Top Shelf Rock: Update

First posted in 2007. See that posting for the Shelf Rules. We have moved the chronological edge of the Oldies rack forward considerably in just three years; it now appears to be about 1990. A note I should add is that blues, soul, and jazz are in another, more chaotically-organized rack (for another day, I guess).

I see all this MP3/iPod stuff as yet another attempt to get me to buy once again the music I already have; I've spit out the bait for the most part. So, it's still CD's, for the most part, for me. Turnover has been reduced, though, because of the contributions of my friend Jose, who filled in major gaps with some burned copies.

For more commentary, see also my review of favorite albums of the "decade" 2000-2009.

NEWER RACK

New Arrivals & Upgrades
Bob Dylan--Time Out of Mind: My choice for best of the New Dylan releases.
Eurythmics--Peace: Ditto for New Annie Lennox.
Living Colour--Time's Up: Vernon Reid would be my nomination as the successor to Jimi, and this would be my selection of his best.
Radiohead--The Bends: My selection as best Radiohead (Second would be In Rainbows, but that's my son's).
Coldplay--A Rush of Blood to the Head: Their second-best--"Viva La Vida" is my son's CD.
Fatboy Slim--You've Come a Long Way, Baby
Doves--The Last Broadcast
Steve Earle--Jerusalem
Morcheeba--Big Calm
Bright Eyes--I'm Wide Awake, It's Morning
Green Day--American Idiot
The Killers--Hot Fuss
James--Seven
Olive--Extra Virgin
K.D. Laing--Ingenue
Beck--Mutations
Various Artists--No Alternative
Various Artists--Future Soundtrack for America
Beatles--Anthology 2 (technically, released in 1996)
Los Lobos--Colossal Head



Holdovers
U2--Achtung!Baby, Bush--Sixteen Stone, Alanis Morissette--Jagged Little Pill, P.M. Dawn--Jesus Wept, Nirvana--Unplugged in New York, Modest Mouse--Good News for People Who Love Bad News, Santana--Supernatural, Gomez--In Our Gun

OLDER RACK

New Arrivals & Upgrades
Simple Minds--Sons & Fascination
The Police--Zenyatta Mondatta
King Crimson--Lizard: Jose's KC#1 covered the early albums, except this obscure, beautiful release.
The The--Infected: A tough call vs. "Mind Bomb". I went with Infected because of "Sweet Bird of Truth"

Holdovers
The Beatles (White Album), The Who--Tommy, Steve Winwood--Arc of a Diver, Bruce Springsteen--The Wild, the Innocent and the E Street Shuffle, The Rolling Stones--Sticky Fingers, Elton John (eponymous), Al Stewart--Past, Present and future, Pixies--Doolittle, Indigo Girls (eponymous), Traffic--John Barleycorn Must Die, The Allman Brothers--Eat a Peach, Yes--Close to the Edge, Cream--Disraeli Gears, Robbie Robertson (eponymous), Simon and Garfunkel--Bookends, Hot Tuna (eponymous), Bob Dylan--Blood on the Tracks, The Edge--Captive, Steely Dan--Pretzel Logic, Frank Zappa--Apostrophe/Overnight Sensation, The Clash--Combat Rock, Sex Pistols--Never mind the bollocks here's the, Talking Heads--Speaking in Tongues, Tears for Fears--Songs from the Big Chair, Pet Shop Boys--Disco.

The Great Game in the 21st Century

Comes now the intrepid New York Times to report that Afghan Pres. Hamid Karzai is complaining about US motives and strategy. We are not doing well by Afghanistan, just trying to gain influence in the region, the unnamed US sources accuse him of complaining. He could do a deal now with the Taliban if the US weren't interfering, he is said to have said. The US, for its part, goes public with the news that Karzai's invitation to visit the White House (on a date not set, but soon) has been revoked--ostensibly because he made moves to force his control of a corruption commission.

Still no mention of the offer on the table and how it relates to the current complaints and counter-complaints. Now, Afghanistan is not one of those reputed great chess-playing nations (like the Iranians, Russians, or Armenians)--their national game is the one where the men mounted on horseback drag the dead goat back and forth. I see Karzai as choosing to be one of the mounted guys, rather than the goat.

First, it can only help his level of esteem among the average Pashtun to be standing up, even a little, to the US. Here he's taking a page from Iraqi P.M. Al-Maliki.

The tension I see (which has not been reported) is whether to engage in peace discussions now or in the not-so-distant future. The optimal strategy is to beat up the Taliban and other insurgents throughout the summer and work the negotiations with the bruised remaining forces next winter. Then, the pullouts could begin on President Obama's schedule, or even a bit ahead of schedule.

I see the US military as the ones who are opposed to Karzai's desire to move more swiftly than that. Let's say that the reasons for that are "good" ones: the buildup of US forces is just now kicking in, and there are many available Taliban butts to kick. There may be a chance to strike successfully, and they don't want it taken away by an early peace, which may not be sustainable without more military success.

The only problem will be if one or more of three things happen: 1) The Taliban don't get their butts kicked this year--the battle in Kandahar, Karzai's home area, is going to be extremely tough; 2) The offer to make peace is permanently withdrawn by all insurgent groups; or 3) The US military starts doing a Vietnam-like "just one more offensive, just six more months" kind of thing in 2011 (and thereafter). 1) and 2) are clearly linked, but could happen independently; 3) could happen as a result of 1), but also independently, as our success will inevitably be less than complete.

My strongest advice is for President Obama, and it is that he not become the goat both sides start tugging. The message which should have come out of his secret, but announced meeting with Karzai should be: 1) The offensive will continue in force throughout the summer; 2) Engage the enemy in peace talks aimed at completion around year's end; 3) There will be no extensions of time, and we plan to pull out ALL forces from Afghanistan. Neither Karzai, nor our US military commanders, have to like this, but they should have no choice.

Obama in Kabul

It is certainly cool that President Obama can disappear from Camp David and suddenly reappear in Afghanistan and basically the public doesn't hear about it until he's there. Certainly it's best not to allow our foes to know of our commander-in-chief's movements in advance, and it's a good opportunity, at this holiday season, to boost morale and show our country's support to our forces.

I suspect there is another motive in the visit, one that I haven't yet seen reported (but as a blogger, I'm free to speculate upon it). It is a fact, well-reported, that one of the top leaders of the Afghan insurgency, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has made a recent peace proposal to the Karzai government. It would make a ton of sense for Obama to meet privately with Karzai to discuss the proposal and agree on a strategy to respond to it.

Hekmatyar is a guy who has been on the scene forever. He received aid from the US during the insurgency against the Soviet invasion in the '80's. He was one of the chief warlords battling over Kabul in the period after the Soviets' withdrawal and basically destroying the city...until the Taliban came and took over. He ended up going into exile when the Taliban were overthrown, and now his forces are fighting with them. He is a hardcore fundamentalist and an Afghan nationalist.

He should not be considered a Taliban leader, though: he's basically a warlord with his own independent power base, as well as considerable, continuing support from Pakistan. Clearly, he's looking to return, and his proposal, although not acceptable in its current form, would quite possibly form the basis for negotiating amnesty and a separate peace agreement, possibly even on terms that could attract other components of the insurgency. For example, he is not objecting to the continuation of the current government and control of security in the country. The timetables he proposed for withdrawal of Western forces don't align with US' plans, but are close enough to discuss. So, this is an opportunity which should be engaged, not passed up or flatly rejected.

This is complicated and delicate stuff, no doubt. Pakistan recently caught one of the top Taliban leaders--he was apparently involved in peace discussions with a special envoy backed with the UN for some time, so the arrest--while it seemed positive for the counterinsurgency--put an end to that channel for making peace. We have had to accept that Pakistan will have a critical role in what happens in Afghanistan. This is equivalent to the role we needed to acknowledge for Iran in Iraq's fate. You could also compare it to the interest the US might have had when Europeans put one of theirs, Maximilian, in charge of a weakened Mexico in the late 1800's. So, if Pakistan's guy wants to make peace, it can't be all bad.

Officially, it's Karzai's country and his play, but there's also every reason for him to review options with us, and there are probably a few tactics we can employ which would help him succeed in bringing this guy, and his forces, in from the cold.

Iraqi Election Update: Oh, Well

I am (seriously) interested in the Iraqi election results, and there was major news reported today: Prime Minister al-Maliki's State of Law group finished narrowly second, both in the national "popular vote" and in the Parliamentary seats announced today. The apparent leader in the voting is former P.M. Ayad Allawi (a secular Shiite) and his Iraqiya list which features many Sunnis.

The New York Times reported this news, and it included a very interesting and useful interactive graphic (click on the title of this post, or here, to view it). It was both interesting and useful, but it included some errors, which, with the help of Al-Jazeera's site, I can correct here. Four provinces' names were not given on the graphic: the one in the top in the Kurdish area is Suleymania, the one on the top which has none of the boxes filled in (the actual results appear to be 8 seats for Allawi's Iraqiya, 4 seats for the minor party Iraqi Unity) is Salahuddin, the one in the middle section with the votes closely divided among four or more parties is called Muthanna, and the one in the southern section is Wasit. Wasit? Yes, it was. Also, the one they are calling "Tamim" is generally referred to as "Kirkuk" (a very critical area, one whose parliamentary votes are evenly split between the Kurdish Alliance and Iraqiya).

Finally, the "Other seats" at the bottom have to do with seats allocated to religious minorities and to women, if necessary. From the graphic, it suggests there are 15 seats, of which seven were allocated to the four major party groups. The other eight, if they existed, would take the total seats to 333 rather than the 325 which all news reports have. The explanation is that the other eight seats were not allocated (at least at this stage), perhaps because enough women were elected through "natural" means. There is quite a complicated process for this, explained in English at this site posted by the Iraqi electoral commission.

OK, So What?
First, I credit Allawi's ability to create a credible political challenge to Maliki's grouping and even reach first place (results subject to challenge, review, and possible modification, of course) despite some efforts to suppress his efforts, including disqualification of many of its candidates. His group's appeal was truly national; a lot of the early reporting focused on how Maliki's group led in more provinces, but Allawi's group got seats in more provinces, including ones both in the north-center and the Shiite south. The fact that his list drew strong participation from Sunnis, and apparently some others as well, bodes well for the development of truly national parties, and for the chances to keep Sunni insurgency from bursting out once again. And, that has to be the most important objective of the elections, from our perspective in the US, and also that of most Iraqis.

Second, though the numerical allocation of seats among the parties was not that different from what I had anticipated in my election preview, it was different enough to change the picture substantially. The outcome may be the same--Maliki leading a coalition with parts of the Shiite Iraqi National Alliance and the major Kurdish parties--but the route to it is likely to be more tortuous, contentious, possibly even more violent, than we were hoping.

By normal Parliamentary protocol, Allawi will be given first shot at forming a government as leader of the party with the most seats. (That is, once the results are certified, which could itself take a while, both because the elections are so close, and because Maliki's governing party has every reason to challenge if there's any chance of gaining any ground.) Allawi is unlikely to be able to ally with any of the three other leading parties, though: Maliki's because he will prefer to lead the government himself, the Kurds because of their intense rivalry over the border Kurdish areas with the Sunnis, and the Iraqi National Alliance, because that group will presumably not want to ally with either Sunnis or secular Shiites.

Only after that effort has fully played out would Maliki have his chance. As I suggested previously, he will likely have good possibilities to ally with at least part of the Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, with the larger Kurdish parties (as he did before), and even, possibly, with Allawi's party. This latter development would probably the best for Iraqi's long-term stability, if it were to occur.

Banking Reform Checklist

With health insurance reform, I was blissfully unaware of the issues for a long time, existing comfortably within the warm and comfy incubator of employer-sponsored group insurance. It was only when I was thrust out from that womb-like environment that I saw the ugly pustules in our healthcare system.

Banking is different: I lived it (or at least worked it) for many years, and I saw the warts from the inside. So, I'd humbly say I know pretty well what needs to be done to properly seal up this critical, cracked pillar of our economy. The reader is encouraged to use the following as a checklist to evaluate any legislative proposals for their adequacy.

First, a single entity must be responsible for identifying those private institutions--banks, insurance companies, processors, trade associations, exchanges, etc.--which are critical components of the financial system. They must be US-licensed and be subject to regular independent audits, and all their assets and liabilities must be visible to that regulatory entity. The Federal Reserve being that entity would make sense.

Next, all those critical institutions should be required to have filed, at all times, a "business liquidation plan" in the event of their sudden economic collapse, just as they make business continuation plans for contingencies like computer failure, natural disaster, or act of war. If they were required to identify how their equity and capital could disintegrate, and what would be done with the remaining shards of their business, it would have a sobering effect which would make real to their directors or owners that they are no longer viewed as "too big to fail" and would make their actual collapse much less likely. Significant changes in the asset or liability makeup of the institution should be immediately reflected in the liquidation plan, with appropriate criminal and civil penalties for omissions.

Safety and soundness is actually a different regulatory issue, which should be done by a different organization. The task of supervising potential liquidation of all these institutions requires extreme detachment and disbelief; helping banks to do things to stay alive is a more supportive role, and should ideally be done by an arm of the institution, such as today's FDIC, which will be on the hook to cover the bank's assets (actually it's mostly the liabilities, but I like the sound better the other way) if things go bad. It should still have the hammer--we'll shut you down if you don't raise those reserves/stop making that kind of loans, etc.--but it should be more like "we'll make you stop because we want you to survive".

On consumer protection, the point is not to restrict legal practices more; there are plenty of legal prohibitions, and the basic principle of contracts--that both parties should be able to enter into contracts when the terms are fully disclosed--should be honored. There has been considerable progress in making disclosures to consumers better. The objective should be that there is a potent--even feared--government unit which will listen to consumer complaints and act against unfair practices. That unit should also have a pure enforcement component to shut down, and apply criminal or civil penalties, to lenders, collection agencies, insurers, etc. that do not habitually operate their business according to the laws.

I do not generally favor strict limitations on interest rate lenders can charge--that just eliminates segments of the population from having access to credit. (This includes "subprime" mortgages, which should not be banned.) Of course, there are common-sense boundaries to what lenders may be permitted: if they are charging 10% a month, they are going to have to use leg-breakers to enforce those kinds of terms. Otherwise, the rules should be: you must reserve properly for the risk you take on, and you must keep some portion of all the assets--loans, or insurance policies--you book. The percentage should in all cases be significant, but they might vary to allow low retention percentages for low-risk, "conforming" mortgages and other properly secured loans. Allowing sale--without recourse, except in case of negligence or fraud--helps keep our credit grantors liquid, which is necessary to keep business going, but this business of book, sell, and walk away must end.

Then, there are a few measures I've called for in the past: credit rating agencies' business model has been exposed for a fraud; it must be revised (to be paid for by the buyer, not the seller), or they must take on some of the risk of their bad evaluations, or they should be replaced by a government agency that will do the job with rigor and integrity.

Banks should be "encouraged"--that is, squeezed--to become either investment banks or custodians of public funds, but not both, by a revision of reserve requirements which penalizes such a mix of assets beyond the level which each class would require.

Complex derivatives should be traded on transparent markets, or prohibited. Derivatives that require secrecy for their purpose should not be allowed for publicly-regulated utilities.

Hedge funds have been unfairly advantaged over mutual funds and equity investments based overseas; the rules which attempt to prevent Americans owning such investments should be relaxed, as they are an arrogant assertion of extraterritoriality (pretending we have jurisdiction over peoples' actions outside our borders).

Finally, the mortgage industry's risk management (and account servicing) techniques are immature. The huge edifice of equity in homes, comprising the largest share of Americans' savings, rests upon three poorly-poured foundation elements: a naive assumption of steadily rising home prices, the perceived benefit of the mortgage interest deduction, and simple rules of thumb in credit granting and treating troubled loans. The first has been permanently shaken and lies in ruins; the second, though politically (and economically) impossible to repeal anytime soon, should begin to be phased out in the near future (just as credit card interest's deduction was phased out some 20 years ago); and the rules, while useful for establishing the terms of securitization and FNMA/FHA guarantees, have proven inadequate as a basis for downstream management of accounts. Mortgage grantors need to monitor better the real estate values of properties they "own" (and they should own more of them) and more proactively and efficiently use a broad array of account management techniques (refinancing and restructuring offers, temporary payment holidays, structured cash management and renovation assistance, etc.), all designed to prevent unfavorable foreclosures--the economic cost of which, to lender, borrower, and community--have become too familiar during the ride through this Great Crater.

I will evaluate proposals against this lengthy checklist. My first impression is that Barney Frank's House legislation is closer to the mark (although its range is too limited), and that Chris Dodd's desperate attempts to placate Senate Republicans was both unsuccessful (in getting their support) and terribly weak in its power and scope.

Health Care: Last in a Series?

So, it's finished--all but the Epilogue, the Senate's passage of the reconciliation package. The Republicans may be able to delay it briefly, but the budget reconciliation procedures themselves should ensure that is not too long. The only hiccup that is likely is that if some provision in the carefully-vetted package does not fit within the limitations of budget reconciliation (as judged by the Senate's Parliamentarian), then there may need to be some minor modifications which would require it to return to the House again.

For that reason, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's work on the project is still officially Incomplete, but he seems headed for a B or B-. It was, after all, the Senate bill which was signed today, one for which Reid somehow managed to get 60 votes. It is a shame, though, that the Senate never had a vote on a public option--regardless of whether he had the votes, he let us down on that one.

President Obama also let them off on that topic--a government-run program was part of his original campaign promise (and no government mandate, either). This ended up being a success for him, a credit to his patience, persistence, and the power of his final pushes--for passage of the Senate's bill in the House, and framing the final reconciliation package, a delicate set of compromises and policy considerations. As he said about his first-year performance, "a solid B+".

Top marks (an A) go to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the Democratic members of the House (the ones who voted for it, anyway). She and her team of Democratic leaders found the necessary formulas to deliver the votes that were needed, when they were needed, every time. She got a bill passed with a public option, too!

Republican efforts get a failing grade--their ideas were weak and insufficient, their tactics ugly and ultimately unsuccessful.

A Personal Note, and A Glimmer of Hope
In the five years since my COBRA policy ended, I've been one of those who've seen the ugly, blunt edge of our health insurance system. I have paid for 100% increase in monthly premiums (and in deductibles) on our Blue Cross policy, and a member of my family was denied coverage for a minor (but potentially expensive), pre-existing condition. Her insurance coverage (until--coincidentally?--this month) has been flimsy, overpriced, and continuously increasing.

This experience has taught me that the current system of private health insurance really is not a working one--I would not wish that experience on others, but if more had been exposed to it, they would not have been so complacent about the need to change this system. The private insurers do not deserve the additional business, and the continuation of their monopolistic control of most of the market, that this bill will further cement into place.

The effort to start a government-run program was an attempt to make the insurers honest. Instead, it will be attempted through regulation, and we shall see if this works, and for how long: there is a long history in this country of regulatory agencies being effectively captured and ultimately controlled by the industry they are supposed to regulate.

But wait--perhaps there is something with potential in this area in the bill, after all. Read this description in the excellent interactive chart summarizing key areas of the Senate bill and modifications included in the reconciliation package, from in Sunday's NY Times:

The federal Office of Personnel Management, which provides health benefits to federal employees, would sign contracts with insurers to offer at least two national health plans to individuals, families and small businesses. The new plans would be separate from the program for federal employees, and premiums would be calculated separately. At least one of the plans would have to operate on a nonprofit basis.

This text is far from clear: two pilot programs, but where and for whom? I did some research--the provision is in Sec. 1334. It will follow the Federal employees' health plan in design and implementation, though it will be separate from that very successful program. The government's Office of Personnel Management will take some time--months to a year?--to get proposals from insurers (or groups of insurers) and make contracts for this offering, which will initially be offered--to individuals, and small businesses--to 60% of states, and roll out to all within three years afterward.

This does suggest that maybe, in a few years, there will be something better on offer, something to complete "health insurance reform" (as President Obama correctly described it). Then, we can move on to the next, even larger task: that of reforming our health care system itself, how it works, and how it is paid for, so that we can deal with the tsunami wave of future health care needs that is visible on the horizon. Other than just heading for the hills!

Bracket Madness

Every year it gets bigger: the spectator sport of picking the NCAA men's basketball team through all the rounds is deep and getting deeper.

ESPN has tried to hijack the NCAA tournament as its own (CBS has the network telecasts for the key games). Its website, which usually is full of features limited to paying customers, is open for all to participate in its Tournament Challenge for a $10,000 prize. One thing I really love is that ESPN allows us to make ten different sets of complete bracket picks, which allows us to experiment a bit with various scenarios.

It also seems to be clogging up their website. I made seven sets of picks Sunday night, before the dust had settled. I tried to do one tonight and the computer kept hanging up.

I didn't see a whole lot of games this year during the regular season beyond my faves (Kentucky, Louisville, Syracuse, New Mexico), my hates (any televised game I thought Duke, Texas or North Carolina could lose), and my parents' alma mater (Indiana, and its arch rival, Purdue). I did watch the conference tournaments last week pretty devotedly, and their impact on my opinions has been considerable.

To The Whiteboard, Already
There have been two teams that have shown the kind of dominance and consistency one looks for in a potential national champion: Kansas and Kentucky. There is a pretty large gap between their success and that of any other team. As a Kentucky fan, I would be disappointed if the Wildcats lose in any game other than the final, to any team other than Kansas. I expect the Jayhawks' fans feel the same, if not more so (i.e., they may not give Kentucky as much respect).

I have no real issue with the other two #1 seeds, Duke and Syracuse. Duke came on strong and dominated the ACC, even if it was relatively weak this year. Syracuse had a great regular season in the toughest conference, even if the Orange were clearly outplayed in their first game in the Big East tournament by Georgetown. What makes no sense whatsoever to me was that the #2 seeds in Kansas and Kentucky's regions are the best ones, the ones that should clearly have been #5 and #6 in the seedings, the winners of the Big 10 and Big East tournaments (Ohio St. and West Virginia).

Just as there is a big separation between the top two and the next level, there is also a pretty sizable gap between the upper seeded teams (let's say the top three in each region) and the rest, especially to the lower-rated at-large selections. The difference is one of consistency of performance, because these teams have had big wins, but they have many more losses (often ten or more) and usually some losses to mediocre teams.

This means that there are plenty of opportunities to pick upsets against vulnerable big conference teams by "mid-majors" or even low-rated conferences--in fact, they're hardly upsets. The real trick, the difference maker in bracket picking, is finding those momentous games where the 1, 2, or 3 seeds in regions might lose. There won't be many of them, but it is critical to identify them.

Some Critical Games Each Round
First Round The classic upset pick in the first round is the #12 vs. #5; the records show it happens a lot more than any other true upset game (#8 vs. #9 and #7 vs. #10 are essentially even matchups; feel free to flip a coin or just go with your gut on those. It mostly doesn't matter, because the winners usually get eliminated in the next round by the #1 and #2 seeds). I like this year's #5 models, though, and I see more opportunity for big upsets in the #4 vs. #13 games: Purdue (weakened by injury) vs. Siena, Vanderbilt vs. Murray State, Maryland vs. Houston, and Wisconsin vs. Wofford. I recommend at least one, maybe two upsets for your bracket from among those. Among the 5-12's, three of the underdogs--Cornell, UTEP, and New Mexico St.--are at least interesting picks, but I'm not going with any of them in my standard, "canonical" picks.

I don't see any likely first-round upsets of the 1,2, or 3 regional seeds--though one will probably happen, I don't see where. Two #11's I like in their first round games against sixth-seeded teams are San Diego St. (winner of the Mountain West tourney) over Tennessee (which was seriously humbled by Kentucky in the SEC tournament) and Minnesota over Xavier. This latter is a weird one: a lower-level team from a top conference as underdog beating a perennial upset threat team from a mid-major. I just don't think this Xavier team is as good as their best, while Minnesota showed a lot in the tournament of the eleven-team Big 10 conference.

Second Round The South region (Duke's) has the weakest top seeds, but some very good mid-level seeds. This should show up in the second round, with three really good matchups with upset potential projected: #6 Notre Dame (a rising team) vs. #3 Baylor, #7 Richmond vs. #2 Villanova, and #9 Louisville vs. #1 Duke.

One other big obstacle to a seeded team making the Sweet Sixteen is the projected matchup in the East (Kentucky's) region between #6 Marquette and #3 New Mexico. The Lobos have done great things for the morale of all of us here in NM this year, but this game is a deadly serious early-round threat they will have to be fortunate to survive.

Third Round If you've got Villanova surviving the second round, then they're likely to face another severe (even terminal) challenge from the Notre Dame-Baylor winner. This is the round when all the top Big East teams will face critical challenges: Georgetown-Ohio St. looks likely in the Midwest (Kansas') region, there's a possible intraleague matchup of Marquette and West Virginia in the South (West Va. won by one point in their only matchup during the season), and Syracuse could face a serious threat from either Maryland or NCAA overachiever Michigan State.

Fourth Round Teams that have gotten this far have proven their class, so there aren't any weak links. An upset here is defined as a #1 team losing. Kentucky's biggest challenge (prior to the final) could come here against #2 West Virginia, if they make it this far, and, similarly, Kansas' could be here against Georgetown (or even Ohio St.)

The big ones, though, are my clear expectations (in my "standard" brackets) that Duke would lose here (most likely, to Baylor), and that Syracuse will fall here to Kansas State (who looks to have a pretty easy ride to the regional final). My standard Final Four are Kansas, Kansas State (great Big 12, intrastate matchup projected for the semis, the fourth time they would meet, with Kansas winning all three so far), Kentucky and Baylor. This is a huge shout of respect for the Big 12, with three teams in the last four (that certainly has never happened, with the move from Eight to XII being a fairly recent development; I believe it happened once with the Big East and never with any other conference). I've got occasional brackets including one, but not both, of Syracuse and Duke in the Final Four (though losing in the semifinals), with longshot candidates Butler, Georgetown, and Richmond winning a regional final somewhere in my set of ten ESPN brackets.

Most of my brackets will have the standard matchup of KU and UK in the final. It won't differentiate me from the pack, but it will give me the best chance of having the final two, which in most systems and most pools is a requirement to be seriously in the running to win.

If you're competing against me and have read this, you can try to game me. Emphasis on "try". Shame on you, though; otherwise, good luck!

Letter to The Nation Magazine

I suppose I'll pull it from here if it's going to be published and they ask me to do so.

I am neither an amateur nor professional jazz discophile. Much less am I an an academic expert on music, though I do enjoy and even revere it as one of humanity's most impressive products. I do enjoy good pie-throwing historical hagiography, though, so I read with interest David Schiff's polemics in his review of Terry Teachout's "Pops: A life of Louis Armstrong" (March 1, 2010).

In an essay with so much focus on the social and cultural roots, largely hidden from public view, of Armstrong's life and art, I was surprised to find no mention whatsoever of the underground legend that Armstrong was an avid smoker of marijuana throughout his life. If true, surely this fact would have some social import Schiff could glean--it would support his opposition to the Louis-Armstrong-as-Horatio-Alger story, for one thing. If false, its debunking would be news to many of us and worthy of inclusion in Armstrong's biographical discussion. Could his "muggles"--as the legend says Armstrong called his pot (and note the curious allusion to the not-yet-created work of J.K. Rowland!)--be partly behind his exclusion from white, polite society? Perhaps this can be a topic for future publications, maybe as part of a larger discussion of illicit drugs and jazz and its implications--someday when the topic is not too hot to handle.

Not to suggest compromise or the "R-word"--reconciliation--but surely all observers of Armstrong's life and work could agree that the theme music (rather than "Accentuate the Positive" or "I Got a Right to Sing the Blues") should be "When You're Smiling". Armstrong's big grin was an act of will, overcoming all the sorrows of the world, and at the same time a pragmatic and successful strategy. It's also right at the heart of his universal appeal: "the whole world smiles with you."

Genocidally Boring

The delicate subject of the alleged genocidal massacre of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in the latter stages of World War I, and efforts to force modern Turkey to recognize that it was genocide, has once again been raised in the US Congress.

A House committee voted 23-22 in favor of a resolution declaring that it was indeed genocide. The bill would go to the House floor, but the Obama administration has opposed consideration of the measure.

Politically, declaring for genocide would be popular--particularly with the influential Armenian-American population--but it would be a disaster diplomatically. Turkey, one of our most important allies, takes great offense to any suggestion that there was a genocide on Turkish soil (they admit some atrocities, but in the context of "civil war" or other decay of authority, and insist that Armenians performed their share, as well).

What would actually make sense would be a resolution supporting the efforts by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to get Turkey and Armenia to sit down and resolve this among themselves, difficult as it might be for them to do so. There is much to be lost by America getting into the middle of this, and nothing to be gained. It should be resolved through historical research--both countries making their documentation available. Particularly relevant would be the articles of state and of the military from the old, collapsing Ottoman Empire, which should be studied to understand whether the assaults on Armenian civilian populations by the military were a matter of policy, lack of discipline, or ambiguous in their authorization. Reparations for the acts of some 95 years ago should be taken off the table from the start.

Of course there is the question: so what? It does seem to matter--excessively--to both governments, neither of which had anything to do with it. Here are some relevant facts:

o World War I was itself an atrocity, the whole thing. Every government involved ended up disgracing itself, either by the way it went to war, the way it conducted its war, or in the postwar mess.
o The Great War would appear to disinterested eyes to have been a suicidal form of genocide, a reasonably successful attempt to depopulate Europe through scorched earth and elimination of an entire generation of young men.
o The Ottoman Empire centered in Turkey was right up there among the worst in terms of having the war destroy what was left of its legitimacy to govern (along with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Kaiser, and Czarist Russia). Modern Turkey has no connection with that government and should have no need to defend it (nor the "Young Turk" nationalist generals who are the ones most associated with extermination efforts against the perceived "Fifth column" traitors among the Armenians). The only problem would've been if the postwar founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal "Ataturk" had been implicated, but he was involved in a different front, the one in Gallipoli with the British, and he later went on record condemning the "campaign" in Armenia.
o Whatever the official policy, the Armenian population was effectively eliminated from its lands in today's northeastern Turkey. The Armenians moved to the lands on the other side of the border, and many went in a diaspora to many other countries. On the one hand, Turkey should be responsible for allowing Armenians to return; on the other, it seems unlikely they would want to do so.

I think Turkey is a wonderful nation and am very optimistic for its future, in which it can play a unique, important role in international affairs as a strategically-located, prosperous, democratic, overwhelmingly Islamic example for the world. This is only true, however, if it can put aside this ugly aspect of its past and its embarrassed refusal to look honestly at it. It makes very little sense for the Erdogan government to hold to the errors of a long-lost, discredited militaristic nationalism, unless they are afraid of the specter of another military coup.

Oscars--Final Predictions

I am firmly in favor of the expansion of the Best Picture nominees to ten and the new voting system. Best Picture is far from a foregone conclusion, and it is the focus--appropriately--for the telecast.

There are two predominant modes of thinking about tonight's awards: the Avatar sweep vs. the spread-out awards result. I am going with the latter--if all my other predictions (see below) were all correct, then Avatar, The Hurt Locker, Up, Crazy Hearts, and Inglourious Basterds (sp) would each have two awards going into the final one (all but C.H. being nominated for it), which would then be decisive for the night's big victor. Under slightly different scenarios, Up in the Air or Young Victoria could also meet that level, or, more likely, but still in the spread-out mode, H.L. or "The Big Av. (3-D)" could have three or four going into the climax).

For me, the key indicators through the evening will be for Art Direction and Film Editing. In the first case, a win by Avatar would indicate a likely big evening for it, while film editing will be a head-to-head between Hurt Locker and Avatar in a category very central to the relative perceived merits of the two. Best Director could also be an indicator (Cameron winning would indicate major sweep tendencies), but I think Bigelow has become the probable winner.

I feel that Oscar prediction is a field in which it is possible for me to have success analyzing possible outcomes ahead of time, qualified by the uncertainty some areas have (in that sense, different from betting on the point spread of football). I've had some success in the past, but I'll readily admit this year's uncertainty level is relatively high.

Here are my final predictions (followed by preferred choice among nominees, if different), and a certainty level from 1 to 10 (1 being no real clue and 10 being absolute certainty):

Best Actor--Jeff Bridges (George Clooney) - 8
Best Actress--Sandra Bullock (Meryl Streep) - 6
Supporting Actor--Christoph Waltz - 9
Supporting Actress--Mo'Nique (Anna Kendrick) - 8
Best Director--Kathryn Bigelow - 7
Animated Film--Up (The Fantastic Mr. Fox) - 8
Art Direction--Sherlock Holmes - 6
Cinematography--Hurt Locker - 5
Costume Design--Young Victoria - 8
Best Documentary -- The Cove - 9
Documentary Short--China's Unnatural Disaster - 4
Foreign Language--A Prophet - 5
Visual Effects--Avatar - 10
Adapted Screenplay--Up in the Air - 7
Original Screenplay--Inglourious Basterds (The Messenger) - 6
Film Editing--Avatar - 6
Makeup --Star Trek - 5
Original Score -- Up - 8
Original Song --Crazy Hearts - 9

BEST PICTURE -- HURT LOCKER (UP IN THE AIR) - 7

Iraqracy 2.0

The second parliamentary elections in Iraq were held yesterday. There were some attempts to disrupt the voting, but the citizens showed courage and, largely, turned out peacefully.

My reading of various sources, and of the way the voting will work (mostly by individual candidate, but after reaching the election threshold, excess votes will be re-distributed to other members, if any, of the voting alliance within constituencies) lead me to expect something like the following preliminary results when they are announced around Wednesday (in terms of percentage of seats in the newly-expanded Parliament):

Law and Order (Maliki's)-35%
Iraqi National Alliance (Shiite)--25%, of which about half Sadrist, half Sistani
Iraqiya (led by former P.M. Ayead Allawi--secular, with Sunni support)--15%
Kurdish Alliance (the two main parties, running together)--10%
Gorran (Kurdish alternate movement)--5%
Sunni parties--5%
Others--5%.

If these are approximately the results, it will be favorable for Iraqi stability though not easy to create a new government. Maliki will have the edge and plenty of time to make a coalition, as well as several options. He can ally with the more secular and Sunni groups if he finds the Shiite parties intractable, even though that would go against his past history. The Kurdish parties will still have a great bargaining position, which will be one of the most favorable aspects of the post-election environment for keeping the country together.

Maliki--whose party name, "Law and Order" (as translated, anyway), has got to be a great draw--is nicely placed in the middle of the continuum of Iraqi parties: not secular, safely anti-Baathist, Shiite ascendant, but not in the pocket of the mullahs. The best outcome I could conceive--a dynamic, good-government coalition-- would be an alliance with the new, non-traditional Kurd movement (Gorran--see this link for more information) and the Sistani (moderate) Shiites. Reports from the campaign suggest that Moqtada al-Sadr's supporters only nominally worked with Sistani's followers, and that there could be a cleavage between the two (al-Sadr's group is probably beyond the pale for Maliki and for the US).