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Monday, November 04, 2024

Follow-Up

Did I mention that Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, 65-4 in years in control of the Diet and government, lost its snap election?   That was an oversight on my part; the LDP most likely will do the Italian thing and find another party willing to go with them, the classic trap. But still, one more piece of evidence of this unstable moment. 

 I'm not going to retract any of my picks in the previous post, but I probably should explain my unorthodox pick of Harris-Walz winning Arizona, which has fairly consistently polled in Trump's favor (though by very little).  You know the theory about the "shy Trump voter" who polls always miss?  I'm not questioning its existence, but I don't see it applying in the case of Arizona:  from what I've seen, Arizona Republicans are the opposite of shy.  Instead, I would suggest the existence, and the miss in the polls of the "shy Latina voter".   Think of it this way, and praise our culture for the (still) secret ballot:  How about the Latina who answers the phone, but doesn't want to do the survey, and clearly her husband is just in the next room?*

As additional evidence, look at the trend on "delta" to national popular Presidential vote:  How did the pollsters miss this?  I rest my case. 

About Pennsylvania, though, I have to admit that the data says "tie", just as the polls do, and PA will likely be determinative.  Harris-Walz can't win without PA (or a combo of other non-Wall states), and Trump, the same, really (though his campaign is trying as a last-ditch effort to make Michigan viable as an alternative).  I'm going beyond the data to give a small edge on the tangible/intangibles, as I suggested. Wisconsin/Michigan: I'm staying optimistic about both.  Loss of either would portend disaster for Harris-Walz, as much as would Trump-Vance losing...

North Carolina/Georgia: I am usually disappointed in NC at the end (Obama in '08 the single exception in the other direction).  Like I know that a very good Democratic candidate in Texas (read:  Colin Allred) gets just about 48%, if they run a very good campaign.  Yes, Democrats will win the Governor race there, by a lot, and thus probably control the legislature despite extreme gerrymandering.  As for Georgia, besides Harris needing a massive turnout, she needed the severe Republican political malpractice that benefitted Biden, Ossoff, and Warnock in their races before. The state Republicans worked together this time and Trump didn't do enough specifically in GA to screw it up.  At least that's how I see it. 

Finally, Nevada. Jon Ralston got over his freak-out over the Republican-trending early vote there and reversed the sense of his guidance at the last moment, now predicting a "very, very close" victory for Harris.  I stand by my unique Toss-up call for that one.   It's like picking a draw in a league soccer match, which is a thing. 

 As for the World Series, the less follow-up, the better.  All the drama was in the first game, really, which was one for the ages.   I guess the last game--which I missed--was at least exciting. Instead of "follow-up", when it comes to postseason baseball, with so many 100-mph hurlers, it's about the change-up.  Or Blake Treinen's curve ball.   The question is whether this throwback matchup is the first of many, or the first of a more-normal kind of interval, a decade or two?  The likely departure of Juan Soto suggests there may not be a rematch next year, which I'm sure Yankee fans would be seeking for their buck.  It reminds me of Brooklyn Dodgers fans in the Fifties, so they say.  

Wait 'til next year!  And if Trump wins, we won't need any more years, it'll be like that forever. 

But Change.  When you have weak incumbency, something you could argue exists for both White House tickets, you get this.  





*Morale of the story:  Not all white men are the same, behaviorally.  I know some people of color might reply that when it comes down to certain situations, they are, and they might be right.  Anyway, in Arizona they are proud of their rightness and will not shy away from saying so.  More like the effect if you canvassed whites in Wyoming, or Alabama.  

Instead, the additional hidden turnout in Harris' direction might be from Native Americans  (especially those on the reservations); though they are several percent of the state's population, who overcome obstacles and vote, they probably never get polled.

Friday, October 25, 2024

After Fol-de-Rol, Predictions

Talkin' Baseball

The impetus for this post at this moment is the imminent start of baseball's World Series.  It's the Yankees and the Dodgers, what I've been fearing and dreading.  For years, and decades, really, but this year this particular rivalry for the championship has raised its head once more.  

This is the matchup that has occurred most often in World Series history, which is basically to say that the Dodgers are the team the Yankees have faced most often.  The Yankees have a large edge in their Series showdowns, but the Dodgers have had a couple of memorable wins (1963, 1955) 

The Yankees' rise goes back to acquiring Babe Ruth in 1919; the Dodgers' to breaking the color line with Jackie Robinson, and then Roy Campanella in the early Fifties, . Neither team has spent much time away from the top of the standings since then.  

In my career as a Reds fan, they are both among the teams which I hated, and envied, most often. After my initial negative impressions of them formed, it was their habit of buying the most expensive players which irritated me, as it made my small-market team's chances ever more difficult. 

With the Yankees, their 4-1 defeat of the Reds in the '61 Series imprinted resistance to their inevitability, without my even being aware of it; it was something I became aware of and resented soon after its occurrence as I first experienced the outside world. We did get our revenge against them in 1976, a 4-0 Series sweep, the Big Red Machine's finest achievement. 

The Dodgers had their history with the Yankees in the Sixties, with my reluctant support--the greatness of Koufax and Drysdale was undeniable, and they proved it against the perennials, the Bronx Bombers in that '63 Series. But their re-emergence in the late Seventies as rivals to the Reds was what turned me against them for all time.  Particularly as long as they had Tommy Lasorda as manager. 

It surprised me to discover that this, the most frequent World Series rivalry, has not come up since 1981. (Don't get me started on that year's improvised playoffs, something which burns me still....), not even by accident.  More like it's been an accident it didn't occur sooner.  It's been a welcome respite.  My aversion has even faded a bit in its intensity, though I still root against both teams in all games, on principle. .

Beyond doubt, this is the ideal World Series matchup.  The #1 team in each league, the two top TV markets, Ohtani vs. Judge, as well as Mookie Betts vs. Juan Soto, Freddie Freeman vs. Giancarlo Stanton.  Six probable future Hall of Fame hitters. The network "got lucky" when the Mets won game 5, ensuring that the Series would start on Friday, instead of Tuesday (if both teams in the Series won in 5 games or less).  

Starting pitching is, somewhat surprisingly, a weak spot for both, though the Yankees do boast a top one in Gerrit Cole and a hot one in Clarke Schmidt.  If Ohtani, Betts, and Freeman (followed by Teoscar Hernandez and Max Muncy) are clicking, though, it will not matter who the Yankees send out there.  On the other side, though, the depleted Dodger rotation will give way quickly to their deep and strong bullpen, as they show the Yankee slugging stars frequent changes of pitchers ("different looks"). I expect a couple of slugfests, a couple of pitching duels (maybe not the ones expected), and a couple of blowouts.    

Election Commentary

I have no need to wait for more data to form opinion of my expectations; more poll data will serve for nothing.  The Biden Weakened scenario gave way to Biden Out, but that morphed almost immediately, due to the expert salvage operation by Kamala Harris and the Democratic Party, to get back to Status Quo by the convention.  There was an Inflection Point, indeed, as Harris' improvement trend flattened out.  And there it has stayed, despite everything (Harris destroying Trump in the debate, Trump's meandering but threatening nonsense, and more).  The 48-46 national polling advantage I cited for Harris at the beginning of the month has not really moved, despite a number of polls all over the place. 

The largest uncertainty at this point is about the mysterious uncounted Trump voter from the 2016 and 2020 polls, compared to results in elections, if he is still out there, uncounted.  Or, perhaps overly accounted for. Nate Silver had a piece in his paid Substack, and then one in the Times, showing the frequency table of  different combinations of winner, by state, resulting from his simulations, using correlations and certain other elements of his own secret sauce (but only showing the 20 or so most frequent of the 128 permutations).  His conclusion was like one that James Carville has mentioned, that the most likely outcomes are ones where one candidate or the other wins all, or almost all, of the swing states.  What he has discovered is that the error term, that 1%, plus or minus, on the Trump voter error estimate (which comes in the adjustment from registered voter to likely voter, usually done by respondents' past history of voting, when available) makes all the difference in the outcomes, along with the correlations between swing states, seemingly very high. I take this to mean that he has no clue on the big picture, but his detailed analysis proved useful to me: 


That projection sequence, from poll preference to popular vote to state outcomes, remains very central to any possible prediction based on data.  If we look at the intangibles, and the tangible adjustments we need to make in order to come up with a final estimate, we find those to be largely in the favor of the Harris-Walz campaign.  Things like ground game, money, increasingly caustic media criticism of Trump's performance, along with grudging acceptance that, yes, Harris can answer questions--all day long, if she has to--though she is not going to deviate from her victory plan of retaining all Biden's supporters and adding what she can of disaffected Republicans.  

Both campaigns are running what I would call limited tactical upside strategies. Harris is not going to articulate anything dramatic that could change the dynamics--it's too late anyway, now.  Trump is not going to appeal to moderates and independents not already leaning his way--he can't.

The question of turnout is central now; the drive to get that 1% that could make the difference in these close state races.  It also bears on the close Senate races, many of which in the same swing states closely  contested for the Presidency, and indirectly bears on the critical outcome of the contest for control of the House. In this regard, the effort by the Harris campaign to do a big event in Houston is relevant:  while the GOTV effort may not be fully realized in NY and CA (apart from the districts with the close races), the underdog effort to try and break through statewide in TX (and in FL, wait and see) will pad the popular vote margin in a similar way to 2020.  

Predictions

I start with an estimate for the national popular vote:  Harris-Walz 82 million vs. Trump-Vance 77 million. This out of 165 million total votes.* The percentages corresponding are Harris 49.7%, Trump 46.7%.  So, a bit more improvement for the Democrats than Republicans from the present poll averages as we scale up to the full 100% of voters (with 3.6% others).  By applying the adjustments to the national average by state that I reviewed in my post "Inflection Point", this then plays out to the following outcomes by state (mean estimates of Democrats' margin, with 80% MOE), with state-level adjustments and brief comments; 

 North Carolina  (-2)  +/- 2%:  1 pt to Democrats for the reverse coattails because of a miserable R Governor candidate;

Georgia (-0.5) +/- 2%:   1 pt to Republicans for Democrats' turnout being not quite as amazing this time;

Nevada (0) +/- 3%:  The largest uncertainty, but the least important for the EC;

Arizona (+0.5) +/- 2%:  I'm going against the consensus with an adjustment for the strong Senate candidate and the abortion referendum. 

Pennsylvania (+1) +/- 2% : 1 pt Adjustment for the focused turnout I expect from the Democrats. 

Wisconsin (+1.5) +/- 2% : 1 pt Adjustment for Walz-adjacent effect!

Michigan (+2) +/- 1% : Democrats should never lose Michigan, except by neglect, and that is not the case here. 

If we start with the standard 226D - 219R, the count without the swing states and with the 1 CD vote from NE and ME switching from their statewide winners, these point estimates result as 281 Harris, 251 Trump, with the 6 EV in Nevada TBD.  So that makes the final margin (prior to some potential actual fol-de-rol in the event) either 36 or 24 electoral votes. Slightly reduced from the 2020 Biden margin, more like that of Jimmy Carter in 1976 vs. Gerald Ford, which I think is appropriate in multiple ways. 

Senate

We have to accept as starting point that the Democrats will lose the seat in WV and that Tester's chances in MT against a 15-20 point gap in the Presidential race are slim.  That takes us to 51R, 49D, prior to any other seats changing hands.  The most likely ones after that are WI (Tammy Baldwin) and OH (Sherrod Brown), though I would give each better than 50% chance of surviving.  A little lower than that are others like the slim Democratic pickup chances (FL, NE, but especially Allred defeating Cruz in TX) and those for which the Republicans had hopes (NV--Rosen, MI--open seat, PA--Casey). My mean estimate would be a little worse than 49-51, but as we are limited to integers I will stick with that. Hopes will then turn to Lisa Murkowski of Alaska (Independent, now caucusing with the Republicans), especially if Harris wins.

House

I give credit to those pundits who do the research at the district level and report back, though I do not necessarily agree with their broad approach in their ratings.  Beyond the 13 or so "Toss-up" seats, all of which are truly likely to flip, there are the "Tilt' seats, which are shown siding with the incumbent in almost all cases.  This is the pundits' conservatism in calling for defeat of an incumbent or a change of party control.  When we consider those just a little tilted to one side as also highly vulnerable, there are 32 seats at high risk, 18 Republican and 14 Democrat, with the Republicans leading 204-199 in seats rated Safe, Likely, or "Lean" (going by Nathan Gonzales here, though his is very similar to those such as Cook Political Report.  Lean means the pundit has a clear idea who is ahead, though they are a little insecure about it.)

 That means the Democrats would need to win 19 of these 32 jump balls, or 60% of them, to take control of the House.  The means to take them presents itself in just a few states, and the Democrats are focused on them, almost as much as they are on the Presidential swing states (some--in AZ, for example, and PA--are the same, some are in less-urban areas of NY and CA, and a couple are in Iowa).

I believe the Democrats will succeed in gaining control of the House, picking up 5-8 seats.  A gain of 8 would bring the Democrats back to 222-213, the inverse of the Republicans' in 2022, and the same as the Democrats won in 2020.  The reversal of control of both the House and the Senate in the same election, in different directions, such as I am predicting, would be a first in US history.  Perhaps that is why the pundits are so reluctant to go there. 

Baseball

I think this will be regarded as one of the great World Series of days (post-DH).  One reason it might not be is because it may be just the first of a series of such Series, which may surpass this one (as with Dodgers-Yankees in the Fifties). Another is if one team dominates, but I don't expect that to happen.  Instead I expect it to be seven games, or if not that, six.  I reluctantly predict Yankees (or the Crank-biters, as we colloquially call them) to win in 7.  

As for the NBA, which began its regular season this week, the big question is whether the Boston Celtics can repeat.  There is a lot of parity in both conferences, if we exclude the fact that the Celtics seem a notch better, a bit more complete, as long as their quadrilateral (in order of importance, Tatum, Brown, Holiday, and Porzingis) remains intact.  We'll see, around Christmas, if that is the case.

*The comparable numbers from 2020:  Biden 81-74 million over Trump with total votes of 160 million, a margin of 51-47%.

Thursday, October 03, 2024

More Quick Hits

Strategy for Playoffs (Planning Them) 

If you read between the lines in my previous WC comments, I believe that, if they are going to keep this extra playoff round, they should make it more valid.

 Expand the Wild Card round to best-of-five, the Division Series to a full 4-of-7. That would fix it, in the way the NBA Playoffs ensure these contests have their completion (though I personally would advocate "calling it" in any best-of-7 when it's 3-0).

That would mean a long break for those two bye teams in each league, both for good and for ill. The next evolution would be toward a system in which the only bye team for the first round is the one with the best regular-season record in the league--the NFL once again setting the pace. 

Where do the days come from to do all this? By reverting to the traditional 154-game regular season (from the current 162).  Adding those four potential additional games to the length of the whole season (including playoffs) would need this adjustment, though the one I propose would also bring the chance for more off-days and make-up days.  Few would object to this change, except team owners.  So they would need some adjustment, perhaps in their precious cap limits. 

"College football" is in chaos, it seems to me, with professional college, inc. teams serving as money-making incubators for the NFL owners to cherry-pick. The 'conferences", and their championships? Don't make me laugh. There are two that matter (the SEC and the Big 10) for the new, over-expanded playoff system. Those championship games will be life-and-death battles, for seeding? It makes no sense except in the greed, cow-milking one. And I was one of the ones recommending the radical idea of an expanded round! (I meant, to six). 

4X4 for Kamala 

Post-Election Proposals for Popular (mostly non-Partisan) Reform 

1) Remove the income cap for Social Security tax--this will fix one problem, at least. The previous argument for the famous shut-off in midyear for the privileged, that Social Security is but an insurance policy, now paid for the year, is no longer sustainable, as the tide has gone out and we see our wet suits for what they are. It is pay-as-you-go, always has been, really, and this gap for income earners between $140K (or whatever the current calculation for when the tax stops, for the rest of the year), and $400k, which was the Biden going-nowhere proposal, with tax recurring above that, will have to go. Among other reasons, for equity. It can get bipartisan support, and the complete change will save the security-part of SSA. (Above 400k, it can increase, or whatever the system can allow...) She could even advocate this now, if she wanted to show some intelligent diversion from a straight Biden line, but it has risks. 

 2) Direct election of the Speaker of the House

 Yes, but--ARTICLE 1,-Section 2. The House shall chuse their Speaker.. 

So, it would be non-binding, in a different way from chusing our President. Get it? I'm sure the House would, and meaningful challenges to the will of the electorate would be rare. Any of that would importantly take the struggle away from the existential question of the ownership of the White House. The elected Speaker would be able to deal with the Senate and thus with the President as head of Congress, and pull back the legislative authority from the presidency. The over-empowered executive could then focus on its true, huge responsibility for global security, maybe? Yes, and administration, a la- Jimmy Carter (bless him!--his 1976 victory is the key to understanding this election). 

I'd suggest ranked-choice voting, runoff of top 3, low barrier to entry but short campaign (in years with Congressional elections, so every two years). 

Could Donald Trump win this, after he loses to Kamala? I'm willing to see it. 

 3) Do Away with States' Winner-Take-All (Conditionally) - This would be a compact of Congress that would support best practices and induce states voluntarily to switch away from giving all their Electoral Votes for President to the candidate getting the plurality in their state.  This would create more interest in turning out in the large states with partisan majorities, in spite of which there are always contrary pockets, usually in multiple Congressional districts. .

The other half of this would be independent certification that states are not excessively gerrymandering their districting.  Fair congressional districts are within our power to develop; AI could actually be useful here in developing a set of districts maximizing various objectives, in order to present decision-makers with a final choice. This reform would be targeted for the 2032 Presidential election.

4) Start a Federally-Supported Institute for Home Health Training - This is a favorite unopened envelope from the 2020 campaign. It is clear that the best health service for many, the one woman worth paying for, is at home, with varying levels of attention there, from periodic to full-time, depending on the needs and resources of the client.  It is very hard to find and keep active capable home healthcare workers.  A nationally-recognized certification program would allow these workers to move about, as many would like to do, and get work where they go.  So many will be needed.

The Institute should be located in South Florida (this is the partisan part).  That's closest to where the greatest portion of eventual work will be, and it is a good area to recruit future home healthcare workers. 

These are proposals for a Harris administration that could actually be accomplished in a hostile, or hopelessly split (at best) partisan Congress.  Doing any of these would radically change the dialogue and push toward 21st-century-suitable processes to manage one of the most important aspects of our society. If, on the other hand Harris loses, I got nothing for you, US. 

 These would not require constitutional amendments, which are not possible at this time.  Some may need to wait until after the expected post-Trumpian collapse of the Republican party as a viable competitor for national office (as opposed to the Senate, where they will linger on).

Wednesday, October 02, 2024

Quick Hits

 WC Round

(Baseball) 

By this I do mean messy, needing maintenance, perhaps an entry key.  But it is a facility that can be used. 

2 out of 3 for the lower-seeded team in these major-league basball playoffs is essentially just winning a series on the road against a good team.  They have all done it, and it doesn't create unusual pressure--except to win the first game.  

The Tigers showed it best with their quick sweep of the team I picked as part of my (un-bet) quinella for the World Series, the Houston Astros.  The 'stros run of 7 straight appearances in the ALCS (the League final series) ended quickly to a team that just didn't care. 

Contrast that a bit with the struggles of the Orioles to do anything in the post-season, despite dominant performance in the regular season. They definitely seem a bit overwhelmed, once again, in a pressure situation before the home crowd, a reward they earned with a strong second-place finish. (Game in progress at this moment). 

The other team I had in the proposed bet (at something like 15-1, with a huge margin for the house vs. the implied odds) was the San Diego Padres, a team not quite as hot as the Tigers (or the Astros were, for that matter) but one that finally may have its act together, healthwise.  They were the only team of the four home teams across the two leagues to win their critical first game. 

If the Royals complete their two-game sweep of the Orioles, it will be #5 vs. #2 (Cleveland) and #6 (Tigers) vs. #1 Yankees in the ALDS (Division Series, or league semifinal series).  These will at least be 3 out of 5, with home-field advantage only really in a decisive Game 5--not too many go that far, usually.  One would think with those one-sided seeding matchups the winners of that next round would be predictable.  I doubt it--I still think there will be a team that doesn't get a bye (i.e., not #1 or #2 in their league) that will make the World Series--but my hypothetical bet is already in the WC toilet (to repeat myself0.

V.P. Debate

Vance put a bandage on his ticket's bleeding. Walz got ifinn a potential knockout blow at the end, keeping J.D. from a 15-round win on points, dodging the whole time. It happens. .
Best line of the night for Walz: "Fact-check Donald Trump".

Michael Steele called Vance "Blue", which was a cute sort of insult, but I have to say he should be addressed as "Yo Disk!"

Regarding the "mexican gun cartels" comment, that was actually an opening Walz missed. The gun trafficking is primarily in the opposite direction, to Mexico, because the US has more access to them. Vance slipped it in unchallenged.

--My comment on Political Wire, 11 pm.  

EBK-PRB

In 1963, Pete Rose was my favorite baseball player.  Radio was the primary way I was experiencing the game, and Rose was the hit of the broadcasts--taking an extra base, finding the hole for a base hit, filling the hole on defense (at second base)--he seemed to be everywhere for the team, which was experiencing a high point (not quite World Series level, though).  

In the 70's, he was an integral component of the historically successful Big Red Machine, now at third base due to the essential addition of Joe Morgan.  During this time, it became apparent to me that his quirks (flat-top haircut, running to first after a walk) were part of a sociopathic nature, shown also by his affinity for the likes of Nixon, Marge Schott, etc. 

He became a justifiable target for targets and jokes in his latter career, when he could no longer command a league-leading level of batting average, and his Sixties ambition of being "the first $100,000 singles hitter" had transformed into the quest to win one of the league records then viewed as untouchable:  Ty Cobb's 4,191 safe hits.  Ty Cobb, the similarly behaviorally-challenged star hitter of the early 20th-century (not the former Trump lawyer--no relation, I hear?).  Rose hung on in active duty several years as a replacement-level player to get there, but at least he could choose his hitting matchups for himself as player-manager some of the time during the end. 

That was the period when he screwed the pooch, his gambling habit becoming an addiction that sent him way over the line into prohibited behavior--betting on any baseball game.  He was rightly banned from active participation in the game after that--for life.  For Rose, who had little real value in his life beyond baseball and betting, it hurt a lot. 

Worse for him in the longer run was being eliminated from participation in the voting of the writers for the Baseball Hall of Fame.  This somewhat exclusive club--those inducted, the writers (a floating bunch, over time) who vote on its members, and those ad hoc groups which pick others who never get voted in (the Negro Leagues representatives being the most prestigious of those sets of selected members).*--chose to abide by the decision that Rose's behavior was disqualifying. 

Rose has passed away now. I recognize that my own view is biased:  I have long advocated for his induction, and even for more serious consideration of some other Hall-worthy players "cancelled" from membership (due to steroid use, admitted or alleged) despite clearly having met the performance levels.  I would now say it is time for him to be admitted in, posthumously.  Despite his unique (an once again, seemingly unchallengeable) record, he's not one of the all-time greatest, but he would qualify as the 25th-man, the utility guy, on the all-time team.  The "lifetime" ban has expired!

More Online Odds Discussion

Comparison of my odds on outcomes political vs. PredictIt:  Harris 65-35 vs. PI's 55-58 to 45-48 (!); Democrats winning the House 55%, PI (no entry); Democrats holding the Senate 18%, PI (no entry).  Perhaps the subject of a later posting will be that it is not now so clear to me there will be an (overall) strong turnout result, though it will be strong in many areas.  NY/CA drive is probably more specific than statewide.

*Of course, they are not officially of the same level, but the Executive Board and the writers are really the ones with control.

Monday, September 02, 2024

On the Killing of the Six Hostages

I have been thinking about this horror which I heard about only last night, and I am going to write what I think is going on, in blunt terms. 

The report is that the Israeli forces found the hostages already dead, and they estimated that they had been killed three or four days before.  Although the chances Israeli assaults might accidentally kill hostages are high, I find this report credible, if unproven.  

Let's go with that report and what it means.  Israel has had to send out warnings to evacuate from areas they are considering for attack in the very short term.  Not doing so would multiply civilian deaths beyond their already outrageous levels.  My supposition is that Hamas has developed a new strategy:  kill the hostages held in those areas with known risk of assault, before the IDF can get there. 

It has a cold-hearted logic, and the implications for Israeli offensive actions against Hamas are clear:  attack, and they die.  The chances for Israeli surprise rescue assaults, I would suspect, are now very few.  They are left with no good reason to continue with their generally unsuccessful posture of attacking as the best way to get the hostages free, in the context of Hamas intransigence.  I am sure they don't have any good leads about how to take out the top Hamas leaders, regardless of the cost, or they would have done so.

It is time for Israel to declare a unilateral cease-fire, for a period of a couple of weeks or so, with the expectation Hamas would move during that time to make the cease-fire continue by releasing their hostages or making commitments to do so immediately.  If they do that, Israel would not renew hostilities so long as Hamas does not do so. 

I see no risk whatsoever for Israel to do that, beyond the damage Hamas will likely cause when they break the cease-fire with Israel still mobilized for active defense.  It won't even require Netanyahu to resign, if he can pull it off.  If Hamas refuses to release their hostages (something they have offered to do, but under relaxed security conditions Israel would not accept at the time) they would just go back to killing each other--nothing has been lost.  Israel would have to be somewhat stoic with their unilateral cease-fire until Hamas/Islamic Jihad violations inevitably cool down and avoid retaliation, or make that retaliation extremely limited and targeted.  They have the ability to do that.

If Hamas does not agree, it is time for the women of Gaza to slit the throats of their oppressors while they sleep. 


Sunday, August 25, 2024

Inflection Point

 President Biden (praise be!) would typically cite the phrase in speeches in discussion of the US' place in history and of the status of elections in our constitutional republic.  I think that, typically, the phrase was not really getting across to the public in that fashion, and especially to those swing voters he was trying to attract.  

An inflection point can be described as a change in the direction of a graphical curve. In a broader sense, it means a turning point. Biden believes that 2024's election is such a turning point.  I suggested something similar in my rant about the "precipice" at the beginning of the year.  This election can clearly be seen as the climax of something, this battle of our political norms vs. Trumpism. On behalf of all, even the Trumpists, there is a belief that this election will be decisive.  

I can clearly see an inflection point, and it is not on Election Day (at least not yet, it could still happen) but it already happened, on July 21, when Biden chose to announce he would end his campaign for re-election and suggest Vice-President Harris for the party's nomination. Before that, Biden's standing v. Trump was trending downward, slowly, but seemingly without any positive inflection in sight (first derivative negative, second derivative=0).  Since then, a month with a favorable sequence of events, all evidence shows steady improvement in the public's view of the Democrats' ticket.

Where does Kamala's trend go from here?   My estimate of the gain since 7/21 is 3-5%, from down 1-2% (Biden or Harris vs. Trump) to up 2-3%.  One change that contributed to the gain since 7/21 was the collapse of RFKJR's candidacy, which, along with Harris replacing Biden, has made this much more a head-to-head, two-person race. Roughly speaking, the popular vote now looks to be about 48-46 Harris-Walz over Trump, with some 3% insisting on another individual and 3% undecided.

Those 3% are probably more like "don't know", meaning that they don't know anything about it that they will admit to knowing.  Those particular folks may not end up voting, unless something really grabs their attention (like a war threat).  Regardless, some combination of changes will bring the numbers up to 100% total (with the 3% 'other').  There isn't more than that amount (3%) of downside to the current percentages I suggested, for either candidate, if that much.  Trump's popular vote floor I would say is 43%, and Harris' 45%, which is where Biden was when he stopped.  I will say, though, that a 3% downward move for either from the current level would absolutely lead to a landslide.  So, the time is one of vulnerability, avoiding harm, even as Harris may gain even a bit more during her campaign's post-convention afterglow. Another debate looms; another inflection point is likely before November, though that could be an acceleration (less likely), a reversal--let's hope not, a plateauing (most likely). Or maybe not, just a steady increase, all the way. Sounds good.

 

Graph of the Predictit market for Democrats winning Presidential election by 35-64 Electoral Votes, from May 26 to August 25, 2024.

Is National Popular Vote Irrelevant?

Clearly I don't think so, as that's what I've been discussing--using its estimator, the polling averages.

I often see it suggested as being meaningless by Republicans who are on the defensive because they would lose by that measure every time these days.  (2004 the only recent exception)  I would argue that, instead, it is a measure for which there is ample data and one that, broadly speaking, can be used to provide a key measure useful to predict outcome in the critical states. .     

If we look at the percentage vote for one of the parties in the Presidential elections within these states, it is not at all static.  It rises up and down with the relative fortunes of the party.  However, there is less movement relative to the overall popular vote, and even moreso if one looks at the order of these states on that measure.  

To take an example, North Carolina's popular vote percentage margin for Democratic presidential candidates, as compared to the overall US popular vote margin, resulted the following in the last four elections:  -7.0 (2008), -5.9 (2012), -5.8 (2016), and -5.9 (2020).  (Note:  2008, the worst of the four data points, was the one when the Democrats won the state!)  So, you could estimate that the US Democratic margin nationally should be above 6% to favor their chances. 

Let's look at that measure, which also shows some distinctive trends in individual states vs. the national voting, and some conclusions that may be drawn from it: 

 

State

2008

2012

2016

2020

Comment

Nevada

+5.2

+2.8

+0.3

-2.1

Negative trend; projects to -4

Michigan

+9.1

+5.6

-2.3

-1.7

Projects to -2

Pennsylvania

+3.0

+1.5

-3.1

-3.3

Projects to -3

Wisconsin

+6.6

+3.0

-2.9

-3.9

Projects to -3 or -4

Arizona

-15.8

-12.9

-5.6

-4.2

Improved rapidly; projects to -3

Georgia

-12.5

-11.7

-7.2

-4.3

Changing rapidly toward D; projects -3 to -1

Florida

-4.5

-3.0

-3.3

-7.7

Not out of reach if Dems +4; 2020 looks like an outlier

In terms of rank order of this measure, GA, AZ, and NC have consistently been lowest, MI at or near the highest, and PA right in the middle.  With all these swing states below the national average in 2020--a high turnout year like 2008, and like 2024 is likely to be, it is clear that those who say Harris-Walz will need a clear lead in the popular vote, like 3 or 4%, have the recent data on their side.  At the same time, though, a lead of 5-6% might lead to an Electoral Vote "landslide" of 100 EV or more, and much more if FL flips. 

This model doesn't take into account specific variations and their possible causes; I would suggest the outlook in Wisconsin looks more favorable than this because of the Walz effect.  Turnout nationally, and its effect on the US national popular vote, will be up for Democrats because New York and California are so critical for regaining control of the House and will get extra attention, which will boost the Democratic vote margin, without doing much in some of the swing states. 

With a 50-45 popular vote margin, which I think is quite likely, this projects to a 297-219 lead for Harris-Walz, with Nevada and North Carolina too close to call and Georgia, once again, somehow on the Democrats' side.  On the other hand, if it finishes 49-47,by this model Harris would lose Pennsylvania, where Democratic turnout totally matters, and most likely the election as well.  The margins are fine. 

Unfortunately, though exit polls might help, the popular vote takes days to assume its final shape.  So we are left to lean upon the unwieldy support of the polling averages. That is, if we don't want to go by the even more inconsistent measure of polling averages in the several states.