Sunset for Netanyahu? --Take Two--

When we last visited this story, in April, Benjamin "Bibi" Netanyahu was completing yet another successful parliamentary escapade.  In a vote dominated by security issues, his Likud party (I say "his" because, as Trump does the Republican party, he owns it now) narrowly won a plurality over the centrist Kahol Lavan, headed principally by ex-heads of the military staff, and dedicated to the single objective of forming a government without Bibi.  Netanyahu got the nod to try to form a government and had reached the point of claiming a government with a fairly safe majority from an alliance of the center and the right (without Kahol Lavan).  Gloom descended generally at the realization of a new term, clouded from the outset by Netanyahu's legal jeopardy, with an indictment of him for corruption remaining likely (as if Trump started a second term without resolution of the threat of impeachment for his old misdeeds).

Then was heard the sound of thunder.  One of Netanyahu's key allies and Cabinet ministers, Avigdor Lieberman, leader of a rightist, secular party (more openly Jewish-nationalist than Likud) balked, due to a dispute over a bill to make Yeshiva students subject to military service.  He wanted it; Netanyahu's Orthodox allies did not.  Without Lieberman's party, there was no more coalition majority for Netanyahu.  At this point, he decided to gamble:  If he allowed the control of government formation to pass beyond him, there was every possibility of a unity government, one that would pull various parties (possibly with Lieberman's) using the draw of a government without him.

So he called for new elections.  There was a subsequent head fake, a week or two later, when it appeared he had a new plan and wanted to cancel them, but no dice, the election was ruled to be on--definitively.  The date of the voting will be September 17, with electoral lists locked down early in the coming week.

The Israeli parliamentary system provides for proportional representation of each list--a party-determined list, or one formed by multiple parties in coalition--with 3.25% or more support.  This has helped lead to a multiplicity of parties, and much fluctuation of party loyalty among individual MK's (Members of Knesset).  Some prominent names ran more-or-less vanity party lists in the April  election and did not reach the threshold; these have tried to trade their couple of percent or so of support--not enough alone to get representation, but able to move the needle significantly for some of the smaller parties.

One party to make such a deal was the reconstituted Labour party, whose leader in the last election bowed out after a shockingly bad result in April followed by one too many ham-handed political moves.  His replacement, who won out over some more charismatic younger contenders, is a veteran, Amir Peretz.  Peretz has now dived into the a muddy pool and come up with a partner, Orly Levi-Abekasis, something of a center-right media diva who ran a failed solo effort in the last round. 

Tactically, the move could have made sense, if one anticipates a post-election scenario where control--between the contesting Likud and Kahol Lavan--turned on a few centrist seats.  But the fact that it was Labour--the great left-center party of the early days of the Israeli state--that was eyeing a secondary role--a role of a type that has led to failure, internationally, for party after party taking it on in recent years--shows how that party has fallen and lost its way.

The Israeli Left--without Labour--has scrambled to correct its failure in the last election, when each of the many parties basically went its own sub-optimal way.   There are no less than four parties of the Israeli Arabs; they first united in 2015, with substantial shared progress, but failed to do so earlier this year.  As of now, three have united and the fourth's accession to the deal seems almost certain. Meretz is a party on the "fringe left"--essentially continuing the democratic socialist policies which Labour progressively abandoned in search of political expediency during a period when security--which Likud has owned, at least until recently--mattered most, and capitalism flourished in Israel.
Meretz maintained some representation, but in an isolated way--until now, when they announced an alliance with Ehud Barak, and his floundering political comeback effort.

Yes, that Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister, the one who came closest to making the two-state deal with the Palestinians (or at least that is the legend; probably Rabin was closer in spirit, though not as far along in the details).  Barak has been 'named' with regard to the Jeffrey Epstein scandal--they are, in fact, business partners on a substantial level.  His planned re-entry vanity project was about to go up in smoke, but he seriously wants to help depose Netanyahu, so he has joined with Meretz.

And the parties to the right of Netanyahu?  Some of them have also combined to consolidate electoral forces, behind a woman (Ayelet Shaked) whose improvised party failed to reach the threshold in April.  There are Orthodox parties still further to the right--for whom a woman leader would be anathema--and Lieberman's party, it seems, will remain outside this alliance. Lieberman's motives for the coalition-breaking action remain unclear, though he said at the time that the bill had been promised to him.  Is it that he only needs this reform, or is it that he has had enough of Netanyahu's machinations?

What do all these maneuvers mean for the next election, and what will that mean for Israel, and for Netanyahu?   It would seem to mean that these combinations will present more coherent alternatives for voters on the left and right, other than the two centrist parties--I would expect the shares of seats for those two to dip somewhat.  Still, if one adds up all the seats that parties to the right of Likud will get, the potential will still be there for Likud to form a new center and right government. These larger blocs will perhaps provide for a less chaotic negotiation to form a government, though Netanyahu will still have to prove that he can bring them all together.

If he can unite these groups and form a new government, he can be expected to put forward a bill which would give him the immunity he seeks from prosecution; right now, his indictment is expected late this year, which would jeopardize his own continuation as Prime Minister.  The coalition might be able to continue on without him, and in fact, this may be the unwritten understanding many of them would make around him.

There is another possibility:  if Kahol Lavan should gain a larger number of seats than Likud, its leader (Benny Gantz) may get first shot at forming a government.  In that circumstance, he would look to ally with some parties to his left, and possibly some to his right, too.  My suspicion is that Lieberman may feel his personal ambition would benefit from pushing Netanyahu out, and that even some Likud members may abandon him.

But does Kahol Lavan have the means to win the election?  The basic idea of its formation this year was to present a centrist alternative to Netanyahu and Likud that could provide sufficient assurance to Israeli voters on the critical security dimension.  It remains that, and nothing more.  Current polls have Kahol Lavan and Likud projected to win the same number of seats, but it is a long way still to the September 17 election date, and Netanyahu can be relied upon to create what we in America would call an "October surprise"--an incident, a timely crisis, which could drive more voters into his camp. 

Thus, I would say that it is not a fair bet whether Likud or Kahol Lavan will "win"--which means being the lead party in a new government:  Likud must be the favorite at this point.  The predictit.org market that relates to this is simply whether Netanyahu will be Prime Minister at the end of the year, and it is currently running at 73% yes.  At that price, betting on NO looks somewhat more attractive, and it is possible to win the bet without Bibi's losing the election--if he has to resign, for instance.  It is also possible, though, that he would still be in the job in a caretaker role if the new government--to be led by either side--has not completed its preparation and gained Knesset endorsement.

Why does all this matter so much?  After all, Israel is a small country, with a relatively small population.  For me, though, the parallels between Netanyahu's status and Trump's are such that I can see Israel's path and outcome as being a harbinger of what may happen in 2020.  In a still broader sense, the peace effort in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians has been stuck in neutral throughout Netanyahu's 13 years as PM, and he is, without any doubt, adverse to any agreement which would raise the Palestinians' status or give them any national sovereignty, even on unfavorable terms (such as the ones proposed in Trump/Kushner's still unannounced "plan").  So, his leaving the job is a prerequisite for any progress--necessary, but not sufficient.