Israel's boarding of a flotilla of boats bearing humanitarian aid to blockaded Gaza ended with tragedy. The Israeli Navy forces boarded with ladders from helicopters and were not expecting hostilities. When people on one of the ships, mostly Turks, started attacking the boarders with metal rods and clubs, the Israelis opened fire, and some 10 people were killed.
What was this--miscommunication, an act of piracy, a legitimate act of self-defense, civil disobedience, or a "massacre" (as some of the Palestinian press have dubbed it)? I would say, none of the above. While Israel has a legitimate right to self-defense, which would justify it examining anything crossing its borders into Gaza for weapons which might be used against it, this attack took place in international waters, against ships bearing a white flag of peace. Israel warned the flotilla against the direct route to the Gaza coast that it was taking--most likely, the boats could have accepted being re-directed to the Israeli port and the goods would have been delivered (more or less what is happening, after last night's unpleasantries, and after the deportation of those Israel doesn't want around).
I would call it a criminally stupid overreaction to a deliberate provocation. The Israelis were not expecting arms (and none were found) in the fleet of boats--if they were, they would've planned an armed attack. The flotilla wasn't practicing satyagraha, they (some of them, anyway) wanted to fight to defend their right to make an unauthorized landing. There was a principle at stake, for both sides--the Israelis claim to have control over anything coming into Gaza, while their opponents deny that claim. That was what the fight was about.
The Israelis' claim is not backed by international law--they have no legitimate authority over Gaza. They have a treaty with Egypt to control anything coming in from that direction, and there are no other land routes into the "world's largest open-air prison" that do not go through Israel. The US tolerates the Israelis' unilateral declaration of blockade as a practical necessity, but it is not formally recognized, certainly not by the United Nations. The purpose of the blockade is to undermine Gaza's legitimately elected government (which is Hamas), and the Israelis claim it is working. So, they intentionally starve Gaza of all but the minimum required for bare survival. This is not a humane policy, and it will not stand up to the scrutiny of the world, which Israel has invited through an unwise, aggressive action.
Monday, May 31, 2010
Sunday, May 30, 2010
Fixing A Hole
A "Top Kill" We Can Believe In
Here's a joke I made up myself:
OK, not so funny maybe--I never said I was a pro jokewriter--but it is a colorful and strangely appealing image.
Let's just say I am more than a little tired of listening to all these people criticizing the President because he can't get the hole plugged, or pointing out the series of flawed plans and decisions that led to the initiation of the disaster.
The rule is: Unless you consistently opposed all forms of offshore drilling, or are up there solely to admit your errors, just shut up. That especially goes for all those Drill, Baby, Drillers, and even so-smart-so-committed-with-his-shirtsleeves-all-rolled-up, Governor Bobby Jindal. Unless you are ready to say, "I was wrong, and there will be no more drilling off the shore of Louisiana", Bobby, you've got nothing I want to hear, either.
That goes for me, too. While I was not a big proponent of offshore drilling, I had accepted it as a transitional strategy which could reduce our dependence on imports. In particular, I believed far too much that the technology was proven and understood. I was wrong.
Further, I had bought into BP's line of BS. I believed that they were thinking "beyond petroleum" as their ads used to say (they'd better not be showing them, these days), and I thought that was a good long-term business strategy. So, I'd bought some shares. Now, if they could just get out from under this immense PR drag on their stock price, their obscene profits would give it some buoyancy--mostly, shareholders don't care about any of that--and I could get out of it. And I won't be back.
The challenges of pressures at 5,000 feet underwater seem to have been severely underestimated and the risks minimized far too much. Our regulators were in the pocket of industry--not too surprising, because encouraging the drilling was part of the policy of both the current and previous administrations.
All existing deepwater drilling operations should be stopped, and no new permits granted, until we get our hands around the technology required to manage the risks and to shut off this spill. Near offshore drilling should be suspended, with each state having a chance to think twice about whether they really want it, and certain environmentally precarious areas should be permanently protected by legislation. Someday, it may be possible, safe, and still necessary (as in, we still haven't weaned ourselves off the oil), and we could allow the drilling's resumption. Until then, the best place for the oil is for it to stay in the ground, under the sea--except for those gallons we can't prevent from leaking out.
Here's a joke I made up myself:
Q. How many BP executives, smart-ass politicians, and talking head pundits does it take to contain the oil spill in the Gulf?
A. Not so many, really--all roped together, and stuffed face down at the wellhead--because their mouths are so big.
OK, not so funny maybe--I never said I was a pro jokewriter--but it is a colorful and strangely appealing image.
Let's just say I am more than a little tired of listening to all these people criticizing the President because he can't get the hole plugged, or pointing out the series of flawed plans and decisions that led to the initiation of the disaster.
The rule is: Unless you consistently opposed all forms of offshore drilling, or are up there solely to admit your errors, just shut up. That especially goes for all those Drill, Baby, Drillers, and even so-smart-so-committed-with-his-shirtsleeves-all-rolled-up, Governor Bobby Jindal. Unless you are ready to say, "I was wrong, and there will be no more drilling off the shore of Louisiana", Bobby, you've got nothing I want to hear, either.
That goes for me, too. While I was not a big proponent of offshore drilling, I had accepted it as a transitional strategy which could reduce our dependence on imports. In particular, I believed far too much that the technology was proven and understood. I was wrong.
Further, I had bought into BP's line of BS. I believed that they were thinking "beyond petroleum" as their ads used to say (they'd better not be showing them, these days), and I thought that was a good long-term business strategy. So, I'd bought some shares. Now, if they could just get out from under this immense PR drag on their stock price, their obscene profits would give it some buoyancy--mostly, shareholders don't care about any of that--and I could get out of it. And I won't be back.
The challenges of pressures at 5,000 feet underwater seem to have been severely underestimated and the risks minimized far too much. Our regulators were in the pocket of industry--not too surprising, because encouraging the drilling was part of the policy of both the current and previous administrations.
All existing deepwater drilling operations should be stopped, and no new permits granted, until we get our hands around the technology required to manage the risks and to shut off this spill. Near offshore drilling should be suspended, with each state having a chance to think twice about whether they really want it, and certain environmentally precarious areas should be permanently protected by legislation. Someday, it may be possible, safe, and still necessary (as in, we still haven't weaned ourselves off the oil), and we could allow the drilling's resumption. Until then, the best place for the oil is for it to stay in the ground, under the sea--except for those gallons we can't prevent from leaking out.
Thursday, May 27, 2010
World Cup Preview I: The Big Picture
For a month--from June 11 to July 11--most of the world will focus on South Africa for the World Cup of football (soccer).
Thirty-two teams will vie for this supreme sporting honor; only one will win. Which will it be?
Well, there is a clear view based on the history of the event, which has been held 18 times previously (every four years since 1930, except for 1942 and 1946). The Rule--of who wins the Cup--has two forms:
1) The International Version: If the World Cup is in Europe, a European team wins; if it is not, a South American team wins.
2) The Brazilian Version: Brazil is the only team that has won the World Cup outside its own continent.
Version 2) is a little less specific, but it has no exceptions. Version 1) failed to hold true only once, in 1958, when Brazil won in Sweden. Either version would lead to the conclusion that a European team will not win this year's event, but then there has never been a World Cup in Africa before. So, will The Rule hold? The betting would be on "Yes", but a bit more solidly on Version 1).
The reason for the preference for that version is Argentina. In spite of a less-than-stellar performance by Argentina in the South American qualifications (the team finished fourth and did not clinch its spot until the final day of the round-robin), I would say without doubt that Argentina has the greatest collection of talent of any squad, led by the world's top player, Leonel Messi (who normally plays for Barcelona), and the hero of the recently-concluded European Champions League, Diego Millito (of Inter Milano). The team also has plenty of talent in midfield and a couple of tough cookies in defense; the only question mark about the squad is at goalie, where a young talent--23-year-old Sergio Romero of Dutch squad Alkmaar--is the leading candidate.
The real reason for doubting Argentina's team is their head coach, Diego Maradona. One of the top five talents of all time in the sport as a player, he has not impressed with his strategy, handling of players, or sideline poise.
Their highly likely finals opponent, Brazil, looks to have a solid, unspectacular team--not so much the beautiful game this year as a real tough opponent, one any other team would look to avoid. Brazil's coach Dunga was a long-time anchor of the national team, and the team seems to have been built from his stolid mold: a top goalie, a couple premier defenders (who can move skillfully to the attack), a couple well-known stars in midfield, and not much up front.
These two nations will expect nothing less than victory. I would say there are two more that have similar--if not fully justified--expectations: at least the semifinals, say. Those would be Spain--who broke a long history of underperformance with a brilliant win in the European championships two years ago--and the defending champions, Italy. Spain's level of talent is comparable to Argentina's, but their loss to the United States (!) in the Confederations Cup last year (one team representing each region) suggests the team is capable of excellence but may be unreliable--and since a string of four straight wins in elimination games against proven opponents is required, one would guess that's not quite enough. Italy's team will look pretty familiar to those who watched the World Cup four years ago in Germany, but they have mostly stood pat with their aging playmakers and key defenders since then, not showcasing and tempering new talent, something one would expect from a team trying to maintain dominance over time.
There's also one other problem for Italy and Spain, which leads to a discussion of the World Cup draw. There are eight groups of four teams each; two teams go forward from each group, then the rounds of 16, 8, 4, and 2 are all single-game eliminations. Each of the eight groups has a clear favorite. If Italy and Spain each win their groups, then their respective games in the round of 16, they would face each other in the quarterfinals. If one doesn't win its group, it's bound for the portion of the bracket where Brazil is expected to rule. So, it is absolutely certain that one--at least--of those four teams will not make the semifinals.
Fortunates, Unfortunates, Long-shots, and Also-Rans
One semifinal team--at least--must be from outside those four favorites. Three teams are group favorites in the top half of the draw--along with Argentina--and one of those is likely to make the semifinal (where it would be expected to meet up against Brazil). Those three teams--each of which, I would say, should normally be expected to consider making the quarterfinals a successful campaign--are England, France, and Germany. They are "the fortunates". England and France would remain in that quarter of the draw if they win their groups, Germany if it finishes second.
England's team has plenty of talent, headed by Manchester United's Rooney and Liverpool's Gerrard, and played well for coach Fabio Capello in the qualifications, but it has a bit of an on-field leadership issue: veteran David Beckham is out with an injury, and Chelsea's John Terry was ousted ("outed"?) as captain due to an extramarital affair he had with the ex-girlfriend of one of his teammates, Wayne Bridge. I would expect Rio Ferdinand to be the captain, but leadership could remain an issue.
France was runner-up four years ago, but its leader Zidane is long gone, and the team also looks to be suffering from a stand-pat approach. I like their midfielders Riberry and Malouda, more than their aging strikers Anelka and Henry. Their competition in the group stage is Mexico, Uruguay, and host South Africa; they may have just enough to handle those teams, but I don't expect much more.
Germany has been reliable over the years, especially since unification, as a team that can make the quarters and possibly more. That being said, I don't like the look of this outfit much: their captain, Chelsea's Ballack, is out with an injury, and their key striker Klose hasn't been close to his best this year (sorry). Of the eight group favorites, I'd say their chances are the weakest (though I'd still expect them to get through).
Two teams that had unfortunate draws are Netherlands and Portugal. The Dutch have been extremely strong in qualification and are loaded with talent, but their perennial nemesis in the World Cup is Brazil, and they are destined to meet in the quarterfinals unless there is some surprise. Portugal, starring Cristiano Ronaldo but with plenty of supporting talent, has it even worse: Brazil is in their group. If they survive that and finish second (not a sure thing--see below), they would end up in the quarter of the bracket with Italy and Spain, but if they are playing well they could conceivably survive that and make it through to a semifinal against Argentina. The Lusitanians' recent performances suggest none of that will happen.
Leading the list of longshots are the leaders from the North America/Caribbean region, the US and Mexico. The estadunidenses have a marquee first match with England, but the key game for the US is probably the one with Slovenia, a typical, dangerous mid-level European team with no stars but good team chemistry. I would expect US to finish second in their group, putting them in a round of 16 match with Germany. Or, maybe not: there seems always to be one national team from the Balkans that overperforms, and this year's choice looks to me to be Serbia, who I would pick to finish first in Germany's group, and maybe to make the quarterfinals. Like the US, Mexico should finish second and end up in a bracket location near US, probably doomed to a matchup against Argentina.
Next to mention are Chile and Paraguay, both of which finished ahead of Argentina in the South American qualifications (!), but which seem fated to face Brazil and Netherlands in the round of 16, unless they can pull off an upset in their first-round matches against, respectively, Spain and Italy.
One of the key story lines will be the fates of the six African teams, playing for the first time ever in their home continent, feeling both more pride and more pressure than ever before. Ghana has been strong in regional competition but will be missing their top player, Chelsea's Michael Essien. The Ivory Coast will be potent with Chelsea's striker tandem of Salomon Kalou and Didier Drogba, but they are a bit unfortunate to be in the group with both Brazil and Portugal. The African teams whose chances to advance seem best are Nigeria, in Argentina's group, and Cameroon, in Netherlands' one. Algeria could surprise in one or more of its games with England, the US, and Slovenia, but I don't expect them to advance. South Africa has a couple good players but wouldn't be in the competition were it not the host.
The Asian teams performed great when the World Cup was in South Korea and Japan eight years ago and didn't show for the one in Germany--expect the same kind of disappointment. Australia has an outside chance to advance, in a fairly even group with Ghana, Serbia, and Germany. New Zealand, not so much. Other European teams with decent chances to advance are Denmark and Greece, but I like their group competitors Cameroon and Nigeria better under the circumstances. All nations should be respected for making it to the tournament, even North Korea, probably doomed to three one-sided losses and no future return visits to the Cup.
Although the expected outlines of the tournament may seem apparent, a single first-round surprise could change things dramatically. I will pick up the preview after the first-round games, when the shape of the remaining matchups will be determined.
Five Key First-Round Matches
(Date of game, and start time in US Eastern time zone. We're not counting England-US--6/12, at 2:30 p.m.--which should be entertaining but not too consequential: Either should be able to survive a loss.)
Chile vs. Spain(6/25, 2:30 p.m.) Chile should not be discounted. This is one of the games from the third and final set of the first round, so its significance will depend partly on both teams' winning their first two. If so, it will be a serious test for Spain, and the loser would likely face Brazil in the next round, so there will be plenty of incentive.
US vs. Slovenia(6/18, 10 a.m.) Not of cosmic significance, but it will be crucial if the US loses to England. If by some chance we beat the Southeastern Brits, substitute the Slovenia-England match (6/23, 10 a.m.) for this one as being especially significant.
Greece vs. Nigeria(6/17, 10 a.m.) This should determine second place in Argentina's group; the winner might have a real shot in the round of 16, probably against France.
Portugal vs. Ivory Coast(6/15, 10 a.m.) An early game which will show us the quality of both teams. If Portugal wins this one, the match with Brazil (6/25, 10 a.m.) could become crucial: if Portugal were to win its group, Italy and Spain could suddenly see the Brazilians coming over to mess with "their" quarter of the bracket. If this one goes to Cote d'Ivoire, though, the Portuguese could be headed for yet another embarrassing first-round elimination.
Germany vs. Serbia(6/18, 7:30 a.m.)Australia and Ghana could also affect the group's outcome, but this game will likely determine who will face England and the US in the round of 16.
Thirty-two teams will vie for this supreme sporting honor; only one will win. Which will it be?
Well, there is a clear view based on the history of the event, which has been held 18 times previously (every four years since 1930, except for 1942 and 1946). The Rule--of who wins the Cup--has two forms:
1) The International Version: If the World Cup is in Europe, a European team wins; if it is not, a South American team wins.
2) The Brazilian Version: Brazil is the only team that has won the World Cup outside its own continent.
Version 2) is a little less specific, but it has no exceptions. Version 1) failed to hold true only once, in 1958, when Brazil won in Sweden. Either version would lead to the conclusion that a European team will not win this year's event, but then there has never been a World Cup in Africa before. So, will The Rule hold? The betting would be on "Yes", but a bit more solidly on Version 1).
The reason for the preference for that version is Argentina. In spite of a less-than-stellar performance by Argentina in the South American qualifications (the team finished fourth and did not clinch its spot until the final day of the round-robin), I would say without doubt that Argentina has the greatest collection of talent of any squad, led by the world's top player, Leonel Messi (who normally plays for Barcelona), and the hero of the recently-concluded European Champions League, Diego Millito (of Inter Milano). The team also has plenty of talent in midfield and a couple of tough cookies in defense; the only question mark about the squad is at goalie, where a young talent--23-year-old Sergio Romero of Dutch squad Alkmaar--is the leading candidate.
The real reason for doubting Argentina's team is their head coach, Diego Maradona. One of the top five talents of all time in the sport as a player, he has not impressed with his strategy, handling of players, or sideline poise.
Their highly likely finals opponent, Brazil, looks to have a solid, unspectacular team--not so much the beautiful game this year as a real tough opponent, one any other team would look to avoid. Brazil's coach Dunga was a long-time anchor of the national team, and the team seems to have been built from his stolid mold: a top goalie, a couple premier defenders (who can move skillfully to the attack), a couple well-known stars in midfield, and not much up front.
These two nations will expect nothing less than victory. I would say there are two more that have similar--if not fully justified--expectations: at least the semifinals, say. Those would be Spain--who broke a long history of underperformance with a brilliant win in the European championships two years ago--and the defending champions, Italy. Spain's level of talent is comparable to Argentina's, but their loss to the United States (!) in the Confederations Cup last year (one team representing each region) suggests the team is capable of excellence but may be unreliable--and since a string of four straight wins in elimination games against proven opponents is required, one would guess that's not quite enough. Italy's team will look pretty familiar to those who watched the World Cup four years ago in Germany, but they have mostly stood pat with their aging playmakers and key defenders since then, not showcasing and tempering new talent, something one would expect from a team trying to maintain dominance over time.
There's also one other problem for Italy and Spain, which leads to a discussion of the World Cup draw. There are eight groups of four teams each; two teams go forward from each group, then the rounds of 16, 8, 4, and 2 are all single-game eliminations. Each of the eight groups has a clear favorite. If Italy and Spain each win their groups, then their respective games in the round of 16, they would face each other in the quarterfinals. If one doesn't win its group, it's bound for the portion of the bracket where Brazil is expected to rule. So, it is absolutely certain that one--at least--of those four teams will not make the semifinals.
Fortunates, Unfortunates, Long-shots, and Also-Rans
One semifinal team--at least--must be from outside those four favorites. Three teams are group favorites in the top half of the draw--along with Argentina--and one of those is likely to make the semifinal (where it would be expected to meet up against Brazil). Those three teams--each of which, I would say, should normally be expected to consider making the quarterfinals a successful campaign--are England, France, and Germany. They are "the fortunates". England and France would remain in that quarter of the draw if they win their groups, Germany if it finishes second.
England's team has plenty of talent, headed by Manchester United's Rooney and Liverpool's Gerrard, and played well for coach Fabio Capello in the qualifications, but it has a bit of an on-field leadership issue: veteran David Beckham is out with an injury, and Chelsea's John Terry was ousted ("outed"?) as captain due to an extramarital affair he had with the ex-girlfriend of one of his teammates, Wayne Bridge. I would expect Rio Ferdinand to be the captain, but leadership could remain an issue.
France was runner-up four years ago, but its leader Zidane is long gone, and the team also looks to be suffering from a stand-pat approach. I like their midfielders Riberry and Malouda, more than their aging strikers Anelka and Henry. Their competition in the group stage is Mexico, Uruguay, and host South Africa; they may have just enough to handle those teams, but I don't expect much more.
Germany has been reliable over the years, especially since unification, as a team that can make the quarters and possibly more. That being said, I don't like the look of this outfit much: their captain, Chelsea's Ballack, is out with an injury, and their key striker Klose hasn't been close to his best this year (sorry). Of the eight group favorites, I'd say their chances are the weakest (though I'd still expect them to get through).
Two teams that had unfortunate draws are Netherlands and Portugal. The Dutch have been extremely strong in qualification and are loaded with talent, but their perennial nemesis in the World Cup is Brazil, and they are destined to meet in the quarterfinals unless there is some surprise. Portugal, starring Cristiano Ronaldo but with plenty of supporting talent, has it even worse: Brazil is in their group. If they survive that and finish second (not a sure thing--see below), they would end up in the quarter of the bracket with Italy and Spain, but if they are playing well they could conceivably survive that and make it through to a semifinal against Argentina. The Lusitanians' recent performances suggest none of that will happen.
Leading the list of longshots are the leaders from the North America/Caribbean region, the US and Mexico. The estadunidenses have a marquee first match with England, but the key game for the US is probably the one with Slovenia, a typical, dangerous mid-level European team with no stars but good team chemistry. I would expect US to finish second in their group, putting them in a round of 16 match with Germany. Or, maybe not: there seems always to be one national team from the Balkans that overperforms, and this year's choice looks to me to be Serbia, who I would pick to finish first in Germany's group, and maybe to make the quarterfinals. Like the US, Mexico should finish second and end up in a bracket location near US, probably doomed to a matchup against Argentina.
Next to mention are Chile and Paraguay, both of which finished ahead of Argentina in the South American qualifications (!), but which seem fated to face Brazil and Netherlands in the round of 16, unless they can pull off an upset in their first-round matches against, respectively, Spain and Italy.
One of the key story lines will be the fates of the six African teams, playing for the first time ever in their home continent, feeling both more pride and more pressure than ever before. Ghana has been strong in regional competition but will be missing their top player, Chelsea's Michael Essien. The Ivory Coast will be potent with Chelsea's striker tandem of Salomon Kalou and Didier Drogba, but they are a bit unfortunate to be in the group with both Brazil and Portugal. The African teams whose chances to advance seem best are Nigeria, in Argentina's group, and Cameroon, in Netherlands' one. Algeria could surprise in one or more of its games with England, the US, and Slovenia, but I don't expect them to advance. South Africa has a couple good players but wouldn't be in the competition were it not the host.
The Asian teams performed great when the World Cup was in South Korea and Japan eight years ago and didn't show for the one in Germany--expect the same kind of disappointment. Australia has an outside chance to advance, in a fairly even group with Ghana, Serbia, and Germany. New Zealand, not so much. Other European teams with decent chances to advance are Denmark and Greece, but I like their group competitors Cameroon and Nigeria better under the circumstances. All nations should be respected for making it to the tournament, even North Korea, probably doomed to three one-sided losses and no future return visits to the Cup.
Although the expected outlines of the tournament may seem apparent, a single first-round surprise could change things dramatically. I will pick up the preview after the first-round games, when the shape of the remaining matchups will be determined.
Five Key First-Round Matches
(Date of game, and start time in US Eastern time zone. We're not counting England-US--6/12, at 2:30 p.m.--which should be entertaining but not too consequential: Either should be able to survive a loss.)
Chile vs. Spain(6/25, 2:30 p.m.) Chile should not be discounted. This is one of the games from the third and final set of the first round, so its significance will depend partly on both teams' winning their first two. If so, it will be a serious test for Spain, and the loser would likely face Brazil in the next round, so there will be plenty of incentive.
US vs. Slovenia(6/18, 10 a.m.) Not of cosmic significance, but it will be crucial if the US loses to England. If by some chance we beat the Southeastern Brits, substitute the Slovenia-England match (6/23, 10 a.m.) for this one as being especially significant.
Greece vs. Nigeria(6/17, 10 a.m.) This should determine second place in Argentina's group; the winner might have a real shot in the round of 16, probably against France.
Portugal vs. Ivory Coast(6/15, 10 a.m.) An early game which will show us the quality of both teams. If Portugal wins this one, the match with Brazil (6/25, 10 a.m.) could become crucial: if Portugal were to win its group, Italy and Spain could suddenly see the Brazilians coming over to mess with "their" quarter of the bracket. If this one goes to Cote d'Ivoire, though, the Portuguese could be headed for yet another embarrassing first-round elimination.
Germany vs. Serbia(6/18, 7:30 a.m.)Australia and Ghana could also affect the group's outcome, but this game will likely determine who will face England and the US in the round of 16.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
Tribute: "Tommy", Townshend
The other day (Wednesday) was Pete Townshend's 65th birthday. Yesterday was a special 35th-anniversary screening of Ken Russell's movie, "Tommy", featuring The Who's rock opera and a great cast (Roger Daltrey as the lead, Oliver Reed, Ann-Margret, the other Who members, Eric Clapton, Elton John, Tina Turner....)
I will never forget (or discuss publicly) my experience watching the movie in 1975, but it was both a lot of fun (ever seen the part where Ann-Margret is covered with gooey mud? Or is it baked beans?) and a bit of a revelation. I had always loved the music to "Tommy", but I hadn't really gotten the point too much. In a very recent interview, Townshend discusses the inspiration for "Tommy" (the teachings of Sufi master Meher Baba were very much behind it, with the deaf-dumb-and-blind Tommy--before the cure--being us unenlightened folk) and praises the movie for bringing out the images more than their recordings or even their performances.
As for Mr. Townshend, he would get my nomination for the Best Live Rock Performer--ever. At least, the best I've ever seen. I love his songwriting (check out "Scoop" sometime), his musicianship, and I appreciate (but don't necessarily get) his efforts to raise up our consciousness. He is much more than the guy who blasted feedback and smashed his guitars. He has written anthems that will (or should, at least) resound forever with young adults. He has given us so much, and I feel he is more unappreciated than ever. Happy Belated Birthday!
I will never forget (or discuss publicly) my experience watching the movie in 1975, but it was both a lot of fun (ever seen the part where Ann-Margret is covered with gooey mud? Or is it baked beans?) and a bit of a revelation. I had always loved the music to "Tommy", but I hadn't really gotten the point too much. In a very recent interview, Townshend discusses the inspiration for "Tommy" (the teachings of Sufi master Meher Baba were very much behind it, with the deaf-dumb-and-blind Tommy--before the cure--being us unenlightened folk) and praises the movie for bringing out the images more than their recordings or even their performances.
As for Mr. Townshend, he would get my nomination for the Best Live Rock Performer--ever. At least, the best I've ever seen. I love his songwriting (check out "Scoop" sometime), his musicianship, and I appreciate (but don't necessarily get) his efforts to raise up our consciousness. He is much more than the guy who blasted feedback and smashed his guitars. He has written anthems that will (or should, at least) resound forever with young adults. He has given us so much, and I feel he is more unappreciated than ever. Happy Belated Birthday!
Friday, May 21, 2010
Recycle Uranium, Not Iranians
There was an interesting sequence of developments in the recurring soap opera of Iranian enriched uranium. First, American diplomats reported progress in getting the Russians and Chinese to buy into new sanctions against Iran, targeted at Iran's trade in components in nuclear energy, and more specifically at Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements who are believed to control the nuclear program.
Next, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, who is angling for an enhanced international role for his country and has opposed new sanctions, visits Iran. Within days, he announces that Iran agreed to a swap of enriched uranium for even more-highly enriched (but not suited for weapons), with Turkey the facilitator. The deal is similar, but not exactly the same, as one that had been worked out under pressure from the US last year. Iranian President Ahmadinejad said yes at the time, but then was apparently overruled by hardliner domestic elements.
The reactions to Lula's gambit were interesting. China and France both responded positively to the agreement, if cautiously. The US, though praising Brasilia and Ankara's sincere efforts, discounted the clear intention of the agreement--to head off the sanctions--and said it would press forward.
One can understand why we might dis, up to a point. First, Iran would have to follow through with official government approval to make the agreement real; second, there would need to be rigorous monitoring of the process at all stages (by the IAEA), because we should all suspect some kind of Iranian trick (like the hidden nuclear processing facility that was uncovered last year). Third, the agreement for sanctions has been hard-won, and it should not be given up on a flimsy Iranian promise.
That does not mean that our reaction was the best one, though--I like the cautiously positive response better. I'm all for punitive sanctions, but we can't punish Iran for doing things they are allowed by treaty to do, or for not choosing to defuse their nuclear program in an agreement with the right counterpart. First, we should note publicly and often how just the threat of sanctions moved the Iranians to make concessions. Second, if the exact details of the swap were not adequate, the terms should be improved. Third, it's good if countries like Brazil and Turkey can get behind the Wizard of Oz-type smokescreens Iran sends out and find the ones who are pulling the knobs and levels, if indeed they have done that (to us, the screens are pretty impenetrable).
The solution would seem to be simple: go ahead and get the approval for the sanctions--if it's still there--but include in them an incentive to make progress: specify the terms required for a swap that would allow Iran's nuclear energy program to go forward but not its nuclear weapon program (and, please, don't prohibit activities Iran is clearly allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty). If Iran has negotiated in good faith, they can follow through and cause an end to the sanctions. If their agreement was bogus, that will be revealed in time, and the sanctions will be fully justified.
My gut reactions to the news sequence are above, but I have to give credit to "The Globalist", Roger Cohen of The New York Times for his editorial which encouraged me to post them.
Next, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, who is angling for an enhanced international role for his country and has opposed new sanctions, visits Iran. Within days, he announces that Iran agreed to a swap of enriched uranium for even more-highly enriched (but not suited for weapons), with Turkey the facilitator. The deal is similar, but not exactly the same, as one that had been worked out under pressure from the US last year. Iranian President Ahmadinejad said yes at the time, but then was apparently overruled by hardliner domestic elements.
The reactions to Lula's gambit were interesting. China and France both responded positively to the agreement, if cautiously. The US, though praising Brasilia and Ankara's sincere efforts, discounted the clear intention of the agreement--to head off the sanctions--and said it would press forward.
One can understand why we might dis, up to a point. First, Iran would have to follow through with official government approval to make the agreement real; second, there would need to be rigorous monitoring of the process at all stages (by the IAEA), because we should all suspect some kind of Iranian trick (like the hidden nuclear processing facility that was uncovered last year). Third, the agreement for sanctions has been hard-won, and it should not be given up on a flimsy Iranian promise.
That does not mean that our reaction was the best one, though--I like the cautiously positive response better. I'm all for punitive sanctions, but we can't punish Iran for doing things they are allowed by treaty to do, or for not choosing to defuse their nuclear program in an agreement with the right counterpart. First, we should note publicly and often how just the threat of sanctions moved the Iranians to make concessions. Second, if the exact details of the swap were not adequate, the terms should be improved. Third, it's good if countries like Brazil and Turkey can get behind the Wizard of Oz-type smokescreens Iran sends out and find the ones who are pulling the knobs and levels, if indeed they have done that (to us, the screens are pretty impenetrable).
The solution would seem to be simple: go ahead and get the approval for the sanctions--if it's still there--but include in them an incentive to make progress: specify the terms required for a swap that would allow Iran's nuclear energy program to go forward but not its nuclear weapon program (and, please, don't prohibit activities Iran is clearly allowed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty). If Iran has negotiated in good faith, they can follow through and cause an end to the sanctions. If their agreement was bogus, that will be revealed in time, and the sanctions will be fully justified.
My gut reactions to the news sequence are above, but I have to give credit to "The Globalist", Roger Cohen of The New York Times for his editorial which encouraged me to post them.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
News of the Week
Primary Season
Some very dramatic results tonight in state primaries for three Senate races, but I would maintain that they don't change a thing.
First, in Pennsylvania, Congressman (and former Admiral) Joe Sestak took out long-time incumbent Senator Arlen Specter.
Second, in Kentucky, the battle for an open Senate seat took place as Rand Paul (son of Ron Paul) won the Republican nomination and Attorney General Jack Conway defeated Lt. Governor Daniel Mongiardo for the Democratic nomination.
Third, in Arkansas, challenger Bill Halter forced Democratic incumbent Blanche Lincoln into a runoff (technically, one could argue that it was the third-place candidate, D.C. Morrison who created the need for the runoff).
One could say that these were surprising results, in the sense that incumbents and establishment Republicans suffered setbacks, but none of these individual cases were completely unanticipated. Maybe the most surprising of these results for me was the defeat of Mongiardo, who has proven some strength for the Democrats in statewide races in Kentucky, a tough row to hoe for Dem.
Pennsylvania is still a tossup (though I am much more likely to take an active role supporting the Democratic candidate with Sestak's win), Kentucky is still a likely Republican hold (though I am excited at the prospect of a Republican Senator in Mitch McConnell's own state he can't successfully control), and Arkansas is still an extremely unlikely Democratic hold, no matter whether Lincoln or Halter wins the runoff.
Wizard Wall
The NBA's lottery, on the other hand, once again produced a surprise. There is a great history of this probabilistic endeavor producing improbable results, and tonight was no different, as the 6th and 7th most-likely teams (as I recall), the Washington Wizards and Philadelphia 76ers, got the first and second draft spots.
I am happy that the Wizards got the first pick, which one would have to expect will be used for brilliant Kentucky freshman point guard John Wall. That pick might seem to dispossess the Wizards' incumbent--bad day for incumbents is the unifying message?--but Gilberto Arenas was already on the way out, one way or the other, after his conviction on a gun violation occurring in the Wizards' locker room. It's much better for the Wizards to get Wall than the two other "finalists" of the final three teams, which each have good, young point guards (Jrue Holliday on the 76ers and Devon Harris on the last-place New Jersey Nets).
Don't Drill Me, Bro!
I haven't commented on the Deepwater Horizon debacle in the Gulf of Mexico yet; I think I was hoping for some good news on efforts to contain it, news that just doesn't seem to be forthcoming.
I have to admit that I was much too lax about offshore drilling and open to the idea that the technical advances had made it safe, at least in areas like the Gulf of Mexico that I would consider a little less than pristine and environmentally sensitive. The scale of this disaster, and its colossally bad management dimensions (by private industry and the government agencies supposed to be regulating the activity) have totally undermined my belief in this source of energy production.
At this point I would have to oppose any offshore drilling of any kind and support the strongest possible regulation of all existing drilling. I also support a substantial tax on imported oil in all forms.
Some very dramatic results tonight in state primaries for three Senate races, but I would maintain that they don't change a thing.
First, in Pennsylvania, Congressman (and former Admiral) Joe Sestak took out long-time incumbent Senator Arlen Specter.
Second, in Kentucky, the battle for an open Senate seat took place as Rand Paul (son of Ron Paul) won the Republican nomination and Attorney General Jack Conway defeated Lt. Governor Daniel Mongiardo for the Democratic nomination.
Third, in Arkansas, challenger Bill Halter forced Democratic incumbent Blanche Lincoln into a runoff (technically, one could argue that it was the third-place candidate, D.C. Morrison who created the need for the runoff).
One could say that these were surprising results, in the sense that incumbents and establishment Republicans suffered setbacks, but none of these individual cases were completely unanticipated. Maybe the most surprising of these results for me was the defeat of Mongiardo, who has proven some strength for the Democrats in statewide races in Kentucky, a tough row to hoe for Dem.
Pennsylvania is still a tossup (though I am much more likely to take an active role supporting the Democratic candidate with Sestak's win), Kentucky is still a likely Republican hold (though I am excited at the prospect of a Republican Senator in Mitch McConnell's own state he can't successfully control), and Arkansas is still an extremely unlikely Democratic hold, no matter whether Lincoln or Halter wins the runoff.
Wizard Wall
The NBA's lottery, on the other hand, once again produced a surprise. There is a great history of this probabilistic endeavor producing improbable results, and tonight was no different, as the 6th and 7th most-likely teams (as I recall), the Washington Wizards and Philadelphia 76ers, got the first and second draft spots.
I am happy that the Wizards got the first pick, which one would have to expect will be used for brilliant Kentucky freshman point guard John Wall. That pick might seem to dispossess the Wizards' incumbent--bad day for incumbents is the unifying message?--but Gilberto Arenas was already on the way out, one way or the other, after his conviction on a gun violation occurring in the Wizards' locker room. It's much better for the Wizards to get Wall than the two other "finalists" of the final three teams, which each have good, young point guards (Jrue Holliday on the 76ers and Devon Harris on the last-place New Jersey Nets).
Don't Drill Me, Bro!
I haven't commented on the Deepwater Horizon debacle in the Gulf of Mexico yet; I think I was hoping for some good news on efforts to contain it, news that just doesn't seem to be forthcoming.
I have to admit that I was much too lax about offshore drilling and open to the idea that the technical advances had made it safe, at least in areas like the Gulf of Mexico that I would consider a little less than pristine and environmentally sensitive. The scale of this disaster, and its colossally bad management dimensions (by private industry and the government agencies supposed to be regulating the activity) have totally undermined my belief in this source of energy production.
At this point I would have to oppose any offshore drilling of any kind and support the strongest possible regulation of all existing drilling. I also support a substantial tax on imported oil in all forms.
Sunday, May 16, 2010
Robin Hood: Making It Real
I see Ridley Scott's "Robin Hood" as continuing the project he started with "Kingdom of Heaven" in 2005; the attempt to de-mystify the legends of the medieval age, putting the naked brutality, injustice, and cruelty of period in clear view. I would compare the project to modern Westerns like "Unforgiven" or "McCabe and Mrs. Miller" which convince us of their honesty through realism but have strong moral purpose.
Film allows total fancy and whimsy (for example the classic Errol Flynn version of "Robin Hood"), but it can also make things concrete. Scott makes every effort to put us into that bygone world and see what it was like. It was ugly and savage, but it was also a world in which people had aspirations for justice and liberty which have continuing meaning for us.
Scott places Robin Hood into a historical context which, if not factually accurate, at least gives a picture of the political realities of the times. For example, the Magna Carta--the movie shows accurately what brought it about; the same King John of the movie is the one who signed it, then repudiated it. On the other hand, he didn't burn it as in the movie (it's still around), and, of course, its provenance from Robin's father was invented for the movie. Another example: the heroic Richard the Lion Hearted really did order the execution of some thousands of hostages--men, women, and children--in Acre in the Holy Land during his Crusade; here Robin dares anger the King by rubbing his nose in it a bit.
So, it's serious, but also (much more than "Kingdom of Heaven") entertainment, with some good dialogue and more than a fair share of action.
Some of the casting was very good, I think, especially Max von Sydow as
Lady Marian's old, blind father, Danny Huston as King Richard the
Lion-Hearted, and Kevin Durand as a very different kind of Little John, the warrior. Also, writer Brian Helgeland invented some good anecdotes
of Robin's early associations with those who became his Merry Men, and came up with some straight-outta-modern dialogue between Robin and his lady as they initially battle, court (but not in the old-fashioned style), and love.
As for the leads, Cate Blanchett's portrayal reminds me of many other feisty, down-to-earth Englishwomen, and I think it will be very popular. Russell Crowe's Robin is not going to be such a crowd-pleaser, but I think he produced the performance that Scott wanted.
Film allows total fancy and whimsy (for example the classic Errol Flynn version of "Robin Hood"), but it can also make things concrete. Scott makes every effort to put us into that bygone world and see what it was like. It was ugly and savage, but it was also a world in which people had aspirations for justice and liberty which have continuing meaning for us.
Scott places Robin Hood into a historical context which, if not factually accurate, at least gives a picture of the political realities of the times. For example, the Magna Carta--the movie shows accurately what brought it about; the same King John of the movie is the one who signed it, then repudiated it. On the other hand, he didn't burn it as in the movie (it's still around), and, of course, its provenance from Robin's father was invented for the movie. Another example: the heroic Richard the Lion Hearted really did order the execution of some thousands of hostages--men, women, and children--in Acre in the Holy Land during his Crusade; here Robin dares anger the King by rubbing his nose in it a bit.
So, it's serious, but also (much more than "Kingdom of Heaven") entertainment, with some good dialogue and more than a fair share of action.
Some of the casting was very good, I think, especially Max von Sydow as
Lady Marian's old, blind father, Danny Huston as King Richard the
Lion-Hearted, and Kevin Durand as a very different kind of Little John, the warrior. Also, writer Brian Helgeland invented some good anecdotes
of Robin's early associations with those who became his Merry Men, and came up with some straight-outta-modern dialogue between Robin and his lady as they initially battle, court (but not in the old-fashioned style), and love.
As for the leads, Cate Blanchett's portrayal reminds me of many other feisty, down-to-earth Englishwomen, and I think it will be very popular. Russell Crowe's Robin is not going to be such a crowd-pleaser, but I think he produced the performance that Scott wanted.
Friday, May 07, 2010
Wall Street: WTF?
Yesterday's 15-minute cliff-dive of the stock markets sent a visible shiver through the financial houses. The rest of us won't be long in catching cold.
It's not clear to me whether the massive sell order which triggered the plunge was a human mistake or an intentional "mistake" from a panicky hedge fund, but the automated sell programs weren't waiting around to find out before pulling their own triggers. Fortunately, there were also a few programs around to snoop out buying opportunities at the moment--otherwise the fall could have continued, unarrested, and we'd be talking about "Black Thursday" forever more.
Clearly, there are more financial "weapons of mass destruction" than just derivatives and collateralized debt obligations. This episode reminded me of a couple of movies, in particular "Fail-Safe" and my all-time favorite, "Dr. Strangelove."
One can be sure that if the fall had not been corrected, it would be the retail investors, and not the big computerized trading firms, which would have had the naked positions, the stop-loss orders coming in about 15 minutes and $20/share late. This massive snafu will justifiably chill out those small-time, squeamish operators who can't afford to lose a million or two, like you and me.
Not that I'm pulling out my money now, since the real correction--driven by real corrective forces of weakness and fear--is in full erasure mode. If you're not in cash already, you're late.
As for gold, it's overpriced and, at the same time, much in demand. Justifiably so.
It's not clear to me whether the massive sell order which triggered the plunge was a human mistake or an intentional "mistake" from a panicky hedge fund, but the automated sell programs weren't waiting around to find out before pulling their own triggers. Fortunately, there were also a few programs around to snoop out buying opportunities at the moment--otherwise the fall could have continued, unarrested, and we'd be talking about "Black Thursday" forever more.
Clearly, there are more financial "weapons of mass destruction" than just derivatives and collateralized debt obligations. This episode reminded me of a couple of movies, in particular "Fail-Safe" and my all-time favorite, "Dr. Strangelove."
One can be sure that if the fall had not been corrected, it would be the retail investors, and not the big computerized trading firms, which would have had the naked positions, the stop-loss orders coming in about 15 minutes and $20/share late. This massive snafu will justifiably chill out those small-time, squeamish operators who can't afford to lose a million or two, like you and me.
Not that I'm pulling out my money now, since the real correction--driven by real corrective forces of weakness and fear--is in full erasure mode. If you're not in cash already, you're late.
As for gold, it's overpriced and, at the same time, much in demand. Justifiably so.
UK Postscript
As I write now (about 5 p.m. UK time), there are only two of 650 seats yet to be declared. The Conservatives have 305, Labour 258, the Liberal Democrats 57, and 28 went to other parties.
The big picture is that there is only one feasible coalition government, that of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. No other combination (except an unthinkable Labour-Conservative alliance) makes the math work for an actual majority. There are definite possible minority governments and combinations, which might require the passive support of either the regional nationalist parties or the Liberal Democrats themselves to survive for more than a few weeks.
This will take weeks, if not more, to emerge, and in the meantime Gordon Brown will stay in office. If the Conservatives' bid to ally with the Liberal Democrats fails, he will still get a chance--but the math suggests he would fall short (256+57+3 SDLP members from N. Ireland+1 Green party member=317 which is <325--actually the number might be 323, because of the 5 Sinn Fein deputies from Northern Ireland who won't be seated because they refuse to swear allegiance to the Queen; the equivalent calculation for the Conservatives, without the Lib Dems, is 305+8 Ulster Unionists).
The big news stories of the day are three:
1) The shift of some 5% from Labour to Conservative--this is about equivalent to the shift from the Republicans in 2004 to Democrats in 2008, with a similar, dramatic result in control (though the Conservatives must still consolidate it, they have it). Gordon Brown is likely finished as Labour leader, though that will await the conclusion of the political crisis.
2) The shortfall of the Liberal Democrats vs. the projections--they got about 1% more than five years ago, but five less seats. In the late going, it appears about one percent of their support went to Conservatives and one or two to Labour (they got some 3-5% less than the late national polls indicated). That made a huge difference, probably allowing Labour to prevent the Conservatives' winning an actual majority.
3) The question of electoral reform--this one has three parts, coming out of the elections:
For some, the relative defeat of the Liberal Democrats yesterday suggests that the voters don't want the change the LibDems want (to proportional representation, which would give the LibDems a huge boost, all things being equal: they got 23% of the votes and 9% of the seats). For the LibDems themselves, the results just prove the need for change.
To me, the best approach would be the "instant runoff", in which the voters rank their choices, and the losing candidates' voters second and subsequent choices are progressively reallocated until a candidate has a majority. I think this approach is consistent with British tradition and the political situation--in many districts, there is something like 30-50% for two major parties, and 10-20% for the third, so the decision would come down to the reallocation of the preferences of the third-place party's voters, which might make for more stable decisions supported by clear majorities. Proportional representation, on the other hand, seems doomed to defeat, and if the LibDems are gulled into a coalition with the Conservatives on the promise of a referendum "some time, though we won't necessarily support it", they will end up regretting it.
Interestingly, Gordon Brown supports something like the instant runoff, which is called the Australian system in Britain. If the negotiation between the Tories and LibDems founders on the electoral reform issue, there is a clear opportunity for agreement between Labour and the LD's. Just not a majority at the end of the discussion.
The big picture is that there is only one feasible coalition government, that of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. No other combination (except an unthinkable Labour-Conservative alliance) makes the math work for an actual majority. There are definite possible minority governments and combinations, which might require the passive support of either the regional nationalist parties or the Liberal Democrats themselves to survive for more than a few weeks.
This will take weeks, if not more, to emerge, and in the meantime Gordon Brown will stay in office. If the Conservatives' bid to ally with the Liberal Democrats fails, he will still get a chance--but the math suggests he would fall short (256+57+3 SDLP members from N. Ireland+1 Green party member=317 which is <325--actually the number might be 323, because of the 5 Sinn Fein deputies from Northern Ireland who won't be seated because they refuse to swear allegiance to the Queen; the equivalent calculation for the Conservatives, without the Lib Dems, is 305+8 Ulster Unionists).
The big news stories of the day are three:
1) The shift of some 5% from Labour to Conservative--this is about equivalent to the shift from the Republicans in 2004 to Democrats in 2008, with a similar, dramatic result in control (though the Conservatives must still consolidate it, they have it). Gordon Brown is likely finished as Labour leader, though that will await the conclusion of the political crisis.
2) The shortfall of the Liberal Democrats vs. the projections--they got about 1% more than five years ago, but five less seats. In the late going, it appears about one percent of their support went to Conservatives and one or two to Labour (they got some 3-5% less than the late national polls indicated). That made a huge difference, probably allowing Labour to prevent the Conservatives' winning an actual majority.
3) The question of electoral reform--this one has three parts, coming out of the elections:
a) people "queued" to vote were turned away--by law--at 10 p.m. in several precincts, and that seems improper and unfair to many;
b) the late, slow counting of votes has raised the notion that electronic voting might replace paper ballots (not that it will end ccntroversy about it, as we know);
c) the big issue of changing "FPTP" (First Past The Post, as they call it)--the system of one representative per district, largest number of votes wins.
For some, the relative defeat of the Liberal Democrats yesterday suggests that the voters don't want the change the LibDems want (to proportional representation, which would give the LibDems a huge boost, all things being equal: they got 23% of the votes and 9% of the seats). For the LibDems themselves, the results just prove the need for change.
To me, the best approach would be the "instant runoff", in which the voters rank their choices, and the losing candidates' voters second and subsequent choices are progressively reallocated until a candidate has a majority. I think this approach is consistent with British tradition and the political situation--in many districts, there is something like 30-50% for two major parties, and 10-20% for the third, so the decision would come down to the reallocation of the preferences of the third-place party's voters, which might make for more stable decisions supported by clear majorities. Proportional representation, on the other hand, seems doomed to defeat, and if the LibDems are gulled into a coalition with the Conservatives on the promise of a referendum "some time, though we won't necessarily support it", they will end up regretting it.
Interestingly, Gordon Brown supports something like the instant runoff, which is called the Australian system in Britain. If the negotiation between the Tories and LibDems founders on the electoral reform issue, there is a clear opportunity for agreement between Labour and the LD's. Just not a majority at the end of the discussion.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010
The Pendle Theory (UK election Preview IV)
As I said in my first preview posting, there are very few districts where there is a true three-way race (I've seen lately, the neologism--new word--for it is a "truel", or three-way duel). But I did find some.
Out of the 650 constituencies, I identified the one which appeared most like the national percentages in the 2005 election, and, to make things a bit more valuable for projection purposes, the boundaries of the district were not changed.
The constituency is called Pendle: it is in the county of Lancashire, in the northwest of England. It is a somewhat rural area near a heavily-populated strip, (near Manchester, Burnley, Blackburn). It is most known for a witchcraft trial in 1612, in which 10 were hanged (what, no burnings?)
The 2005 percentages (from electoralcalculus.co.uk): Labour 37.1%; Conservative 31.8%; Liberal 23.2; Other 8.0%. The projections, from the same source: Conservatives 35.1%, Liberal 27.9%, Labour 26.7%, Other 10.4. These projections are very, very close to those I'm seeing for the national popular vote.
The idea of looking at such a bellwether is to see whether the national opinion shifts are fully reflected in such a race (as opposed to, say, the Liberal Democrats improving a lot in districts where they have no chance to win, of which there are many). A theory that I subscribe somewhat to is that they may actually improve more in such a race--but remember that Labour has the incumbent.
I saw that the Pendle Council is offering to shoot out its results on Twitter and Facebook this year, so I've "friended" them, and will be looking for some results on Thursday.
If you don't like my choice of Pendle, here are some other three-sided constituency races worth looking at: Blackburn, Bristol Northwest, Leeds NorthEast, Northampton North, and especially Watford and Ealing Central and Acton.
Out of the 650 constituencies, I identified the one which appeared most like the national percentages in the 2005 election, and, to make things a bit more valuable for projection purposes, the boundaries of the district were not changed.
The constituency is called Pendle: it is in the county of Lancashire, in the northwest of England. It is a somewhat rural area near a heavily-populated strip, (near Manchester, Burnley, Blackburn). It is most known for a witchcraft trial in 1612, in which 10 were hanged (what, no burnings?)
The 2005 percentages (from electoralcalculus.co.uk): Labour 37.1%; Conservative 31.8%; Liberal 23.2; Other 8.0%. The projections, from the same source: Conservatives 35.1%, Liberal 27.9%, Labour 26.7%, Other 10.4. These projections are very, very close to those I'm seeing for the national popular vote.
The idea of looking at such a bellwether is to see whether the national opinion shifts are fully reflected in such a race (as opposed to, say, the Liberal Democrats improving a lot in districts where they have no chance to win, of which there are many). A theory that I subscribe somewhat to is that they may actually improve more in such a race--but remember that Labour has the incumbent.
I saw that the Pendle Council is offering to shoot out its results on Twitter and Facebook this year, so I've "friended" them, and will be looking for some results on Thursday.
If you don't like my choice of Pendle, here are some other three-sided constituency races worth looking at: Blackburn, Bristol Northwest, Leeds NorthEast, Northampton North, and especially Watford and Ealing Central and Acton.
Monday, May 03, 2010
UK Election Preview III: The Numbers
Unlike the US election in which we are polled and advertised to near-death, the UK election is over in a flash (this year, in three flashes called televised debates), so there is no chance to measure much change in momentum. While there is some attempt to take larger national polling samples that measure regional trends, sampling error on those has meant they haven't shown much clear movement, as opposed to some statistically significant shifts on the national level.
The state of the art in analysis is trying to infer changes in the national support levels for the major parties at the district ("constituency") level (where there is no polling data available). The Uniform Shift approach, which is predominant in English electoral analysis, takes the same percentage movement seen nationally and applies it to each district's race, which allows them to project the results for each and then aggregate to total party members elected. That's what all those "swingometers" (see also first preview) are about.
Our own Nate Silver (i.e., American) has brought his formidable analytical talents to the challenge and made an incremental improvement. Instead of a shift of X% of the total, he uses a matrix of From/To % shifts of their previous votes which add up to the desired national shifts. It also allows for a shift in the turnout (though he needs to guess where it goes), on the assumption that this more vigorously contested three-party battle will draw more voter interest. His findings are that the swingometers stickiness "in favour of Labour" is not justified, and that there could be a larger swing to the Conservatives than those methods predict, if there is a sufficient loss of vote level to Labour. His latest forecast is for the Conservatives to win 308 seats, to 198 for Labour and 113 for the LibDems (326 needed for a clear majority), with the popular vote going 35-27-28 (Cons.-Labour-LibDem); his forecast on the popular vote is in line with others', but he has the Conservatives further ahead with that margin.
The LibDems' surge has upset expectations that their ceiling is a mere 100 seats (about 15% of the total), even if they end up with something like 30% of the popular vote and ahead of Labour. Still, I have seen no projections anywhere that they can exceed 150 seats short of something totally unthinkable like their getting 40% of the vote.
The real crux of the matter, by all accounts, is still the relative position of the Conservatives vs. Labour. With even percentages, Labour gets more seats, and possibly a clear majority. More likely, based on the polling, Conservatives will lead Labour by 4-8%, but that range of variation allows for all the difference: if the Conservatives lead Labour by only 4% (say, 33-29), Labour will still likely have more seats, though not a majority; if the Conservatives lead by 8% (say 34-26), they will be at or very close to an absolute majority.
David Cameron is believed to have won the third debate, and the Conservatives were viewed by the polls to have a lead of about 6% over Labour going into that debate. Given that, the expectation now is that the Conservatives will have the most seats, and that they may be close to a majority. The LibDems may end up a couple of percent above Labour, but would (according to projections) have a lot less seats than them. This result will put the LibDems in a ticklish, and rather unfavorable position, in which they only have enough seats to help the Conservatives into power, either actively or passively.
At this point, though, nothing is certain. There could be a late move of support for any party, there could be some shifts due to "tactical voting" between LibDems and Labour (based on voters' expectations of the electoral chances of their local candidates), and the degree of turnout and its effect is very much uncertain. Parallel to the US electoral system, we can expect the Conservatives' turnout to be a given, with an increase in turnout likely to help either the LibDems, or Labour, or both. It is possible that the Conservatives will be short of a majority, but so close that minor and regional parties (such as Northern Ireland's Ulster Unionist Party) could put them over. Finally, local personalities figure prominently in voters' decisions, particularly when incumbents choose not to run again, and the effect of these changes is rarely considered in projections for individual seats.
There is a lot of betting in Britain on elections, something I have avoided looking at while doing these posts. I will take a look and post as comments, but here are my odds, and my bets:
Macro Election outcome: Conservative majority 30%; Labour majority 5%; LibDem majority 0%; LibDems hold margin to help either party to majority 20%; LibDems can help Labour only 5%; LibDems can help Conservatives only 40%.
This translates to my probabilities of the next Prime Minister: David Cameron 75%; Gordon Brown 15%; some other Labour leader 5%; Nick Clegg 5%.
My bet: Conservatives will hold a sufficient plurality (something like 290-230 over Labour) that LibDems, while technically able to help either party to a majority, will feel morally compelled to work with the Conservatives; they will choose to do so passively (a "minority government", in which the LibDems promise to abstain from opposing them in no confidence votes, short of a resolution to go to war) with the Conservatives promising a referendum (on proportional representation, which will not pass, by the way) in four years.
Postscript: I should mention the site electoralcalculus.co.uk, which makes projections seat-by-seat. They aggregate these into an overall projection, too, one that is not too different from others (297-235-86--Cons.-Labour-Libdem--in seats is their latest), but they also allow you to look up seat-by-seat and see what they think. Mostly, it's just a matter of "this seat is safe" or "this seat is definitely in play", but, I would argue, that's about as much as anyone else knows (except possibly a local insider, but that's not comprehensive across all seats).
The state of the art in analysis is trying to infer changes in the national support levels for the major parties at the district ("constituency") level (where there is no polling data available). The Uniform Shift approach, which is predominant in English electoral analysis, takes the same percentage movement seen nationally and applies it to each district's race, which allows them to project the results for each and then aggregate to total party members elected. That's what all those "swingometers" (see also first preview) are about.
Our own Nate Silver (i.e., American) has brought his formidable analytical talents to the challenge and made an incremental improvement. Instead of a shift of X% of the total, he uses a matrix of From/To % shifts of their previous votes which add up to the desired national shifts. It also allows for a shift in the turnout (though he needs to guess where it goes), on the assumption that this more vigorously contested three-party battle will draw more voter interest. His findings are that the swingometers stickiness "in favour of Labour" is not justified, and that there could be a larger swing to the Conservatives than those methods predict, if there is a sufficient loss of vote level to Labour. His latest forecast is for the Conservatives to win 308 seats, to 198 for Labour and 113 for the LibDems (326 needed for a clear majority), with the popular vote going 35-27-28 (Cons.-Labour-LibDem); his forecast on the popular vote is in line with others', but he has the Conservatives further ahead with that margin.
The LibDems' surge has upset expectations that their ceiling is a mere 100 seats (about 15% of the total), even if they end up with something like 30% of the popular vote and ahead of Labour. Still, I have seen no projections anywhere that they can exceed 150 seats short of something totally unthinkable like their getting 40% of the vote.
The real crux of the matter, by all accounts, is still the relative position of the Conservatives vs. Labour. With even percentages, Labour gets more seats, and possibly a clear majority. More likely, based on the polling, Conservatives will lead Labour by 4-8%, but that range of variation allows for all the difference: if the Conservatives lead Labour by only 4% (say, 33-29), Labour will still likely have more seats, though not a majority; if the Conservatives lead by 8% (say 34-26), they will be at or very close to an absolute majority.
David Cameron is believed to have won the third debate, and the Conservatives were viewed by the polls to have a lead of about 6% over Labour going into that debate. Given that, the expectation now is that the Conservatives will have the most seats, and that they may be close to a majority. The LibDems may end up a couple of percent above Labour, but would (according to projections) have a lot less seats than them. This result will put the LibDems in a ticklish, and rather unfavorable position, in which they only have enough seats to help the Conservatives into power, either actively or passively.
At this point, though, nothing is certain. There could be a late move of support for any party, there could be some shifts due to "tactical voting" between LibDems and Labour (based on voters' expectations of the electoral chances of their local candidates), and the degree of turnout and its effect is very much uncertain. Parallel to the US electoral system, we can expect the Conservatives' turnout to be a given, with an increase in turnout likely to help either the LibDems, or Labour, or both. It is possible that the Conservatives will be short of a majority, but so close that minor and regional parties (such as Northern Ireland's Ulster Unionist Party) could put them over. Finally, local personalities figure prominently in voters' decisions, particularly when incumbents choose not to run again, and the effect of these changes is rarely considered in projections for individual seats.
There is a lot of betting in Britain on elections, something I have avoided looking at while doing these posts. I will take a look and post as comments, but here are my odds, and my bets:
Macro Election outcome: Conservative majority 30%; Labour majority 5%; LibDem majority 0%; LibDems hold margin to help either party to majority 20%; LibDems can help Labour only 5%; LibDems can help Conservatives only 40%.
This translates to my probabilities of the next Prime Minister: David Cameron 75%; Gordon Brown 15%; some other Labour leader 5%; Nick Clegg 5%.
My bet: Conservatives will hold a sufficient plurality (something like 290-230 over Labour) that LibDems, while technically able to help either party to a majority, will feel morally compelled to work with the Conservatives; they will choose to do so passively (a "minority government", in which the LibDems promise to abstain from opposing them in no confidence votes, short of a resolution to go to war) with the Conservatives promising a referendum (on proportional representation, which will not pass, by the way) in four years.
Postscript: I should mention the site electoralcalculus.co.uk, which makes projections seat-by-seat. They aggregate these into an overall projection, too, one that is not too different from others (297-235-86--Cons.-Labour-Libdem--in seats is their latest), but they also allow you to look up seat-by-seat and see what they think. Mostly, it's just a matter of "this seat is safe" or "this seat is definitely in play", but, I would argue, that's about as much as anyone else knows (except possibly a local insider, but that's not comprehensive across all seats).
Saturday, May 01, 2010
UK Election Preview II: The Issues?
Thursday, May 6 is the finish line, election day, and the three major party leaders had their last debate (instant polls on that had Conservative party leader David Cameron "winning"). The results will come in very quickly; if there is no clear majority, though, the negotiations for a new government could go on for weeks or more.
One result that seems quite likely is a clear Conservative plurality (more seats than the other parties) without a majority, and no agreement for a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. In that case, there would be a lot of pressure for a minority government, in which the LibDems would agree not to vote against the Conservatives on key measures but would not participate in the governmental Cabinet. That would allow the moment to pass without major crisis, but would make for a fragile government, in which the LibDems could switch to opposition and bring down the government at any time.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. I promised a little discussion of the issues. Here are the four most salient emerging from the "manifestos" (platforms) of the parties and the highlights of the debates:
1) Gordon Brown--Yes or No?
This is the first general election since Tony Blair rode off and left New Labour's leadership and 10 Downing Street to his longtime Chancellor (roughly equivalent to our Treasury Secretary), Gordon Brown. Brown hasn't changed policies that much, but he doesn't have the personality, or oratorical brilliance, of Blair, and it's hurt (though Labour's popularity was already sagging before Blair left).
The voters seems to be looking for a new face, and they have two alternatives. LibDems' new leader Nick Clegg has been the sensation of the campaign, but that's largely because he wasn't known. There are a lot of similarities between Clegg and David Cameron, the Conservatives' new leader: both are upper-crusters (one's Oxford, one Cambridge, if that matters), wealthy, but with youthful energy and an ability not to seem like they are talking down to the public, something Brown hasn't quite mastered.
The Conservatives' strategy all along has been to make this a referendum on Brown, and they have largely stuck to that despite the rise of Clegg. Cameron's been making the argument that those who don't want Brown as PM any more had to vote for the Conservatives, implying that the LibDems would make a deal with Labour that would keep them in, but Clegg has countered that by saying he would not agree to a minority government headed by the party which finished third (that finish--in the popular vote--for Labour seems quite likely at this point, unless there is a late shift to them). Clegg would like to be in the catbird seat, with the option to give either party a majority--with his active support, rather than passively. That may not be an option,though, even if the numerical results put him in that mathematical position.
2) Foreign Policy, War, and the European Union
To an extent one might not consider possible, the Conservatives and Labour largely have the same positions: both supported the Iraq invasion (but would like to get out now), both are supporters of Britain's full participation in the EU (but not the Euro) on pragmatic arguments, both advocate replacing the British fleet of Trident submarines with newer models to keep their nuclear deterrent current.
The Liberal Democrats are the dovish party--one thing they are known for is their opposition to the Iraq invasion in 2003 (though it was fairly irrelevant to the actual decision). They oppose moving forward now with replacing the Trident (could that be more in line with the Obama Administration's position?) Clegg is a former Brussels bureaucrat and a fairly strong advocate for the EU (though it's not clear that is a material difference in position).
At this point I should stick in the parochial concerns of the US: we have none, basically--all three parties want to be the ones most loving and loved by the US, there is no anti-American party or anything like that (at least among the three top parties). If we did have some preference (for example, if the UK's development of a new submarine fleet were important to our defense posture, which I seriously doubt), we would be best advised to keep our mouths shut, and I'm sure that's what advice Obama will receive, and that's what he'll do. Just congratulate whoever on whatever. There is some evidence that there is some antipathy between Brown and Obama, but probably no more than between Brown and any other figure.
3) Economy, Budget, Etc.
I think Brown deserves more credit than he gets for acting forcefully and effectively when the economic crisis hit. The key move was essentially nationalizing the largest domestic bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, which was in danger of folding up from its losses with US mortgage obligations (the other, more international banks, Barclays, HSBC, and Standard Chartered, weathered the crisis very well and are doing well). Given those facts, the LibDems differing positions, that they would have nationalized the banks, don't seem that substantial.
Despite the good reactions, the economy in Britain is at least as bad as the US', and that has to make Brown an underdog to come out of this election still heading the government. Labour defends the current level of essential services like universal health care, and is proposing an unpopular increase in the tax which supports it. The Conservatives have come out for cuts in spending, while the LibDems, having the advantage of knowing they neither will be heading the government nor have to defend the status quo, naturally support services without tax increases.
There are gaps between the Conservatives and Labour on domestic policies, but the Conservatives are not arguing for major rollbacks in the welfare state--that would scare the voters. Instead, they are allowing voters to see them as not so different from the LibDems, for example in opposing the growth in power of the central government--in areas like the national identity card, which Labour has tried to push without any other party's support--except that they know how to govern (unlike the LibDems).
4) Election Reform
This is the Liberal Democrats' key issue, and some accommodation to them will be the price of forming a government for either Labour or the Conservatives, should they not be able to get an outright majority. The LibDems clearly will not get representation in Parliament to the level of their popular vote this time, and this has been their consistent problem over time. So they want a change in the system. Labour has been sympathetic, the Conservatives have not. A change might make the LibDems permanently a major contender for leadership in the government (which they have not been since the rise of Labour in the 1920's); Labour seem willing to gamble that they can make an enduring agreement with the LibDems, which, combined with some electoral reform, could keep the Conservatives out of power for another decade or more.
The Liberal Democrats would propose proportional representation, with seats being allocated in multi-seat "constituencies" according to their shares of the vote. The nature of the reform Labour would propose (through a referendum) would be something like an "instant runoff" (known as the "Australian system" in England), in which voters rank their preferences among candidates for Parliament, keeping the one member/one constituency system now in place. The votes for the candidate with the least would be allocated based on the second-choices, and so forth until a candidate has 50%+. This would keep things much as they are in much of Britain, where districts tend to be either LibDem vs. Conservatives (in the more rural areas) or Labour vs. Conservatives.
To me, this is the key issue actually in play: will the LibDems' numbers rise enough to make their active support critical (which will mean some softening of positions for the Conservatives, and accommodation from Labour), or will the Conservatives win a clear plurality (over Labour) or even a clear majority, in which case the LibDems' gambit for potency will have been thwarted?
So, it's really down to tactics and strategy, rather than policy. More still about this in Part III.
One result that seems quite likely is a clear Conservative plurality (more seats than the other parties) without a majority, and no agreement for a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. In that case, there would be a lot of pressure for a minority government, in which the LibDems would agree not to vote against the Conservatives on key measures but would not participate in the governmental Cabinet. That would allow the moment to pass without major crisis, but would make for a fragile government, in which the LibDems could switch to opposition and bring down the government at any time.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. I promised a little discussion of the issues. Here are the four most salient emerging from the "manifestos" (platforms) of the parties and the highlights of the debates:
1) Gordon Brown--Yes or No?
This is the first general election since Tony Blair rode off and left New Labour's leadership and 10 Downing Street to his longtime Chancellor (roughly equivalent to our Treasury Secretary), Gordon Brown. Brown hasn't changed policies that much, but he doesn't have the personality, or oratorical brilliance, of Blair, and it's hurt (though Labour's popularity was already sagging before Blair left).
The voters seems to be looking for a new face, and they have two alternatives. LibDems' new leader Nick Clegg has been the sensation of the campaign, but that's largely because he wasn't known. There are a lot of similarities between Clegg and David Cameron, the Conservatives' new leader: both are upper-crusters (one's Oxford, one Cambridge, if that matters), wealthy, but with youthful energy and an ability not to seem like they are talking down to the public, something Brown hasn't quite mastered.
The Conservatives' strategy all along has been to make this a referendum on Brown, and they have largely stuck to that despite the rise of Clegg. Cameron's been making the argument that those who don't want Brown as PM any more had to vote for the Conservatives, implying that the LibDems would make a deal with Labour that would keep them in, but Clegg has countered that by saying he would not agree to a minority government headed by the party which finished third (that finish--in the popular vote--for Labour seems quite likely at this point, unless there is a late shift to them). Clegg would like to be in the catbird seat, with the option to give either party a majority--with his active support, rather than passively. That may not be an option,though, even if the numerical results put him in that mathematical position.
2) Foreign Policy, War, and the European Union
To an extent one might not consider possible, the Conservatives and Labour largely have the same positions: both supported the Iraq invasion (but would like to get out now), both are supporters of Britain's full participation in the EU (but not the Euro) on pragmatic arguments, both advocate replacing the British fleet of Trident submarines with newer models to keep their nuclear deterrent current.
The Liberal Democrats are the dovish party--one thing they are known for is their opposition to the Iraq invasion in 2003 (though it was fairly irrelevant to the actual decision). They oppose moving forward now with replacing the Trident (could that be more in line with the Obama Administration's position?) Clegg is a former Brussels bureaucrat and a fairly strong advocate for the EU (though it's not clear that is a material difference in position).
At this point I should stick in the parochial concerns of the US: we have none, basically--all three parties want to be the ones most loving and loved by the US, there is no anti-American party or anything like that (at least among the three top parties). If we did have some preference (for example, if the UK's development of a new submarine fleet were important to our defense posture, which I seriously doubt), we would be best advised to keep our mouths shut, and I'm sure that's what advice Obama will receive, and that's what he'll do. Just congratulate whoever on whatever. There is some evidence that there is some antipathy between Brown and Obama, but probably no more than between Brown and any other figure.
3) Economy, Budget, Etc.
I think Brown deserves more credit than he gets for acting forcefully and effectively when the economic crisis hit. The key move was essentially nationalizing the largest domestic bank, the Royal Bank of Scotland, which was in danger of folding up from its losses with US mortgage obligations (the other, more international banks, Barclays, HSBC, and Standard Chartered, weathered the crisis very well and are doing well). Given those facts, the LibDems differing positions, that they would have nationalized the banks, don't seem that substantial.
Despite the good reactions, the economy in Britain is at least as bad as the US', and that has to make Brown an underdog to come out of this election still heading the government. Labour defends the current level of essential services like universal health care, and is proposing an unpopular increase in the tax which supports it. The Conservatives have come out for cuts in spending, while the LibDems, having the advantage of knowing they neither will be heading the government nor have to defend the status quo, naturally support services without tax increases.
There are gaps between the Conservatives and Labour on domestic policies, but the Conservatives are not arguing for major rollbacks in the welfare state--that would scare the voters. Instead, they are allowing voters to see them as not so different from the LibDems, for example in opposing the growth in power of the central government--in areas like the national identity card, which Labour has tried to push without any other party's support--except that they know how to govern (unlike the LibDems).
4) Election Reform
This is the Liberal Democrats' key issue, and some accommodation to them will be the price of forming a government for either Labour or the Conservatives, should they not be able to get an outright majority. The LibDems clearly will not get representation in Parliament to the level of their popular vote this time, and this has been their consistent problem over time. So they want a change in the system. Labour has been sympathetic, the Conservatives have not. A change might make the LibDems permanently a major contender for leadership in the government (which they have not been since the rise of Labour in the 1920's); Labour seem willing to gamble that they can make an enduring agreement with the LibDems, which, combined with some electoral reform, could keep the Conservatives out of power for another decade or more.
The Liberal Democrats would propose proportional representation, with seats being allocated in multi-seat "constituencies" according to their shares of the vote. The nature of the reform Labour would propose (through a referendum) would be something like an "instant runoff" (known as the "Australian system" in England), in which voters rank their preferences among candidates for Parliament, keeping the one member/one constituency system now in place. The votes for the candidate with the least would be allocated based on the second-choices, and so forth until a candidate has 50%+. This would keep things much as they are in much of Britain, where districts tend to be either LibDem vs. Conservatives (in the more rural areas) or Labour vs. Conservatives.
To me, this is the key issue actually in play: will the LibDems' numbers rise enough to make their active support critical (which will mean some softening of positions for the Conservatives, and accommodation from Labour), or will the Conservatives win a clear plurality (over Labour) or even a clear majority, in which case the LibDems' gambit for potency will have been thwarted?
So, it's really down to tactics and strategy, rather than policy. More still about this in Part III.
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