Status Quo Ante '24: Part 1

Having reviewed in more depth all the alternative scenarios, we now come back to the one summarizing the current reality, the Null Scenario. Biden and Trump each running to the end of the line, gaining their nominations,  and on to the general election, with neither visibly yielding from roughly a half-share of the electorate in a primarily two-man race.  Trump goes through the brutal process described in the Standard Trump Trial Outcomes, but it's not enough to drive him from the race, or even noticeably change his support level.  So, there we are then--what happens? 

In this post we go over the BFD, the Presidential race; in a subsequent one, Congress and some state and local electoral battles. 

At the strategic level, a national election is about a single, dominant issue that drives the dialogue.  Normally, in a contest between an incumbent and a challenger, it's a barometer, a measure of the satisfaction level (or the pain level, if you prefer) with the performance of the incumbent's administration.  The Republicans would like it to be just that, and have confidence that the approval levels and "right track/wrong track" seen at present will continue to be unfavorable to Biden.  

There is one big difference, though--the challenger is a former President, with therefore a huge record of statements and actions that are not easily forgotten by the electorate. Biden's strategy is to make Trump that dominant issue, and he has the enthusiastic assist from the former President himself.  Repeatedly. 

To put his tone on an elevated level, at least here at the outset, Biden seeks to make the issue of the election the Defense of Democracy.  There are three reasons why that strategy will not take hold as much as it should: 

• One is that half of the people in the US don't even know or care what the nature of our (representative) democracy is; 
• The second is that, of those who do know, many recognize primarily a lack of democratic quality in many of  our processes to elect and govern; and
• The third is that many others of us who do know about our system are sworn opponents of Biden's continued administration (or, as they might put it, "Obama/Biden's continued administration"). 

 I think it's a worthwhile message for this early stage, but a bit confusing. 

I would think that ultimately, the Democratic theme will be something along the lines of  "Is That Really Who We Are?", referring to the man who would be the symbol of our nation to the world and of this era to history, if Donald Trump were, once again, re-elected President.  

As the fictional Cmdr. Scott said on Star Trek, "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." The modern-day admonition to Americans might read: "Fool us once, January 6; fool us twice, WW3". 

About Presidential Debates

I considered leaving this section blank, to indicate my expectation that there will be no general election debates between Biden and Trump, but I suppose I should explain why I think that will be the case. 

Neither Biden or Trump will want a debate before a live, impartial audience.  Trump generally does not like to perform before any audience that isn't stuffed with his fans; Biden might be willing to show, despite appearing so old and all, but not with Trump.  He has no respect for him, and might be concerned he wouldn't be able to keep his temper, or his heartrate, under control.*

There would be strong pressure, then, for some kind of meeting of the two, possibly in studio, or before a handpicked, limited audience.  Maybe better with two adjacent soundproof booths, and studio mikes and earpieces.  Zoom would not be a good idea, frankly, but could be a last resort, if there were a way to do it without granting any advantages.  That would be the sticking point of any kind of debate negotiations, which are likely to happen unless both dismiss the idea from the start.  I think they would both like to taunt the other about it, though. 

If there were just one debate, or two, it would be so superficial, with all the Trump diversions and interruptions that he could manage. There might be some interesting variances in the views of foreign affairs that are interesting but not important in many voters' choices.  And that, and a lot of Trump's whining, would be that. 

Tactics and Forecasting 

Money--First, there will be a lot of it. The spending of one side will drive the spending of the other, both in quantity and directionally.  So, keep that in mind as you contribute (see below).  

There is also a lot at stake, though, and pockets are going to have to be deep.  The electronic deluge of election requests are expanding in depth, frequency, and displacement, even at this early stage. I have a couple of consumer-friendly suggestions for those receiving election advertisements below. 

The so-called Popular Vote--That is what would decide our Presidential election, if we really wanted to have our collective preference decide both our head of state and executive head of government (probably not an altogether good idea).   It's not happening anytime soon--maybe if Texas or Florida flips. 

We tend to think of the Democrats having a built-in edge in the raw national vote total, relative to Electoral College outcomes, due to the "excess votes" in states like New York and California. This perception is what prevents popular vote deciding our election.  It's not really true; if Democrats were to abandon, for example, all serious efforts in Florida (something defensible given the failure to provide credible statewide candidates),for example,  that might throw a million or two  "excess votes" to the Republicans.  Something like that happens in those two large Democratic states, as Republicans run but are not expected to win, and have been outgunned since 2000.  Trump's fortunate 2016 found the cracks in the Democratic Electoral College wall. 

Other Issues for the Campaign: The fact of the Republican House's complete inability to legislate is one that works for partisan Democrats, but it doesn't bother Republican voters much if they are seeking less Federal government.  At this point, Independents don't seem inclined to penalize one party more than the other for this ineffectiveness.  Abortion politics were big in 2022 and largely favored Democrats, but I don't see it working at an overall level; the follow-up condition of  reproductive healthcare by state is all over the place--so its effect will be varied.  Taxes, the deficit and debt level, and defending government benefits, will come up, but they aren't going to be important in moving independents within the current static legislative environment.  The economy could be, if inflation ignites again, or a deep recession develops, but that would be more the Biden Weakened scenario than this one.  

The Big Chunks, and Getting "Granular" 

The starting point to identify the winner in a closely-contested election, Trump vs. Adversary (as in 2016, 2020) is:  Who wins Pennsylvania?  If the Democrats can hold Pennsylvania, they have a clear advantage in the drive to reach 270.   If they can't win, that means that Biden's margins in the cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, along with some edge in their suburbs, are not sufficient to overcome deficits in the rural and small towns in the rest of the state.  That would bode badly for the other swing states, each with its own mix of composite populations. 

Electorally, Pennsylvania is no picnic for the Democrats. It's very close, but more often the Democrats can win Pennsylvania in statewide elections, unlike, say neighboring Ohio, where the Republicans usually win, or New York, where the Democrats always do: Those states are also mixed, like PA, but not so balanced at that broad level.  Pennsylvania will have the re-election of popular Senator Bob Casey in 2024, the state government is headed by a popular governor, Josh Shapiro, and there will be other battles driving turnout there.  Biden has always claimed Pennsylvania roots, from one of those smaller cities (Scranton) that are themselves swing areas within the critical swing state. 

Pennsylvania is so important because it is the largest of the swing states, with 19 Electoral Votes.  Without it, Trump practically has to run the tossup states; with it, he only needs to split them with Biden to get into a photo-finish.  Current polling in PA (from Quinnipiac University's poll) confirms that, this far out, Biden and Trump are in a dead heat, well within the margin of error.  Self-declared independents prefer Trump by almost 10 points, and they are focused on the economy. 

The next most critical states are a threesome, all with long-term demographic trends favoring Democrats.  They are at different stages in their gradual shift over the fulcrum toward the left.  Arizona and Georgia have moved in parallel in Federal elections to elect Democratic Senators and narrowly vote Democratic in the Presidential as well (with contrary state government results), while North Carolina has remained just out of reach (except in 2008), though the state government elections show Democrats can win there. 

Democrats' Electoral College majorities before Arizona and Georgia became winnable depended on consistently winning the North Central states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, generally by very narrow, vulnerable margins.  Michigan and Wisconsin tipped over to the Republicans in 2016; they have tipped back since, margins in the urban and suburban areas overcoming furious right-wing resistance from the states' rural areas.  Michigan should lean Democratic if the economy holds, but Wisconsin's furious struggle for partisan dominance is continuing on a number of fronts, both legal and extralegal.  Minnesota was very close in 2016, but recent elections indicate it now has a decent-sized  Democratic lean. 

The other tossup entities are not decisive in themselves but could make a difference in an extremely close outcome.  Nevada (6 Electoral Votes) is always close but has broken to the Democrats in Presidential elections; it will be a focus also due to an expected close Senate race.  Of New Hampshire (4 EV) we can say the same.  Then there are the two individual EV in Maine and Nebraska that tend to go against the statewide result, and their states uniquely allow Congressional district-level votes.  (I wanted to get New Mexico some attention through legislation following this approach, though I'm not getting any traction.) 

Getting to 270

The 2024 election will be the first with revised Electoral College numbers after the 2020 Census, changing the calculations slightly in the Republicans' direction.  Biden wins if he can get 270 or more Electoral Votes; if not, he will lose--Trump wins in the House of Representatives if no one gets to 270.  That would presumably be  due to some third-party Electoral Votes, something that hasn't happened since 1968.  Democrats start with a good lead among states considered "Safe" due to predictably large margins in the large states of California, New York, and Illinois, while the Safe states for Republican are smaller ones; they do close the gap, though, when one adds to their number their "Likely" big states--Ohio, Florida, and Texas. 

In a closely-contested Biden vs. Trump contest, I would give a slight edge to the Democrats in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire.  This would give Democrats an edge of 259-218 (review that map here), with the following ones seemingly Toss-ups at this distance:  Georgia, Arizona, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Nevada, and the two single EV of Maine and Nebraska.  In that situation, any one of the first three states I named would get the Democrats over the line, while winning just Wisconsin of those would leave them one tantalizing vote short (holding the Maine seat, winning the Nebraska one, or Nevada would then be enough). 

To summarize, Democrats have a narrow advantage, even in a close race.  As long as they win Pennsylvania. 

Consumer-Friendly Advice on Political Contributions

The 2024 election is guaranteed to be the most expensive in history; billions of dollars will be expended to try to move small numbers of people to vote, and to vote in the direction sought by the spenders.  Engaged citizens would seek to add their monetary contributions to provide more leverage to outcomes than just voting locally, but we should recognize that ours will pale in comparison to the huge sums being laid down in unlimited Political Action Committees, unless our efforts are strategically or tactically accurate. Here are a few thoughts: 

• There are only a couple dozen House seats constructed to be competitive, out of 435; the other 400+ were constructed to be anti-competitive.  Give no more than a token contribution to your local Representative, or to its challenger, if you prefer, unless yours is one of that handful. 
• The same is true of the Senate races, except for a few--we will identify both groups in a susbsequent post. 
• When they say your contribution will be matched, triple-matched, or 9-to-1 matched (I saw that on a Trump email), it's tempting to think that its effect will be magnified.  It's the opposite:  the matching money is already pledged. 
• Late-campaign contributions will be burnt on TV ads.  In this early stage, one would hope that money will go toward building an effective campaign organization at the grassroots level. Watch out, though, for appeals from campaigns that face hopeless odds, or to defeat primary opponents. 
• Finally, every mid-month or end-month there will be the appeals to meet certain targets by the campaigns' deadlines, especially the official ones for reporting contributions.  Ignore all these; campaigns' bragging about the level of donations will only stimulate their opponents to do more.  If anything, the emails after the deadlines revealing the shortfalls (there's a lot of those, too) might be more appropriate targets for consideration.