nothing new that is not negative from the Federal government over the coming years.  If we are resolute, we can minimize the impact in the places we live of the Trump Administration.  The first two years will be critical:  Trump will have one shot to get fulfillment of promises about deportations, Justice department purges, oil leases, and tax code revisions going.  He will get appropriations for some of it, right away in a budget reconciliation bill, which just needs a bare Senate majority.   He will seek a change in the healthcare regime to replace the ACA; if he has the votes to repeal it, he likely will not have the support for something to replace it. 

The damage from some of these policies can be reduced by attentive local resistance.  Deportees can be protected in some cases; oil drills and pipelines can be tied up by protests and legal challenges. In particular, states may be able to make provisions to reduce the harm coming to our healthcare.  There are Democratic governors with strong political positions (e.g. Newsom, Pritzker, Moore) who can demonstrate that kind of positive leadership  and thereby raise their own prospects for what will be a wide-open 2028 contest.

Democracy, Liberty, and Freedom: I Need a Break from This

I am highly skeptical of our claims to have democratic elections because of all the distortions in our system (Electoral college, gerrymandering, voter suppression efforts, the unrepresentative Senate).  This one seems to have given a clear majority to Trump (final popular vote will be about 50-48, a 3-point shift to him and the same away from Biden to Harris, on similar total vote), and that's what really bothers me.  This is what our voters freely chose; my conclusion is that we do have a democracy but we have a failing polity.  The cost of our elections has gone way up, and the quality of the result way down.   The level of civic education is shockingly low. I'm not going to explain this opinion about what to me is evident; I was witness to this campaign, and I know what I feel when I wake up in the morning:  It is a lot like how I felt waking up during the pandemic; it's very discouraging.

When it comes to liberty, we should expect that Trump would increase it; he is more a libertarian than he is a conservative.  His objective is reducing the degree to which Federal laws, organizations, and individuals touch upon us.  His actions are almost anarchic, reducing the scope and effectiveness of them, except for those tools of government he can use and abuse. The judgment is pending whether he will crack down on things like homelessness, cannabis legalization, same-sex marriage, and reproductive rights, or leave those things to the mixed state and local jurisdictions. This is a key aspect as to whether his administration will be tolerable for the average citizen. 

"Freedom" was one of the keywords of the Harris campaign, recently rejected.  She was using it largely to speak to reproductive rights for women, but there are other aspects of freedom to which we must look. (of course, she lost, and the fate of that freedom is very unclear) I am thinking of the basic ones of where one will live, work, how they will raise children, and enter into social engagements.  We will deny foreigners the freedom to be in our land, and we may well find that penalties will fall on companies and people who dare to leave. 

As for  me, though, I am looking to escape his maladministration and suppression of my liberties.  Appeals to "patriotism" in the fight against Trump are leaving me unmoved; I am more interested in how the rest of the world deals with Trump than I am with our domestic struggles.  I recognize that Trump's malign impact will be felt worldwide; I am not going to be a cheerleader for the USA in these days. 

Predictions

My own predictions for this election were bad, but no worse than most others'. Essentially, I had the scenario wrong:  after Harris came on, I concluded we were probably back to the "Status Quo" scenario of a deadlock, but we were actually still in the "Biden weakened" one (change the name in the subject).  Harris was fatally limited by the Biden administration's weak incumbency.  Harris was further handicapped by misogyny, racism and status anxiety, faults very evident in American society. I will add a dark implication that Hispanics don't seem all that willing to back a black woman.

 I had the ranking of the swing states somewhat right (except for Arizona), but I based them on an estimate of the national vote which was wrong by 3% in each direction.  As I suggested, a three-point drop for either candidate would be catastrophic, and it was electorally disastrous.  

My stake in PredictIt, which had survived the 2016 loss and many other twists and turns, went almost entirely down the drain this time.  The election prediction markets are not very predictive, but they react very quickly.  In the past, I could hedge those kinds of Democratic losses with other markets where I offset the losses confidently.  This year, there were very few markets--PredictIt seems to be on its last legs, with Kalshi now the governmentally-approved site  (I passed on Kalshi when it requested I enlist with a payment service called Plaid which promised to sell my data) , so I risked all of it.  The only money I will have there coming out of this election will be on the win by Ruben Gallego in Arizona and, most likely, some marginal payoff if Biden does not resign his job before Jan. 20 (something I just heard Jamal Simmons suggest). 

My predictions for the Trump Administration:  the tax cuts will happen, through the budget reconciliation process, and that will also fund the increase in ICE and other HHS organizations for the deportations, which will increase but not to the extent Trump pretended in his campaigns.  The logistics are too difficult to deport tens of millions, not to speak of the bad public relations involved.  There will be a harsh immigration bill passed, and there will be a long debate about an abortion bill, which will not pass.  The economy will look great for a year or two and then crash.  Democrats will win what is possible in 2026's midterm elections and will be ready to take on the post-Trump Republicans in 2028. 

The biggest uncertainty about Trump's coming administration is whether he will find the need to declare a national emergency to get his more extreme policies implemented.  He did that for the Muslim ban and to steal appropriations to build some of his wall during his first term.  This time, the circumstances are more favorable for his ability to do his dirty work, so maybe declaring an emergency which would put all our safety at risk will not be necessary.

Flounder, you can't spend your whole life worrying about your mistakes! You f***ed up. You trusted us! Hey, make the best of it! Maybe we can help. -- Animal House

Quick Hits

 WC Round

(Baseball) 

By this I do mean messy, needing maintenance, perhaps an entry key.  But it is a facility that can be used. 

2 out of 3 for the lower-seeded team in these major-league basball playoffs is essentially just winning a series on the road against a good team.  They have all done it, and it doesn't create unusual pressure--except to win the first game.  

The Tigers showed it best with their quick sweep of the team I picked as part of my (un-bet) quinella for the World Series, the Houston Astros.  The 'stros run of 7 straight appearances in the ALCS (the League final series) ended quickly to a team that just didn't care. 

Contrast that a bit with the struggles of the Orioles to do anything in the post-season, despite dominant performance in the regular season. They definitely seem a bit overwhelmed, once again, in a pressure situation before the home crowd, a reward they earned with a strong second-place finish. (Game in progress at this moment). 

The other team I had in the proposed bet (at something like 15-1, with a huge margin for the house vs. the implied odds) was the San Diego Padres, a team not quite as hot as the Tigers (or the Astros were, for that matter) but one that finally may have its act together, healthwise.  They were the only team of the four home teams across the two leagues to win their critical first game. 

If the Royals complete their two-game sweep of the Orioles, it will be #5 vs. #2 (Cleveland) and #6 (Tigers) vs. #1 Yankees in the ALDS (Division Series, or league semifinal series).  These will at least be 3 out of 5, with home-field advantage only really in a decisive Game 5--not too many go that far, usually.  One would think with those one-sided seeding matchups the winners of that next round would be predictable.  I doubt it--I still think there will be a team that doesn't get a bye (i.e., not #1 or #2 in their league) that will make the World Series--but my hypothetical bet is already in the WC toilet (to repeat myself0.

V.P. Debate

Vance put a bandage on his ticket's bleeding. Walz got ifinn a potential knockout blow at the end, keeping J.D. from a 15-round win on points, dodging the whole time. It happens. .
Best line of the night for Walz: "Fact-check Donald Trump".

Michael Steele called Vance "Blue", which was a cute sort of insult, but I have to say he should be addressed as "Yo Disk!"

Regarding the "mexican gun cartels" comment, that was actually an opening Walz missed. The gun trafficking is primarily in the opposite direction, to Mexico, because the US has more access to them. Vance slipped it in unchallenged.

--My comment on Political Wire, 11 pm.  

EBK-PRB

In 1963, Pete Rose was my favorite baseball player.  Radio was the primary way I was experiencing the game, and Rose was the hit of the broadcasts--taking an extra base, finding the hole for a base hit, filling the hole on defense (at second base)--he seemed to be everywhere for the team, which was experiencing a high point (not quite World Series level, though).  

In the 70's, he was an integral component of the historically successful Big Red Machine, now at third base due to the essential addition of Joe Morgan.  During this time, it became apparent to me that his quirks (flat-top haircut, running to first after a walk) were part of a sociopathic nature, shown also by his affinity for the likes of Nixon, Marge Schott, etc. 

He became a justifiable target for targets and jokes in his latter career, when he could no longer command a league-leading level of batting average, and his Sixties ambition of being "the first $100,000 singles hitter" had transformed into the quest to win one of the league records then viewed as untouchable:  Ty Cobb's 4,191 safe hits.  Ty Cobb, the similarly behaviorally-challenged star hitter of the early 20th-century (not the former Trump lawyer--no relation, I hear?).  Rose hung on in active duty several years as a replacement-level player to get there, but at least he could choose his hitting matchups for himself as player-manager some of the time during the end. 

That was the period when he screwed the pooch, his gambling habit becoming an addiction that sent him way over the line into prohibited behavior--betting on any baseball game.  He was rightly banned from active participation in the game after that--for life.  For Rose, who had little real value in his life beyond baseball and betting, it hurt a lot. 

Worse for him in the longer run was being eliminated from participation in the voting of the writers for the Baseball Hall of Fame.  This somewhat exclusive club--those inducted, the writers (a floating bunch, over time) who vote on its members, and those ad hoc groups which pick others who never get voted in (the Negro Leagues representatives being the most prestigious of those sets of selected members).*--chose to abide by the decision that Rose's behavior was disqualifying. 

Rose has passed away now. I recognize that my own view is biased:  I have long advocated for his induction, and even for more serious consideration of some other Hall-worthy players "cancelled" from membership (due to steroid use, admitted or alleged) despite clearly having met the performance levels.  I would now say it is time for him to be admitted in, posthumously.  Despite his unique (an once again, seemingly unchallengeable) record, he's not one of the all-time greatest, but he would qualify as the 25th-man, the utility guy, on the all-time team.  The "lifetime" ban has expired!

More Online Odds Discussion

Comparison of my odds on outcomes political vs. PredictIt:  Harris 65-35 vs. PI's 55-58 to 45-48 (!); Democrats winning the House 55%, PI (no entry); Democrats holding the Senate 18%, PI (no entry).  Perhaps the subject of a later posting will be that it is not now so clear to me there will be an (overall) strong turnout result, though it will be strong in many areas.  NY/CA drive is probably more specific than statewide.

*Of course, they are not officially of the same level, but the Executive Board and the writers are really the ones with control.

Inflection Point

 President Biden (praise be!) would typically cite the phrase in speeches in discussion of the US' place in history and of the status of elections in our constitutional republic.  I think that, typically, the phrase was not really getting across to the public in that fashion, and especially to those swing voters he was trying to attract.  

An inflection point can be described as a change in the direction of a graphical curve. In a broader sense, it means a turning point. Biden believes that 2024's election is such a turning point.  I suggested something similar in my rant about the "precipice" at the beginning of the year.  This election can clearly be seen as the climax of something, this battle of our political norms vs. Trumpism. On behalf of all, even the Trumpists, there is a belief that this election will be decisive.  

I can clearly see an inflection point, and it is not on Election Day (at least not yet, it could still happen) but it already happened, on July 21, when Biden chose to announce he would end his campaign for re-election and suggest Vice-President Harris for the party's nomination. Before that, Biden's standing v. Trump was trending downward, slowly, but seemingly without any positive inflection in sight (first derivative negative, second derivative=0).  Since then, a month with a favorable sequence of events, all evidence shows steady improvement in the public's view of the Democrats' ticket.

Where does Kamala's trend go from here?   My estimate of the gain since 7/21 is 3-5%, from down 1-2% (Biden or Harris vs. Trump) to up 2-3%.  One change that contributed to the gain since 7/21 was the collapse of RFKJR's candidacy, which, along with Harris replacing Biden, has made this much more a head-to-head, two-person race. Roughly speaking, the popular vote now looks to be about 48-46 Harris-Walz over Trump, with some 3% insisting on another individual and 3% undecided.

Those 3% are probably more like "don't know", meaning that they don't know anything about it that they will admit to knowing.  Those particular folks may not end up voting, unless something really grabs their attention (like a war threat).  Regardless, some combination of changes will bring the numbers up to 100% total (with the 3% 'other').  There isn't more than that amount (3%) of downside to the current percentages I suggested, for either candidate, if that much.  Trump's popular vote floor I would say is 43%, and Harris' 45%, which is where Biden was when he stopped.  I will say, though, that a 3% downward move for either from the current level would absolutely lead to a landslide.  So, the time is one of vulnerability, avoiding harm, even as Harris may gain even a bit more during her campaign's post-convention afterglow. Another debate looms; another inflection point is likely before November, though that could be an acceleration (less likely), a reversal--let's hope not, a plateauing (most likely). Or maybe not, just a steady increase, all the way. Sounds good.

 

Graph of the Predictit market for Democrats winning Presidential election by 35-64 Electoral Votes, from May 26 to August 25, 2024.

Is National Popular Vote Irrelevant?

Clearly I don't think so, as that's what I've been discussing--using its estimator, the polling averages.

I often see it suggested as being meaningless by Republicans who are on the defensive because they would lose by that measure every time these days.  (2004 the only recent exception)  I would argue that, instead, it is a measure for which there is ample data and one that, broadly speaking, can be used to provide a key measure useful to predict outcome in the critical states. .     

If we look at the percentage vote for one of the parties in the Presidential elections within these states, it is not at all static.  It rises up and down with the relative fortunes of the party.  However, there is less movement relative to the overall popular vote, and even moreso if one looks at the order of these states on that measure.  

To take an example, North Carolina's popular vote percentage margin for Democratic presidential candidates, as compared to the overall US popular vote margin, resulted the following in the last four elections:  -7.0 (2008), -5.9 (2012), -5.8 (2016), and -5.9 (2020).  (Note:  2008, the worst of the four data points, was the one when the Democrats won the state!)  So, you could estimate that the US Democratic margin nationally should be above 6% to favor their chances. 

Let's look at that measure, which also shows some distinctive trends in individual states vs. the national voting, and some conclusions that may be drawn from it: 

 

State	2008	2012	2016	2020	Comment
Nevada	+5.2	+2.8	+0.3	-2.1	Negative trend; projects to -4
Michigan	+9.1	+5.6	-2.3	-1.7	Projects to -2
Pennsylvania	+3.0	+1.5	-3.1	-3.3	Projects to -3
Wisconsin	+6.6	+3.0	-2.9	-3.9	Projects to -3 or -4
Arizona	-15.8	-12.9	-5.6	-4.2	Improved rapidly; projects to -3
Georgia	-12.5	-11.7	-7.2	-4.3	Changing rapidly toward D; projects -3 to -1
Florida	-4.5	-3.0	-3.3	-7.7	Not out of reach if Dems +4; 2020 looks like an outlier

In terms of rank order of this measure, GA, AZ, and NC have consistently been lowest, MI at or near the highest, and PA right in the middle.  With all these swing states below the national average in 2020--a high turnout year like 2008, and like 2024 is likely to be, it is clear that those who say Harris-Walz will need a clear lead in the popular vote, like 3 or 4%, have the recent data on their side.  At the same time, though, a lead of 5-6% might lead to an Electoral Vote "landslide" of 100 EV or more, and much more if FL flips. 

This model doesn't take into account specific variations and their possible causes; I would suggest the outlook in Wisconsin looks more favorable than this because of the Walz effect.  Turnout nationally, and its effect on the US national popular vote, will be up for Democrats because New York and California are so critical for regaining control of the House and will get extra attention, which will boost the Democratic vote margin, without doing much in some of the swing states. 

With a 50-45 popular vote margin, which I think is quite likely, this projects to a 297-219 lead for Harris-Walz, with Nevada and North Carolina too close to call and Georgia, once again, somehow on the Democrats' side.  On the other hand, if it finishes 49-47,by this model Harris would lose Pennsylvania, where Democratic turnout totally matters, and most likely the election as well.  The margins are fine. 

Unfortunately, though exit polls might help, the popular vote takes days to assume its final shape.  So we are left to lean upon the unwieldy support of the polling averages. That is, if we don't want to go by the even more inconsistent measure of polling averages in the several states.