The Big Ticket

Much has happened since my last stab at the Democratic nomination forecast. This thing about 20-25 states having a primary the same day, including most of the big ones: I dig it, although I think ideally the date would come a couple of months later. Perhaps once this thing gets established, it'll be able to shift later--it's just the dynamic of not being after everyone else that's making this thing happen, and happen so early in the season.

From a strategy and tactics point of view, it changes things considerably. The first four contests remain as they were, but they gain even more importance. The way the primaries have run (since 1972), there develops an inevitable momentum, and buyer's remorse creeps in. This event could conceivably have a different, completely unintended pattern: a split decision, and a close contest following.

Like a buttery stew, 2008 Candidate soup has clarified and then congealed, except for the continuing suggestions that Gore might enter at some point. The big news has been the announcement and continuous rise of Obama. BHO has captured the best terrain on Iraq--don't blame me, I was right all along--and it looks like he's made a serious down payment on the hearts of the African-American community.

Far from being taken for granted, Before Obama there appeared the prospect of an interesting battle for the black vote between Edwards, who had all the right positions, was a genuine Southerner for the key South Carolina contest, and Clinton, who had justly inherited the strong bond her husband held (no, not marriage). Now, it looks as though at least half of African-Americans will gravitate naturally towards Obama as they become convinced that he is, for all the complexity of his background, one of them. That's about 20% of the national Democratic primary vote for Obama, right there.

He's been winning points from Clinton up to now, but in the next, more difficult phase, he will need to gain at the expense of Edwards and the 15% or so (national Dems) of would-be Gore supporters. I see his support among the other two-thirds of Democratic primary voters, the white and Hispanic Democrats, rising to about 30% in this long buildup phase. That brings him to just under 40%; that's where I expect his poll support to plateau.

That's enough to win, depending on the strength and number of other serious contenders. Right now, I'd say there are two, besides Clinton and Obama: Edwards and Bill Richardson. Richardson could well take a substantial share of Hispanic voters, especially out West, which could put him in an interesting role if things should break fairly evenly on Super Tuesday. Even though he's clearly worked on his policies, paying his dues, and honing his message, Edwards would seem to have a tough time making it all the way to winning the nomination, being boxed in by more moderate candidates who attract women and blacks even more than he. Obama could even win over some of the bar community! Dodd and Biden don't look to me to have much chance.

My assumption is that only these four, then, will make it through the qualifiers, the four points of the geographical diamond the DNC has set up: first, the Iowa and Nevada caucuses and then the New Hampshire and South Carolina primaries. Winning three of these should set up inevitable momentum for the Unofficial National Primary, and for big, neutral-territory California, so a strategic win in the early round--3 or 4 wins out of 4--should allow the nominee to emerge immediately from super Tuesday. A tactical win would be two first-place and two second-place finishes from the first four: the results that should then emerge from Big Ticket Day would bring things near clinching. This assumes that one of the other candidates can break through to a second-place finish in at least one of the first four.

On the contrary, though, I see the story line as follows: narrow wins for Clinton (in the 40% range) in both the Iowa and Nevada caucuses; Obama narrowly second in each, over Richardson in NV and over Edwards in Iowa. Obama wins in New Hampshire, narrowly over Clinton, and then more clearly in South Carolina, over Edwards. Having split all but one of the four first-and-second-places between them, Clinton and Obama are at about 40% each going into super Tuesday, with others taking the remaining 20%. On The Big Day, and afterwards, if necessary, Clinton tends to win the open primaries and caucuses, Obama where only Democrats vote. As I suggested before, California could be decisive in a close two-way race.

My greatest concern is if something happens to Obama during the campaign a la Bobby Kennedy in '68.

I'd rate the odds now as: Clinton 50%, Obama 40%, Others (including the normally long-shot possibility of a convention not yet decided for a nominee) 10%.

And the Mezzanine Ticket

With regard to the Republican race, my October projection in the case of a Democratic Victory in '06 was:
Giuliani/Pataki/Romney 25%; McCain 40%; anti-Bushite Right-winger 35%.

The absence of any dominant force among anti-Bushite Right-wingers thus far has probably eased that group's chances of winning down to about 25%--but it's still real. (As I've said, I see Gingrich as the most likely claimant to the mantle).

McCain came out of the election as the clear favorite, as I had been thinking, but he has been busy looking old and flustered, having his iconoclastic Iraq war policy co-opted unexpectedly by the President, and having his policy successes disintegrate. His chances still remain at least 30-35%, though.

Giuliani's chances I would rate just lower than McCain's, Romney's at no more than 5%, and there's still a 5% someone else (besides Newt) could sweep down and claim this nomination.

At this point, none of the candidates are worthy of consideration in a head-to-head with any of the major Democratic candidates (or even the minor ones). That will be different if Chuck Hagel enters.