Obama 1st 6-weeks' period Grade: B

Part II

Foreign policy is central to my grading of the performance of a Presidency of the US. It includes military policy (just ask Clausewitz), which is equally vital and equally controllable from the White House. In this regard F.P. is unlike economic policy (the outcome of which is normally not controllable, just as we are seeing) or, say, sports boosterism (a traditional Presidential activity, of little importance--I saw Daddy O caught the Bulls when they came to visit in DC the other day).

Obama, Hillary, and the key envoys Mitchell and Holbrooke have yet to make a big mark diplomatically of any kind. But it's only been 40 days!

I see vision behind the mundane diplomatic developments viewed so far.

The biggest news was Susan Rice's statement at the U.N. that the U.S. was not going to put up with failed states taking out their sickness on their citizens any more, but that we are going to take this up in the U.N. itself. This suggests a major Charter revision, and I hail that intention.

I believe that the Obama Administration has correctly identified Russia as the key dance partner in these early months' diplomacy. The Kremlin has so much leverage toward our success with Iran, with China, North Korea, Pakistan.

As an example, the US needs a redundantly-secure supply line toward its theater in South Asia (the existing primary one being through Kuwait), in other words a second safe staging area near the region, and I don't think Turkey is going to provide it in the short run. It won't run through Russia's sacred soil itself, but it will cross their sphere of influence at some point or it won't exist. Meaning, they will have to tolerate any new basing we develop as we leave Iraq. That needs to get worked out.

I even see some relevance to the urgently rising problem in Eastern Europe. The Eastern European nations have made the mistake of looking entirely to the near neighbors to the West, which have scorned them in their hour of crisis. I wouldn't mistake Russia for a benign financial influence, but an American initiative which fortifies the financial system for both Russia and the Eastern European nations, including basket cases like the Ukraine, will promote the general global welfare and lower tensions.

In the US' Second Front of diplomacy, the Middle East, Mitchell and Co. have no choice but to wait for the Israeli dust to settle--both from the Gaza incursion and the parliamentary elections. So they correctly build up relationships with all parties.

One hopes that includes the Israeli Arabs, the key group required for a successful peaceful resolution in Palestine; I believe their voice may, one day soon, become the means for the extra-Israeli Palestinians to develop consensus policies. If and when Netanyahu gets the P.M. job and then fails to make progress, there may be an opportunity for a Center-Left government of Kadima/Labor/Arabs-plus a few to create a major diplomatic opening. Of course we have to let the Israelis reach this in their own time.

WOT is Dis?

I think so far the Obama formulation of War On Terror is to make it regional rather than global. Well, it least it's not GWOT no more! That's progress, but only of a certain kind.

I think the withdrawal targets in Iraq are fine, if Iraq validates the SOFA worked out in the latter days of Bushite Misrule. If things are cool over there with our planned rate of departure, we should be on the low side of estimates all the way and not sweat it too much. If they don't tolerate our withdrawal plan, there's going to be a sense of impending doom over the whole process which will no doubt be self-fulfilling. As for timing and numbers, I don't mind the extra three months, but I think Obama does owe an explanation of how the 5000 or so he campaigned upon became 35,000 or so.

As for Afghanistan/Pakistan, though, the critics are right: we need to see the other side of the buildup curve, and it needs to be a promise to the American people. Maybe the buildup--over 24 months, to 50,000 in both countries (half in active combat roles, half in training roles)--followed by a dotted line of indeterminate width (6-24 months) depending on how long it takes to get OBL&Co. onto the run again, then a promised reduction curve of appropriate steepness (roughly crossing the 2009 starting level at Election Day 2012), with a long, low tail of 5000 or so--not 35,000--and their primary role being to protect an international corps of aid engineers.