Italian Elections 2018

What could be less interesting, right?  Wrong! I won't say that this is a world-history making event, since Western civilization's continuation or development no longer depends on the fate of  political struggles in Rome (OK it's been awhile since that was the case), but I find it to be a subject with important ramifications, for both Europe and the US, as well as a fascinating case study.

Modern Italian culture, in all its facets, has been a particular interest of mine, ever since I "discovered its existence"in plain sight, Christopher Columbus-like, about 40 years ago.   A little background on the national scene follows--please bear with me and I will try to be brief. Then I will go into more depth about the likely outcomes and the major personalities involved. 

Italy since World War II has prospered spectacularly, but unevenly.  By most measures, Northern and Central Italy are on par with the most developed countries of Europe, but the Southern part of the boot and Sicily have lagged.  This has been true much longer; one could say that the initial disparity present at the founding of the modern state (mid-19th century) has never been remedied.  The Parliamentary state has consistently disappointed people's expectations, but there is still strong support among the people for democratic ideals.  The Italian economy is recovering more strongly recently after a long, slow recovery from the Great Crater, but it is still a difficult place to do business, for many reasons.  The wealth of the people comes from their great assets:  land and people, and to a large extent, the interaction of the two. 

Why Does It Matter? 
I will make this quick.  It is a significant country in Europe, and if its election is won by the right--which has various Trumpian characteristics among its leaders, including xenophobia, corruption (though probably not with Russia so much), immigration, turning the economy to the favor of the wealthy, and clownish behavior--it will be very harmful for the European Union as we currently know it.  Many of the center-right coalition openly advocate going the Brexit route, and Italy, unlike Britain, is a core member of the EU initiative from its very earliest form in the postwar EEC.

If we think more narrowly, the result is also significant for the US, in the sense that it is yet another very relevant test of democracy and of the public desire, or lack of desire, to reject tribalist and ultra-nationalist thinking, and thus a possible portent of upcoming US political soundings.  Unlike the US, Italy has  a very real current immigration problem--poverty-stricken people coming over to Italy in boats from Libya (after migrating there from many other Third World countries), and there is also a general Italian view that the country has not been properly supported by the rest of Europe in handling this peaceful, but unwanted, burden of handling mass migration. 

The Scenarios and Their Chances
So, to the political structure (of the moment):  This parliamentary election will be conducted March 5 under different rules from the last one, five years ago.  (In a somewhat rare occurrence among Italian governments since the postwar republic replaced constitutional monarchy, the Parliament remained intact for the full five-year term.)  The new Parliament will be composed of a mixture of proportional representation and "first-by-the-post" election of individual districts by plurality (like the US House).  The distribution of seats among the parties for the proportional portion* is somewhat apparent from the opinion polling--opinion moves fairly slowly, in general. The wild card is how the individual seats may play out, as the balances are very fine.  There are a number of possible coalitions, in classic Italian fashion.

On this one, I have some small skin in the game (predicti.org); I will make some references to the market they have on this election:  "Who will be Prime Minister on July 31?"
Here is my list of  the possible outcomes, in order of likelihood:

1) Generally unclear, no coalition easily identifiable.    This has two major variations:
a) totally indecisive result, and everyone sees that it's so (no party or coalition above 30% or so)--the Parliament might seat, make some new rules, or not, but just call a new election.
b) no surprises in the outcomes, continuing discussions, no new outcome on the horizon.  This could go on for a very long time--the 7/31 deadline is a good reference point, as it is shortly before the midsummer break called "ferragosto" when everyone, and especially the politicians, shut it down and go on vacation.  In this case, there could be a continuation of the caretaker government that has been running since the collapse of the Renzi government (see below).  Paolo Gentiloni is the Prime Minister, from the Partito Democratico (yes, the Democratic Party, and it is very comparable to the US one).  He's a dignified, moderate techno-bureaucrat; few would regret the result, though it would be a defeat for: 

2) The Center-right coalition.  This is the only currently-announced coalition that has any chance to get close to a governing majority by itself. The leader of this combination of five parties is none other than Silvio Berlusconi, back for another run at it after his conviction and retreat from the scene.  His party is called Forza Italia (I would translate it as "Go, Italy!"), and it's the only one of the alliance that has meaningful national appeal.  The problem is, because of his conviction, he's supposed to be ineligible to actually serve in the new government.  So, there's a very interesting range of possible PM's.  My money (in predictit.org) for this scenario is on Antonio Tajani, the most respectable of the leaders of Forza (FI).  His odds have surged--I bought him at .14 a month ago and he's up to .33 (on a .01 to .99 scale, pre-election;  after it's decided 7/31, values will go to 0 to 1.000).  Good gains so far, and I may hang around to see if I can make more.

3) Center-left coalition.  There are two big parties in this (potential) space:  the PD (Dems), who had control of Parliament the last five years, and the one-of-a-kind Italian invention called Movimento Cinque Stelle ("Five Star Movement", abbreviated as M5S).  It just missed five years ago, when headed by a sharp-tongued comedian, Beppe Grillo; it has shown some staying power after some purges and other separations se and is now headed by an emergent 31-year-old talent, Luigi di Maio.  Its themes have been opposition to the Establishment and all the other parties, use of 21st-Century technology to create democracy, bloc voting, and eternal internal squabble.  If di Maio has conquered that last tendency then he would be truly deserving of leadership, but probably not as the PM this time around.
They (M5S) and the PD will be the leading single parties in the proportional vote (as they were in 2013) dividing 50-60% of the total.  The question is whether these two could get together; every early indication is no (M5S has sworn off all alliances), but that underestimates the Italian impulse to conspire:  I believe that if the PD and M5S both became convinced that their alliance (after the election, of course, first they have to attack each other all through the campaign) were necessary to prevent someone like Berlusconi winning, they might find a way. 
If there were to be an actual agreement, I would think the likely form would be to agree upon someone unexpected, neither Gentiloni nor di Maio (and not PD leader Matteo Renzi):  they could find some sap from another of the many tiny parties sprinkled through this range, maybe someone who won their district but whose party didn't reach the 3% threshold level for proportional representation.  (In predictit.org terms, all Yes bets would then lose;  if you liked this theory, you'd bet No on everyone and make a relatively small profit.)  More likely that M5S would fulfill their promise of non-participation by abstaining for some center-left variation of government formation, thus allowing it to happen. 

4) "La Truffa" - Somehow, the center-right find some tricky way to put Berlusconi at the head of the government (despite his not being in the Parliament):  they make a law to allow it? 

5) A PD-dominated government - This is a variation on #1 in which the PD does surprisingly well, such that they--and any smaller partners they can find--get to 40% or so of the Parliamentary seats.  Then, suddenly, a government headed by Renzi would become a possibility. 
The problem is Renzi, for my taste the best prominent politician--intelligent, honest, uncorrupted--that Italy has had for a long time. (At least since the deaths of Aldo Moro and Enrico Berlinguer, for those like me who've been following this stuff for decades.) Naturally, everyone hates him--except for his admirers, who have become a lot less numerous since he became a loser.  That happened with the electoral referendum last October.  He openly staked his career on it, a valiant but ultimately and totally unsuccessful crusade to make the company more governable by making it less democratic. 
Shards of his old support have since dropped off to various splinter groups (and the M5M) since then. He is now seen by the left as a would-be Napoleon who betrayed the working class; most of his remaining appeal is to the moderate left wing of the former Christian Democrat party, from whence he came.  I would say his game now is to let someone else try for a few years--and eventually fail.  He would hope to maintain his role until when he could then make a comeback.  He's still only 43. 

Additional Notes
It is rather unlikely that the scenario will present itself immediately from the electoral results (though we will not have to wait long to hear them--the polling is very efficient, as is the tabulation).  Instead, certainty that there will be no electoral majority, and the multiplicity of parties, will mean that the outcome will take weeks or months to emerge.  A recent article in The Economist suggests an obscure southern Italian party (Noi con l'italia--"we are with Italy"), recently formed, could get a surprising number of local district wins and become a critical factor.  In the respected Italian weekly magazine L'Espresso, a writer under the name of "corleone" (could he be from Sicily, perhaps?) points to the elections for the President of the two houses of Parliament (scheduled for March 23, or 18 days after the general election) to get a clue where this thing will be going. 

The other alternatives to Tajani or Berlusconi as PM for the center-right range from scary to laughable; the most noteworthy miscreant after Silvio is Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Lega Nord (Northern League), who leads a party popular in the North whose supporters are tired of the welfare queens and foreigners from Third World countries getting all their tax dollars.  You can see the appeal, right?  His party will be the second-largest in the center-right coalition, earning 13-15% and winning a number of constituencies. He is pretty much disqualified from being the PM because of the intense distaste everyone else has for him, but he would be a force* in the government if it happened:  I imagine he would then be able to lobby for sending the Italian navy down to patrol the Libyan shores, a provocative military stance that could either work--stopping the boatpeople, and their exploitative aggregators, at the Libyan ports--or start actual conflict.  (Libya was an Italian colony for decades, until the Fascists lost it during WWII.)

I have a lot of (very cheap) shares on Renzi, who is currently viewed as a longshot with no chance; a few on Gentiloni, hoping to average down sometime down the road; and a moderate bet on Tajani (another for which I will add more shares if his price drops).  I have No bets on Berlusconi, Salvini, and Di Maio.   The current polling--Wikipedia is maintaining an excellent graph which shows each data point for each party over time--indicates eight parties will make it past the 3% threshold (while several others will win seats through having localized strength.  If you'll permit me to use the TLA's (two-letter acronyms, or three-letter acronyms) I reviewed above, one gets, approximately, the following current values for those who name their choice:  M5S 28%, PD 23%,  FI 18%, LN 13%. Left Alliance 6%, 5% for a neo-Fascist remnant now called Fratelli d'Italia ("Brothers of Italy", a quote from the first line of the national anthem), and about 8% for others. 

*Sorry for the word, couldn't resist. 

Trump: BFJ, Not Funny

And the joke is on all of us.  Turns out Trump did do this thing as a lark, thinking that he would finish in The Middle of the Pack in Iowa and then be free to return to his regular gig.  But no, he crushed his performance—which we’ll come back to defining in a moment—and methodically knocked out candidate after candidate—“And you’re fired!”

The amazing thing was, some of the guys he knocked out came back to him.  Ben Carson, Chris Christie.  Other people so deeply into character (Sarah Palin) that they could not leave the show.  Some new characters in the farce:  The Campaign Manager with the nasty streak; the woman with the imagination to do the American thing and file charges. 

Please, Trumpistas, listen.  He’s been toying with you.  He’s been pulling your strings like a sitar virtuoso.  The sounds resonate for you, and you come away from your encounters with his pitch convinced.  This is not a used car, though; not only do you have to kick the tires a bit more before you buy, but you’re hiring him to drive it, too.  And Trump has shown, over and over again, that he is not prepared to be President.   Even worse, if we refer to our countrys experience with St. Ronnie Reagan, he doesn’t seem to have the sense to hire people who are more responsible, more professional in their professional demeanor than he is.

 

#NeverTrump Update
More significant than the “Drumpfengaffen”—this week, the ones on abortion “punishment” for women, on Japan and South Korea’s response to North Korea’s aggressive nuclear policy, to the “unaffordable” cost of leading NATO’s protection of European freedom and prosperity, all of which just reinforce the known narrative of Trump’s limited understanding of the few issues the Republican campaign has addressed—more important than the outcome of the primary in Wisconsin (a solitary event in the extended blabfest of Act II, Scene 4, after the critical mid-March primary results, which firmly established Trump and Clinton as the frontrunners for the parties’ nominations), there is a quiet movement finally forming within the Republican parties’ meeting rooms (in olden days they would have been smoke-filled) which have the objective of blocking Trump’s first-ballot selection for the nomination.

Leading this quiet, not-quite conspiracy, in the sense that there is no agreement on the strategy, only on the intention, are the canny, hardened party pros working on behalf of Ted Cruz who work, state by state and district by district, to deny Trump committed delegates.  Some are ideologically committed to Cruz, others recruited merely out of the desire to keep the party’s control out of the hands of amateurs. Where they can, they work within the rules of the states to pick up Cruz-pledged delegates, but it is enough to get delegates who will not be pledged for Trump on the first ballot.  The success in the theft of a few in Louisiana caught the frontrunner’s attention, but there are also maneuvers afoot in Tennessee, in Georgia, in Missouri.  Then there is John Kasich’s candidacy, which exists to deny both Cruz and Trump access to his small share of delegates, though so far it does not seem able to add to his chances to promote a viable bid for the nomination.  The Kasich and Cruz campaigns had some initial discussions on cooperating, surely the most effective approach, but Cruz rebuffed the overtures and his campaign and associated PAC are attacking the Ohio governor vigorously in Wisconsin; except for the cirumstances—his weak placement in the horserace—Wisconsin would be a great state for his prospects, but he stands to finish a distant third because of the focus on the two leaders’ contest. 

The Real Kicker

With all the chitter-chatter of a possible contested convention--one to which Trump does not bring a majority of delegates committed to voting for him on the first ballot--the story that has gotten very little attention, but which I predict may be decisive in the contest, is the fate of  the delegate slots won by Marco Rubio, numbering 159 at the time he dropped out of the race just after his massive failure in his home state of Florida (the 159 are about 6.5% of the total).  Rubio “suspended” his campaign, which normally would have released his delegates, but he did not formally release them, and in fact he has followed up with letters to the states where he won delegates to say specifically that he was not releasing them.   I did find one somewhat authoritative voice to address the question in the aftermath of Rubio’s retirement from active campaigning, the lawyer Ben Ginsberg, who said that the results would vary based on individual states’ rules.

I predict that the Republican convention's (Republi-Cons, for short) Rules and Credentials Committees will have to deal with questions of the possible enforcement of pledges of “Rubio delegates”, even in the probable absence of Rubio actually being nominated on the floor, and possibly of voting to decide among competing delegate slates, and that the outcome of these challenges could be decisive (as they were in the last competitive convention, in 1976—the result of those contests put Ford over the top prior to the first ballot).

Finally, in this unofficial anti-Trump conspiracy, there is the notable example of the behavior of Speaker Paul Ryan, Congressman from Wisconsin, who has spoken scornfully of Trumpian rhetoric, but has noticeably not endorsed his chief rival, Cruz, in the lead-up to his state’s primary.  One can only speculate on the reason, but I suppose it is a combination of three possible but not mutually exclusive ones:

   a) Ryan detests Cruz as much or more than he does Trump,
   b) secretly he is hoping Kasich’s candidacy can survive, despite lacking Ryan’s significant endorsement, and/or
   c) he believes that they may come to him in the end, as his Congressional colleagues did when they were stuck for a viable candidate for Speaker of the House, and he is leaving the door open for that if the convention delegates can not agree on Trump, Cruz, or Kasich.

In any case, his lack of endorsement does provide for a fair three-way contest this week and leaves his options completely open.

Act II, Scene 4 will be the Wisconsin primaries in both parties, the results of each should provide for entertaining viewing this Tuesday.  In terms of Predictit.org, Cruz and Sanders are heavy favorites, with secondary markets on the margin of the winner:  will the Republican winner have a margin or greater than or =8% (currently  the market is at 56% Yes, up from 52; I'm betting Yes on Cruz' momentum or Trump's lack thereof.  Secondly, will the Democratic primary winner have a margin greater or equal to 5% (market is at 55%, down from 64%, at which point I bet No)..

Scene 5 will be the series of primaries in the Northeast and Middle Atlantic states, which will have various storylines (Trump and Clinton’s home state of New York, the outcome of the vote of the “two Pennsylvanias”, the urban centers of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and their suburbs, vs. the Appalachian-flavored rest of the state, the Atlantic seaboard battles for Kasich to make headway), and then the final scene, which will be the California primary on June 7, which will either clinch the nomination for Trump, or for Clinton, or possibly set the stage for a drama in Act III, the tale of the Two Cities of Cleveland and Philadelphia.  Those scenes’ scripts have not yet been drafted.

Progress Report - Pt. 2 - Politics

I was on Yahoo! today*  and saw a teaser for an article by Matt Bai, a reporter they have signed up in an effort to be a more serious, complete website.  It was called, "The Coming Foreign Policy Election."  I didn't read it at the time, but I thought to myself, "Matt Bai, if that's what you think, you're a dope." To be fair to Bai, when I read the article later I saw that he's not talking about this election, but the one in 2016--so he's not a dope, just jumping the shark by about two years:  Any honest analyst would have to say he/she has no clue at this time what the 2016 election will be about.

He was also, if my memory serves, one of the shark-jumpers who jumped all over President Obama a couple of weeks ago when Obama honestly stated that his administration didn't have a strategy for ISIS yet. Of course, after that gaffe the strategy gap was filled quickly.  The strategy is an obvious one, it just took a little while to get all the key allies in line.  And, they are:  Western Europe of course, but then Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the two ones that will cooperate fully on an unacknowledged basis:   Iran and Russia.

This could be a bit of a turning point in our relationship with Iran, if both countries allow it to be, as there is no country, outside Iraq and Syria, which has a greater desire to suppress ISIS and its throwback transnational ambitions than Iran.   The need for the others in the alliance arises because ISIS has shown some quality as a movement:  they have not collapsed from too-rapid expansion, the majority populace under their control has found life actually improved (from the chaos they were experiencing, in Syria, and from the religious discrimination in Iraq), and, from a global Islamist/jihadi status aspect, they have scored points for audacity and for coming out in the open, which will help their recruiting (poor fools, heading off to ignominy, death, and no virgins!). ISIS' weakness, which will allow the containment/rollback/destruction scenario to work, is the one that all fanatical movements with global ambitions eventually face:  their neighbors despise them.

Anyway, back to Bai and foreign policy:  even two days ago it seemed as though Obama's foreign policy was circling the toilet drain, with each day bringing new abomination, without any effective response from our part.  Bai will have learned in the last 48 hours how quickly that can all change, though:  Ukraine and Russia have settled, the alliance against ISIS is forming up rapidly, and the events which led him to write the editorial were essentially disproved in two days, not two years (though I doubt he will be admitting as much in his appearance this week on "This Week with George Stephanopoulos"!)  2016 could still be an election year in which foreign policy issues predominate; however, I disagree with him that 1980 and 2004 were such+.

In 2014, though, foreign policy will be near the bottom of issues voters cite to pollsters--if they can think of any at all to cite.  The playing field for both sides is remarkably devoid of any issues, and both sides seem to want it that way.   The whole Boehner lawsuit/possible impeachment thing is a red herring that both sides seem to be able to throw out effectively to the more predatory fish in their respective e-mail ponds:  the lawsuit is a joke,  one based on the hypocritical argument that Obama has not implemented Obamacare sufficiently rigorously; it has no chance of succeeding, and impeachment would blow up in the Republicans' faces if it were tried on Obama.   Immigration?--action is off the table now: Democratic Senatorial candidates in red-leaning states were worried it would hurt them. Keystone XL? - not a powerful issue, and Obama can put it off, too. Minimum wage? - it helps Democrats with turnout of its base, but not convincing the (few) true fence-sitters, while possibly persuadable Republican voters of all economic classes remain attached to their trickle-down ideology.  Citizens United? - Unfortunately, it's just become a partisan club for Democratic candidates and office-holders to use against Republicans, who therefore respond defensively and instinctively to oppose any change, and thereby preserve the (unacceptable, even for them, if truth be known) status quo. Then, of course, there is the #1 issue, especially in a midterm election--the Economy?  It is likely to stay on the same, sluggish course, and there is little the President could do, with or without Congress, and much less that Congress can do on its own.

What this election is about, for both sides, is simply the aggregation of a few bits more of power through skillful fund-raising and the exploitation of those funds.  For the Democrats, this means replicating the Obama campaign methods in 1000 local points of turnout activity, combined with some carefully prepared local tactical advertising based on issue-related focus groups and polling. The Republicans don't need polls, organizing money, or advisers:  they can lead from their gut (Establishment conservative or Tea Party), throw red meat to their base, spend copiously from secret PAC money in the hundreds of millions, and do their best to suppress overall turnout levels.

Ten Most Important State Elections (to Me)
You may have seen a few other Top Ten lists--most vulnerable incumbent Senators or Representatives (they run out of ideas before they get to 10)--closest races, Howard Dean's Dozen, maybe the Mayday.us selections (I may comment on those when they are complete, as I want to give that group every possible promotion, and their choices are quite interesting).  What I find is that there are a bunch of states with very little going on, while some have multiple races that are closely contested while also presenting significant differences between their political positions.  Giving for Democrats at a statewide level can help  at all levels, or conversely, giving locally could help tight statewide contests. So here are my Top Ten state races, from the bottom up:

Honorable Mention - Texas, where I expect nothing very interesting in terms of results, but Wendy Davis' run at Typical Texan Tool Greg Abbott (latest product of the 3-T Ranch) is at least honorable; New Hampshire, which I think will be OK for Jeanne Sheehan as Senator and for both Annie Kuster and Carol Shea-Porter in contested House races; and New Mexico, where I am registered to vote:  Tom Udall should win easily over a self-funded opponent, while Susana Martinez should be able to hold onto her job and position herself as a desperation VP candidate for the Republicans in 2016 if they really Need A Woman (and being Hispanic is a bonus chip) to counter You-Know-Who.

10) Arkansas - I've got no horse in the tight Senate race (Pryor gets nothing from me because of his vote on gun background checks), but the fact that Democrats are competitive in the Senate and Governor races is interesting, anyway

9)  Georgia - I'm not really a believer, but the Democrats have fielded probably their best possible Senatorial candidate (daughter of longtime moderate Dem. Senator Sam Nunn) to compete for a vacant seat, and the polls are all over the place.

8)  Colorado - Sen. Mark Udall in a do-or-die race vs. a Tea Partier.  Udall should win but there is risk, and no room for error given the close count for control of the Senate.  Gov. Hickenlooper is favored to hold on against reaction (this is now a Legal Marijuana state, and some are dismayed he let that happen) and hold off his opponent.

7) Illinois - The state of my current primary residence is a mess, and this is counting against Pat Quinn, even though he seems like a decent guy and he didn't make the mess.  I'm sure electing a big-money trickle-down guy like his opponent will not make it better, but he'll be more willing to approach the legislature for hand-outs to big companies threatening to move jobs out--at least I think that is the marginally-prevailing voter wisdom.  There are several very closely contested House races, in particular those of (I will name the Democrats--the Republicans don't send me constant emails to remind me who they are!) Brad Schneider in the northern suburbs, and Ann Callis (a strong race against an incumbent),  Cheri Bustos and Bill Enyart (who has not asked me for money!) downstate. Dick Durbin should have no problem winning re-election, and despite all the emails asking for money, I don't think Tammy Duckworth should, either.

6) Wisconsin -  The one race I am following here is one of the big headliners this year:  the much-hated Scott Walker (many Republi-con pundits' "interesting" choice for the 2016 Presidential nomination) is fighting, once again, for his political life.  He may lose this one; it seems the promised trickle-down flow of his union-busting was not so much.  No Senate race (that hasn't stopped Tammy Baldwin from deluging my Inbox, though).

5) Michigan - There is a chance that Michigan's Republican governor may lose, but the truly critical race is for the open Senate race.  Rep. Gary Peters is trying to prevent a Republican pick-up and the money is flowing.  Peters is a very slight favorite.

4) North Carolina - Riding somewhat on President Obama's success in that state in 2008, Kay Hagan defeated Elizabeth Dole to take a Senate seat to which she is trying desperately to hold--this time without the Obama machine's support (her choice).   She is clinging to that elusive middle-of-the-road positioning, which puts her a long distance from her opponent, whose positions suggest a nostalgia for the Bad Ol' Days of Jesse Helms.  Based on incumbency and the advantages of a centrist position, one would think this is winnable, and it is, but the outcome is greatly in doubt.

3) Iowa - This is a battleground state on all levels, thoroughly purple.  The Republican Governor Terry Branstad is likely to break all existing records and win yet another term, though his opponent Jack Hatch is pushing hard, trying to exploit Branstad Fatigue.  There are close races in several Congressional districts, particularly for the re-election of Dave Loebsack, and for open seats sought by Staci Appel and Pat Murphy, while all people of goodwill are hoping Jim Mowrer has some chance to defeat that racist blowhard Steve King (probably not).   The big one, though, is the Senate race to fill the seat of retiring longtime Democratic Senator Tom Harkin:  Congressman Bruce Braley is the candidate, his party credentials are strong, but his campaign has left the door open for a Tea Party woman candidate. Yet another do-or-die race for national Democrats.

2) Florida - Floridians have a chance this year to send Governor Rick Scott back to wherever he came from (or, preferably, to jail, where he belongs).  The alternative to him is former Gov. Charlie Crist, who lost a Senate race (as an independent) to Marco Rubio, but now has become a Democrat. He governed as a moderate before, so it's fair for him to say he does not feel at home in his former party anymore (though that may not dispel his political opponents' charges of opportunism).  There are some competitive House races in Florida (I have been getting many emails from Patrick Murphy--not the one in Iowa above, which has been confusing--who is in a close race to hold his seat, as well as many enjoyable ones from Alan Grayson, who apparently has a fairly easy race this time). No Senate race here (or in New York or California; Texas has a near-walkover for John Cornyn.  It is almost certain this election will break records for low turnout, but these circumstances will have something to do with it, along with the political stalemate, the flood of negative ads we can expect....)

1) Kentucky - There are two routes toward the desired outcome that Mitch McConnell will not be the Senate Majority Leader in 2015-16.  The complicated one involves keeping net Democratic seat losses to less than six (with West Virginia, South Dakota, and now Montana near certain, and a variety of states that are possible losses, some but not all of which are discussed above).  The more direct route is voting him out of office completely, and I am thrilled to report that is still a possibility this year.  I should not get my hopes up, but his opponent, Alison Lundergan Grimes, is a strong candidate, a determined campaigner careful to hold to moderate positions appropriate for her state, while Mitch is....one of the least likable politicians ever.   They tried a campaign ad in which he smiled, and I think they had to pull it, as he was scaring little children. The good news is that Kentucky is always one of the first to produce its voting results on Election Night, so I will know early on whether to place my hopes elsewhere.

2014 Elections - Special Cases: 
a) Louisiana - Democratic Sen. Mary Landrieu is running against both a Tea Party candidate and an Establishment Republican candidate.  The conventional wisdom is that she will finish first but fall short of 50%, which by Louisiana rules would necessitate a runoff election a few weeks later against the second-place finisher, then that wisdom suggests she might lose that race, which may at that time be determinant of control of the Senate.  Landrieu is a pureblood politician who picks her spots and avoids votes which will condemn her with her conservative state's electorate. I'm rooting for her to win it in regulation time and think she can do it.  If it goes into overtime, though, with the Senate at 50-49 Republican, it will be an insane mini-campaign, no matter who she has as opponent (New Orleans TV stations are holding time slots open for the windfall revenue, I'm sure).

b) Alaska  - My view of the toss-up Senate race in Alaska is like that of the Arkansas race above: there's an endangered, incumbent Democrat who will have to win without my support. My disappointment is greater with Alaska's Begich (I never had any expectations for Pryor), though I suppose I should be more understanding of his position:  he represents a state full of gun nuts who celebrate the idea that shooting moose from a helicopter is sport, and in fact I was reading that the Gun Owners of America give him a failing grade, despite his effort to appease them by opposing universal background checks for purchases, because of anti-gun crimes like supporting an advocate of gun restrictions for the judiciary and (horrors!) voting in favor of implementing the well-known anti-gun legislation Obamacare (?).   OK, Mark, I know you're not one of them, but have you shown you're one of us?

c) Hawaii - This is the state which has had the most dysfunctional Democratic party this year, but it will probably turn out OK for them in the end.  The story goes like this:  When longtime Senator Daniel Inouye was dying, he spoke with Gov. Abercrombie and suggested Abercrombie appoint Rep. Colleen Hanabusa to his seat until the special election.  When Inouye died, Abercrombie named instead Brian Schatz.  This "betrayal" opened up a rift between Whites and Asians in the state's Democratic party leadership, with the result that Abercrombie was punished with a massive primary defeat.  Meanwhile, Schatz squeaked out a victory over Hanabusa in the Senate primary.  I received tons of requests for money from both Schatz and Hanabusa (I refused to get any of my money involved in the spat).   The likelihood is that both Schatz and the Democratic nominee for Governor will win. Despite the intraparty feud, the Democrats are still too powerful in Hawaii.

d) Kansas, as in "What's Wrong with....?" -  Could Kansas become the new Iowa (only without the showoff Presidential caucus drama)?  My reading is that the revival of Democrats there is mostly connected with severe disenchantment with former Senator (and onetime Presidential candidate), now Governor Sam Brownback.  Brownback rammed through income tax cuts, and is suffering the usual consequences:  ingratitude (it's never enough!), budget deficit, downgraded credit, lack of trickle down flow.  He is running for re-election and is likely to lose.   Poor old Pat Roberts, the longtime Senator, seems to be feeling the downdraft, and with the developments this week he suddenly finds he may be in a fight.  The Democratic candidate withdrew from the race and threw his support to independent candidate Greg Orman.  All of a sudden Orman appears to be a threat to defeat Roberts (though a ruling that the Democrat was too late to take his name off the ballot will help him defend his seat).

Orman is regarded as a "true" independent, and in the style of Angus King (elected Senator from Maine in 2012) has not committed to joining the Democratic caucus if he wins.  So, we may have a scenario such as I described back then (though it didn't come to pass, as the Democratic control of the Senate didn't depend on King's joining them).  What I find interesting is the idea that we could have three Independents in the Senate next year--could this be the beginning of a "swing caucus" that could help break the partisan deadlock?

Other States--Ones in which Democrats should expect mostly Good statewide outcomes:  Maine,  Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia, Pennsylvania.  Ones that they should expect Bad ones:  Mississippi, West Virginia, South Dakota, Montana.   Those last three states are ones that had Democratic Senators that almost surely will go Republican.  After the loss of those three, Democrats can afford a net result of no worse than -2 out of the many close ones they are defending (including Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana, Colorado, Michigan, Iowa, North Carolina, and New Hampshire) and the 2-3 they have a chance to gain (Kentucky, Georgia, Kansas).

*Maybe a topic for another day.  Yahoo!'s website is a real frustration, but I have not yet learned how to live without it.

+--maybe 2002 was, uniquely so for a postwar midterm election, but the Bush victory in 2004 was much more about John Kerry's perceived weakness as a Presidential candidate than any demonstrated Bushite foreign success--the Iraq "victory" line had already worn thin for most--while 1980 was only partly about Jimmy Carter's foreign policy miscues, but also about a really bad economic environment, just the same--with the shoe on the other foot--as 2008.

Psycho-Killer in Tucson

Today, a young assassin attempted to kill Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona while she was holding a public meeting outside a Tucson grocery store. Details of the incident are somewhat sketchy, but this much is known: she was shot in the head at close range, then the shooter began shooting many other people nearby. Six people were killed, including a Federal judge who was a friend of Giffords, a nine-year-old girl, one of Giffords' staff, and three different seventy-year-old ladies, mostly people who just happened to be there. Giffords, miraculously, may survive and recover, as the bullet went straight through her head.

We had highlighted Congresswoman Giffords' re-election race in November--it was one of the closest races in the country, and she escaped defeat to a right-winger by only a few hundred votes. Apparently we erred when we described her multicultural district, one very close to the border with Mexico, as being less subjected to the overheated passions--particularly those rising from Arizona's recent bill directed at intercepting and deporting illegal immigrants--than the Phoenix area. In fact, her office there had been broken into, and Giffords--a moderate Democrat, in fact a Blue Dog--had spoken about the overheated rhetoric, which had led to public incidents and threats. Nevertheless, Giffords was conducting a fairly normal public meeting with no added security when this outrage occurred.

The sheriff of Tucson's Pima County, Clarence Dupnik, came on tonight for a heated news conference, one in which he disclosed a great deal, including that the young assassin may have had an older accomplice. A friend and colleague of both Giffords and the murdered U.S. judge John Roll, Dupnik was perhaps too closely involved and emotional and said more than he might. In particular, he spoke quite harshly about the level of "vitriol" in the political discourse as something which may have pushed this unbalanced individual over the edge to commit this terrible act. Whether he has a basis for this accusation is unclear, but I would agree that this incident is more than just an isolated bit of madness, but a sign of a madness infecting the country more broadly.

Politically, there is nothing much of value that can be or will be said in the short run. All, even those whose vitriolic speech may have contributed to the poisonous political environment, say nothing other than the appropriate: condemn the act, sympathy for the victims, pray the ired recover. Nobody's going to admit that it was his/her/their own inflammatory rhetoric that contributed. Ironically, Giffords was something of a favorite of Fox News, and she often and willingly appeared on interviews for them.

The alleged shooter--about whose identity there can be little doubt, as he was tackled, at great personal danger, by two persons present at the scene of the crime--has refused to talk. He has left, on YouTube and Facebook, plenty of evidence suggesting that he was disturbed, very angry about the Federal government, possibly deranged. Whatever his motivation, his actions are psychotic.

It is an unfortunate fact that Arizona has a gun-happy culture as well as the overheated political environment. That area is a great destination used by the Mexican drug cartel to buy guns, because it's easy there. There may be too much focus on the political demagogues who ginned up this perpetrator's confused mind, and not enough on the fact this nutjob--who the Sheriff has said made threats and has had recent trouble with the law--was allowed legally to own a semiautomatic 9mm handgun (which he apparently fitted with an extra-large magazine--probably illegally--which allowed him to shoot 15-20 times or more without reloading).

This kind of thing is happening way too often in the US. There should be political consequences in the longer run, and I hope Giffords herself--or if she cannot, others who act on her behalf--will begin the difficult task of legislating limits on the "right" of nutjobs to continue to bear arms. If someone gets a restraining order, is arrested for drunk driving, is arrested for disorderly conduct, is subject to mandatory psychiatric treatment, the guns should be taken away.

It is high time that we recognize that this is a matter of public safety; it is an obligation of government under the social contract to have a monopoly control on armaments (especially those such as handguns or assault rifles which are only useful for killing people) so as to protect the public from the dangerous ones in our midst. We need an anti-NRA, a powerful organization to oppose the NRA's extreme positions in favor of access to all arms for all people all the time.

Taking It Back...But How Far Back?

Posted on daily kos this morning.

A Scorecard for 2010 Reaction

How far back will the Tea Party-led Republicans take us? Here are some indicators with which to gauge the undertow from the wave of electoral folly. The higher the score, the further the reversion.

-20 points: The Republicans do NOT take back the House.
-5 points: Fox News can not announce the Republicans will control the House by 12 midnight EDT on Election Night.
+5 points: Boehner will be next Speaker; rise of the House of Orange.
+5 points: Alan Grayson (FL-8) loses to some guy pretending to be Daniel Webster.
+1 point: for every House member over 218 that the Republicans end up with.
+10 points: Russ Feingold loses. We lose our most progressive Senate party member.
+5 points: Joe Sestak falls in Pennsylvania to Wall St. muckymuck Pat Toomey.
+5 points: Michael Bennet falls to church-state separation denier Ken Buck.
+5 points: Rand Paul wins. "Don't Tread on Me" jettisoned as a Tea Party slogan.
+5 points: Alex Sink down the drain to the single most odious major candidate of the year, healthcare fraudster Rick Scott.
+5 points: Barbara Boxer loses to Carly "Outsource" Fiorina.
+20 points: We're bewitched: Christine O'Donnell wins.
+5 points: Sharron "Obtuse" Angle defeats harry Reid.
+25 points: Democrats lose control of the Senate (less than 50 Senators, not counting unreliable Joes Lieberman and Manchin).

We will review the votes of your predictions on Election Eve, then the actual final score (and estimated reversion date) once all the results are in.

Poll: Sherman, set the Way-Back Machine to....
o <0 points: 2012. Let the 21st century finally begin, and bring he/she/it/them on!
o 0-10 points: 2010. We can boldly muddle through this world.
o 11-20 points: 2002--mild nostalgia for Bushite Misrule will be celebrated with the ghost-written book release next week.
o 21-30 points: 1984--the Golden Age of Reaganite Cold War returns. Set the nuclear clock forward to 5 minutes to midnight.
o 31-40 points: 1955--Social wars? Never happened. Sarah Palin will reprise the role of the Attack of the 50-Foot-Woman (apologies, Mother Jones).
o 41-50 points: 1924--Dissipation, corruption, phony Prohibition, Florida real estate scams, gangland violence. What's not to like?
o 51-60 points: 1880--The Gilded age. Robber barons rule again!
o 61-70 points: 1852--Disraeli: Now there's a guy who could confuse voters' class interests.
o 71-80 points: 1500--Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition, least of all those godless Communist Muslims.
o 81-90 points: 476 A.D. The Capitol in flames; barbarians run riot.
o 91-100 points: 8000 B.C. The Long Emergency: Survivalists and hunter-gatherers only at the luncheon counter.
o over 100 points: 1,000,000 B.C. Sarah Palin reprises the role of Loana in animal skins.

(My prediction is a score of +29.)

Evolution Works Both Ways

Friday evening Bill Maher aired a brief bit from his old show "Politically Incorrect" in which current Tea-bagger Senate candidate in Delaware Christine O'Donnell asked the trenchantly stupid question, "Well, then, why aren't monkeys evolving into humans?"

My counter-question would be, "How do we know humans aren't evolving into monkeys?" Or indeed, into something far worse.

If we keep selecting for stupidity--something that poll results suggest Americans are on the verge of doing this election--our legislators will create an environment in which morons like them will survive and propagate themselves. If you've seen the recent "Nature" series on dogs, you will understand that intentional selection can work far faster and more dramatically than random, natural selection.

So, in a few generations we--or most of us--may be mobs drooling and hanging from artificial cellphone trees which don't work any more. The isolated remnants of homo sapiens will be hiding out in places like Hawaii and Bali that are hard for our neo-simian relatives to knuckle-drag their way to.

The Ron Paul Rebellion 2.0

The implosions of the national candidacies of Sarah Palin and Mark Sanford raise again the question: Who the heck the Republicans can possibly come up with for 2012 that would be even a glimmer of a threat to a second Obama Administration? At this point, the base scenario, assuming Obama remains healthy and untouched by serious scandal, and that the economy begins to show serious recovery by 2011, would be: Nobody.

Only a split in the Democratic party, which I consider likely in the longer run(especially if the Republicans continue to weaken) but very unlikely in the next 3-5 years, would give the GOP a chance for a freakish Electoral College victory with a 35-45% share of the popular vote. One could say a Third Party could provide the necessary fragmentation of the solid 50-60% share the Democrats should otherwise expect in '12, but that would amount to the same thing--a split among the Dems--because there is no real 3rd today, and something coming out of the Republicans would only make their calamity worse. A John Anderson-like moderate Republican could easily emerge but would not be a significant factor. No, what would be needed for a real contest would be either a major disaffectation among the Left (due to unfulfilled promises) or the Right (due to Obamadmin's refusal to address untrammelled deficits).

The Republicans have a real option to generate new interest for their party, though, if they were to nominate none other than Ron Paul in 2012. He wouldn't win, of course, but his candidacy could be a Goldwater-like principled stake in the ground that could pay enormous benefits for their remaining a relevant party in the future, a future when we can easily envision rampant inflation, uncontrolled deficits, higher taxes, the financial endangerment of entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare, etc. In such an environment--which might only be 8-10 years away--Paul's warnings about the Federal Reserve, relentless printing of money, endless war, and intrusive finagling with the private economy could be seen as prophetic and convincing.

The wisdom among Mainstream journalists is that "libertarian" politics have been dealt a death blow by the failures of absent regulation of the banking community evidenced in the financial crisis last year. I see it differently: the "laissez-faire" stance toward collateralized debt obligations and other fancy off-balance sheet practices was indeed right at the heart of the problem, but the move for greater regulation hasn't caught fire nor convinced anyone that we will thus prevent the next disasters. The "moral hazard" problem of guaranteed mortgages, and where to draw the lines with them for government-underwritten institutions in our future, is also right at the heart of the matter, and here the libertarian argument scores.

Besides, libertarian politics ranges much wider than just government hands-off big business, though it does seem to include that. The focus for them is much more on the small enterprises and their free operation--still very popular, and that will be getting broad support in the months to come--along with other topics likely to be popular like reducing government debt, ending our involvement in South Asian wars, and ending the costly and ineffective war on drugs (Obama seems to be dragging his heels a bit on this one, though there's still hope he won't let it get away from him).

Paul would do well to keep a relatively low profile, polish his policy stances for current events, make sure he's still accepted by county-and-state-level party hacks (the Washington ones don't matter to him at this point), and campaign vigorously and selectively for 2010 Congressional candidates who would be willing to support him if he helps them. And he can--with fund-raising, organizational support, Internet campaigns--all those areas that the regular party is failing to do and will need to do if it is to survive.

Palin in '12!

We be Palin'.

In the increasingly hostile internecine battle in the Republican Party--they look almost like Democrats, these days!--we have to side with the base purists who look to Sarah Palin as their standard-bearer for 2012.

A Palin-Huckabee ticket would be a very pure expression of social conservatism, and it would be a voter-friendly, not an angry, expression. It won't play well with the Bushite party Establishment, but they've earned their ticket to nowhere. As in, who cares what they think? Karl Rove, this means you.

Yes, it should lose--big time, 45-47% national vote kind of support, kind of Bob Dole-ish--unless the Obama Administration falls flat (and I see only one reason why it would: the impossible nature of the combined domestic and international challenges it will face).

I suppose there is some sort of moderate, 21st-century expression of opposition to the rampaging Democratic majority that could emerge, though I can't imagine why people of that persuasion would choose the Republican party as its vehicle. Nor do I see them taking on Obama & Co. in 2012; if they were really smart they'd wait until 2016.

McPalin and the Electoral Map

Now that the conventions are over, the dust will settle in a few days, and we can see where we really are with regard to the Presidential contest, and most importantly, to the key state races.

The national tracking polls have re-adjusted to the Republican rebound coming out of its convention--they have the race back to a statistically-insignificant one-or-two-point lead for Obama (down from 6-8 in midweek)-- but the state-level polls largely have not. Thus they are showing a large lead--too large--for Obama. For example, 538.com, which works off a percentage probability outcome for each state and Monte Carlo simulation of results, is showing Obama up 310-228, and electoral-vote.com has Obama up 301-224 (with Virginia a tie).

When the state polls fully reflect a return to "normality"--or more accurately, the real starting point for the 60-day general election campaign--they will not end up back at the starting point before the conventions, which I would argue is where the national polls are right now. There will be some shifts due to the naming of the VP's and the course of the two conventions. For example, Delaware is more a lock than ever because of Biden, and Alaska (which had actually been showing itself quite close) should now be written off by Obama. Those are obvious, but there are some shifts, particularly reflecting the Republicans' adoption of scorched-earth attacks on Obama (except by McCain himself) and the McCain-Palin ticket (or McPalin, for short) as it emerges from the convention.

McPalin is a brand: it's feisty like McCain would like to be, if he hadn't squandered all his useful positions of distinction from the Bushites in the primary contest; it's warlike, down-home, it worships traditional values but is hugely vague on religious stance and ethical practice. It has no new initiatives but a fierce desire to define its legacy through opposition. It's at the same time feminist and sexist.

In general terms, McPalin will make the Republicans more competitive in the West and North Central. Biden and Palin will probably be a wash in the key states of Pennsylvania and Ohio. I have the feeling Palin will be a net liability in Florida and, more broadly, in New England and the Middle-Atlantic.

The Democrats didn't really do much in their convention to change the map. They strengthened and unified their own party, and made a credible play for undecided moderates and independents. McPalin did, too, as long as you exclude any of those undecided and independents who actually pay attention to policy positions.

McPalin and stoner(: The Blog)

I will make some revision in my base prediction, previously announced in The Wisdom of Two-forty-five. I hate to do it, because I am still backing that philosophy--get a reasonable route to just over 270 votes without Ohio, then work like the devil to get Ohio, too. In my view, it's what Campaign Obama still has as its basic strategy. However, the realities have moved, and my calls a little, too.

What I'm really predicting here is what the polls will be indicating going into Election Day. There are two or three big uncertainties which the polls will not have in them: 1) due to the "likely voter" approach of polling organizations, there may well be some underweighting of first-time and sporadic voters; 2) their use of landline phones--almost exclusively--will mean that cell phone users' without landlines will not be represented in polling results; and 3) the dreaded "David Duke Effect" (DDE), in which white racist sentiments will not be fully reflected in poll results due to concealment--intentional or unintentional--of those sentiments. 1) and 2) will tend to cancel out 3), but, like the conventions' effect, not evenly throughout the country. I should try to account for these better in my final pre-Election forecast.

The base-case prediction I had before was 293-245 Obama, with Obama picking up all states Kerry won, plus these states Kerry did not: Iowa, New Mexico, Colorado, and Ohio, The long and short of the following discussion is: move CO and OH to undecided, and bring Nevada (NV) over to Obama. That makes it 269-240, with 29 expected to be still up for grabs on Election Day. Two-sixty-nine, of course, is one vote short of Electoral College victory, so if McCain ended up winning CO and OH, and all the electors on both sides "kept faith", it would end up a tie and go to the House of Representatives, where Obama would win (he will have more states' House-member majorities in any reasonable scenario). A win, still, though an extremely nervous one.

Down to Cases

These are ranked in order of the greatest-likelihood of a switch in party from the 2004 outcomes, and color-coded for Bush-Kerry result.

1) Iowa (IA)--Obama's successful prototype organization from the primaries is still flying.
2) New Mexico (NM)--Hispanics have already come home, giving Obama a slight edge, so it's down to turnout and Albuquerque. McPalin will help on the margins with right-wing turnout; any edge to the Republicans from the large military vote (heavy in Albuquerque, but also in other parts of the state) was already in McCain's count before. This is not to say that McCain gets all the military vote.
3) Nevada (NV)--Palin's rudeness to Sen. Majority Leader Harry Reid (even worse, she botched the reading of the preface identifying Reid, as if to say "I don't even know what his title is, he's so insignificant") has been taken personally. So has McCain's advocacy of dumping all the "new-clear" waste in his neighboring state's Yucca Mountain. These look to negate a slight natural advantage--see also the comment regarding Hispanics under NM.

4) Ohio (OH)--My basic starting point is the observation that the Democrats gained electoral control of the state in 2006, so the question is whether McPalin & McCampaign can win it back. At this point, it's very much an open question; apparently, the state Republican organization has rallied around its cause.
5) Colorado (CO)--McPalin will revive flagging interest among the large evangelical community in the Colorado Springs area, which will counter the huge Obama organizational bump coming out of having the DNC there. It will be a turnout war, and the outcome at this point is uncertain.
6) New Hampshire (NH)--The only really strong McCain state in the Northeast, and thus McCain's best chance to pick up a Kerry '04 state. I don't think McPalin will help that much--most of the state's population lies outside the Mooseburger Effect Zone (MEZ--see below). It will be close, but Hillary will go to bat here for Obama with positive effect.
7) Virginia (VA)--The Democrats have the trendline in their favor, and I think Biden will help more than Palin in this state. The DDE may be small--Virginians of that mindset tend to wear their racism on their sleeve, rather than concealing it.
8) Michigan (MI)--McCampaign's big target for an upset, and one can certainly see reasons why, starting with Obama's snub of their unsanctioned primary and ending with Kwame Kilpatrick's sentencing. On the other hand, McPalin has largely given up on contesting the economic issue, except for promising handouts to car companies (but two can play that game!)
9) Florida (FL)--I am somewhat surprised to say it, but Florida is back in play. Charlie Crist didn't get the nod (I think it might have clinched the state for McCain), and I think Palin will turn off more security-conscious voters wondering which ticket is really more risky, than she will gain among confused soccer-mom undecideds (not much hockey down there). Florida will be tilted toward McPalin all the way but polls will remain Too Close To Call through Election Day. DDE may tip things to McPalin in the end.

10) Wisconsin (WI)--I don't know why this state is so close, but it is. So be it (as I suck up my courage and say): McPalin will try hard there, but fall short. As did Dubya, both times.
11) Missouri (MO)--Probably out of reach for Obama.
12) Pennsylvania (PA)--Obama has done everything right to put this state in his column. Republicans will be heartbroken again if they put heavy resources into winning it.
13) Minnesota (MN)--Was close, then Obama was pulling away. McPalin may cut it down (don't forget that the original home of Bullwinkle is Frostbite Falls, Minnesota!), but it still looks like a 5-7 point win for Obama.

14) - 16) Montana and the Dakotas (MT, ND, SD)--If one had an ESPNation-style poll on the question: "Mooseburgers--Sounds Like Food?" these would be among the contested states which could win a majority for "Yes". The polls were getting very close in these states (some had Obama ahead) prior to Palin's nomination, but I see the Republicans rallying to win these states in the Mooseburger Effect Zone. Also in the MEZ are Idaho, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Maine, but none of these are close enough for MEZ to make a difference.

17) - 19) North Carolina, Georgia, Indiana (NC, GA, IN)--These are close states for which DDE may end up being decisive. I wouldn't urge Obama to invest much in these states, except as a feint, over which I don't think will cause McCampaign to lose too much sleep. If they get any (from what I can see of the Obama campaign, they never do).

None of the other 31 states have more than a 1-2% chance of switching sides, in my view.

(This post's title links to 538.com, which along with electoral-vote.com and a piece by archdaemon Karl Rove in Newsweek, are references for some of the points in this one.)