Iraq EndGame Theory

The crunch is coming in Iraq, and it will take place with the national referendum on the proposed constitution. After a brief review, we can move to each of the main players' game strategies.

The key facts are pretty simple: the Kurds and the Shiites have pretty much the constitution they wanted, the Sunnis don't. The rules of the game require an overall majority in favor of the proposed draft, but also specify that if 3 provinces defeat the proposal with 2/3 majorities, the whole process starts over (including new elections for the constituent assembly). Nobody knows if it would really re-start, or just totally degrade into civil strife and chaos. So:

Shiites: This should be pretty simple for them. Generate the required majorities. Make deals if necessary to get them--recall that in the U.S. Constitutional ratification process, there was strong resistance in a lot of states. It was necessary to promise that there would be a Bill of Rights immediately following, and even then it was very close in several states. The Shiites need to be prepared to make such a bargain.

I say "should be" simple--of course, there is the Moqtada Al-Sadr factor. I've heard that he is actually rallying Shiites against the constitution. This shows once again that the guy is not reading the same playbook as the other mullahs and ayatollahs. As they say in The Right Stuff, this guy could seriously "screw the pooch". His group will have to be suppressed; the question is who? and how? I think the plan is to find him, bring him onto al-Sistani's carpet, and give him a sound beating.

Kurds:same deal, basically. They got what they wanted. There could be a deal on Kirkuk to try and co-opt some Sunnis' votes there.

Americans who favor the Bushite policy:Scarce as these people are becoming, they have a good opportunity here. They need the vote to come out right, no matter what. After that, they can join the withdrawal bandwagon. I think the whole business of not naming timetables is just a temporary position until they get past this obstacle. The only problem is their limited ability to affect the outcome (short of tricking the election, which I wouldn't rule out, but don't expect). If it looks as though it may turn out badly (like 2/3 badly in 3 provinces), look for the Bushites to put the U.S. military in the streets "to maintain order" and intimidate opposition voters.

Americans who oppose the Bushite policy: I hate to say it, but they have the same interests. Protest as they will, they can't change who holds the reins of power. If they want the US out, they should want the constitution to pass so it can happen.

Radical Sunnis:Their objective is clear: do not permit the Constitution to pass. Perversely, though, this means that they have to accept the legitimacy of the vote enough to let Sunni opposition voters go to the polls in the Sunni-dominated provinces. Advocating a boycott of the referendum would be disastrous: if the constitution passes, they truly will be the "dead-enders". If it fails in three provinces, they can prolong their insurgency and wreak more havoc. To improve their odds, they want to intimidate the Shiites who live in those provinces.

US military: The strategy should therefore be to protect the Shiite enclaves in the central provinces and ensure that people there feel they can get to the polls safely. That would be a limited role, subject to the political assessment of whether that will be sufficient to ensure the constitution gets 1/3 vote or better in at least a couple of the Sunni-dominated provinces. Regardless of that political assessment, that is what they will need to say they are doing.

Sunnis who are not active resistance fighters:This is the most tricky group to game. They have taken the right initial position, which is opposition to the draft constitution: if there were no threat of the referendum's failure, there would be no leverage for them.

This does not mean necessarily that they should follow that policy through to the bitter end. If they hold that position and the constitution passes anyway, they will lose their leverage and end up with a constitution that is disadvantageous. If they hold that position and the constitution fails, they will have delivered the country over to the resistance's objectives, essentially: more chaos, probably worse, prolonged US occupation, and still, in the end, no likelihood they will emerge on top. I'm pretty sure most of them don't want that.

So, they have to ensure some political discipline among their supporters, as they will want to drive a hard bargain with the Sunnis and Kurds, then shift sufficient support to deliver the constitution's victory. It could be a split, with only certain subgroups (tribes? urban coalition groups?) making a deal.

Bottom line: if everyone follows their best strategy, the outcomes will be: a late deal between the Sunnis on the one hand, and the Shiites and Kurds on the other--probably involving specific concessions to the Sunnis for the local governments of Baghdad and Kirkuk. The constitution will pass in those two provinces (or rather, not fail with 2/3 against), be soundly defeated in one or two others, but pass overall. The US announces a beginning of withdrawals in 2006, starting in the southern provinces.